No. 35 January-March 1961


JESZCZE POLSKA NIE ZGINĘŁA
VYBICKI (1797)
h translation by P. SOBOLEWSKI (1860)
Maestoso M.M. ♩ = 92
Jesz - cze Pol ska nie z nę
While we live she e - ist -
Po ki my zy my
Po and is not fa - len
mf
Co nam ob - ca prze - moc wzię ła mo - cą od - bie - rze - my
We will win with swords re - sist - ing what the foe has sto - len
Marsz, marsz Dą row - ski do Pol - ski
March, march Do - mo - row - ski from I - ta - ly's plain
Za two-im prze - wo - dem zią-czym się z na - ro - dem. - ro - dem.
Our brethern shall meet us in Po-land a - gain. - gain.

SOVIET SURVEY

A Quarterly Review of Cultural Trends

POLAND

WARSAW NOTEBOOK

WHITE EAGLE TODAY AND YESTERDAY

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A Quarterly Review of Cultural Trends

No. 35 January-March 1961

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THE POLISH INTELLECTUAL CLIMATE

Leopold Labedz

RIEN ne dure que le provisoire, but how does the durability of the provisional affect its character, if not its stability? In looking back over four years of cultural developments in Poland since October 1956, one is struck by a basic underlying ambivalence, an ambivalence even more marked than in the political field and one which creates what may be called a ' schizophrenic situation ' for Polish intellectuals.

They resent the retreat from October, but at the same time are afraid to protest too much lest unwillingness to compromise endanger the remaining area of freedom that still distinguishes Poland from other ' popular democracies '. They are on the horns of a dilemma which is general, but which is particularly acute in the intellectual sphere. More than ever before they look towards the West as a source of cultural values and of creative intellectual activity, but they do not expect any political action by the West which could radically change their situation. The lessons of the 1944 Warsaw uprising and of Budapest 1956 have been thoroughly absorbed into the national psychology, on both the conscious and subconscious levels, and they create almost automatic inhibitions and conditioned reflexes.

Torn between history and geography, between culture and geopolitics, Polish intellectuals react in a way which is not really surprising in the light of Polish history and of the character of the communist domination they have to face (but few Western observers who understand the communist system also know Polish history, while Polish exiles seldom go beyond a stereotyped perception of communism). The consequences of this double involvement are for all to see. Never before have so many formulas been used so much in public which so few are ready to use in private. In Soviet Russia many intellectuals talk like *Pravda* editorials in private conversation; in Poland even high party officials do not use in private the official formulas from *Trybuna Ludu*.

The use once more in the printed word of official cant (' numb speech '), a corollary of party reconsolidation, was not accompanied to any appreciable degree by a revival of party ideology, of faith in the ' New Faith '. The situation is different from that under Stalinism, when a discrepancy between private feeling and official ideology could find no expression, and intellectuals had either to withdraw internally or repress their thoughts and rationalise their compromises. The end of terror made such reactions both less necessary and more difficult. Under Stalinism, Polish intellectuals saw in the world around them a gigantic drama or a grotesque tragedy. Now the proportions have been somewhat reduced: the level is often trivial rather than dramatic and the grotesque is merely farcical. Their own role, too, has been reduced and they are not taken all that seriously. On the one hand, this creates less tension, while the private outlets for frustration provide a safety valve, but on the other hand it can make the situation, in some respects at least, even more frustrating. This may sound paradoxical, but it is a definite impression gained from conversations with Polish intellectuals.

THE reasons are perhaps not so far to seek. First, there is the feeling of slipping from the centre of the stage into the backwater of humdrum, everyday compromise. Secondly, not only is the independent role of Gomulka's Poland (both in the world and in the Soviet bloc) dwindling; the contribution of the intellectuals to that independence is reduced to almost nil. Thirdly, although the sense of guilt in accepting intellectual compromise is now correspondingly smaller than in Stalin's time, when it involved an identification with obvious crimes, the price of these lesser compromises is now paid without the sense of guilt being repressed and without the feeling that it is absolutely unavoidable, that ' because of terror everybody else has to indulge in them too '.

Now every compromise involves agonising

appraisals and reappraisals, so there is much bitterness among the intellectuals and few of them come unscathed through the ordeal of having to face once again *la trahison des clercs.* Indeed, there is no more telling paradox than that presented by Polish intellectuals, who pretend to take the official claim that socialism is creating the ' new man ' at face value, and five minutes later loosen their tongues in describing their fellow-workers: it seems that while the ' new man ' is being created *in abstracto,* the flesh-and-blood acquaintances in any specific intellectual field are (close friends excepted) either knaves or fools. Jealousy and malice are of course universal phenomena, and nowhere more prevalent than in intellectual and academic life. But it is difficult to believe that in Gomulka's Poland they are so much more widespread than elsewhere, and that the Polish cultural elite is as scoundrelly as appears from the more candid conversations with both pro- and anti-regime intellectuals. It seems more likely that there are special external reasons for such vindictiveness, and these are deeply rooted in the general intellectual frustration. The connection between frustration and aggression is generally known: in this case, as critical discontent cannot be vented on general issues, it gets displaced into personal channels of verbal aggression.

There may also be other causes. Under Stalin, moral and intellectual choices were cut and dried and there was an air of total unreality about everything written: the line between the official ' truth ' and the individual's perception of what was happening was hard and fast. To get ' inside reality ' it was simply necessary to say ' the Emperor has no clothes ', to invert the party formulas which were not even tangential to reality. That is indeed what happened before October during the revolt of the intellectuals, when national and human feelings converged against foreign oppression parading as an indigenous revolution and against a dictatorship pretending to be a liberation.

Under Gomulka, despite continuous political regression, things are more complicated for the intellectuals. Notwithstanding the tightening of censorship there is no complete divorce from reality; the printed word, though heavily guarded and requiring official approval, conveys at least some individual perception. Every compromise, in addition to being justified in terms of national necessity, appears also as a matter of degree rather than of principle. But although the risks of non-conformism are smaller, and the price of compromise lower in terms of moral or intellectual revulsion, it may not always be subjectively easier to pay. Intellectual self-esteem may be more hurt if obedience is secured by a threat of dismissal or by some other form of administrative chicanery, than by a threat of arrest.

It is also more difficult for the intellectual to arrive at a balanced political judgment. It is no longer a question of rejecting a total lie, but of accommodating himself to a series of half-truths containing varying proportions of veracity and falsification. The divorce between the private and the public spheres of expression forces the intellectuals once again to take part in the general game of make-believe, pretending in public that they take for granted as self-evident certain taboos which they readily denounce in private. This necessity to walk in the shadow of falsehood, treading cautiously between fact and fiction, may be no less unbalancing, in some respects at least, than the old paranoia. It may even be that for some intellectuals practising *Ketman,* Stalin's black-and-white picture of the world might have been easier to shake off than Gomulka's *chiaroscuro.* They do not believe in it, but it is hard to dissociate from it.

IN general, however, the ' schizophrenic situation ' of Polish intellectuals differs not only from their earlier situation, but also from that of the Soviet cultural elite under Khrushchev, where intellectual *marranos* are few and far between. In Gomulka's Poland intellectuals face frustration but still retain some breathing space. The censorship is becoming more and more strict, but it is still possible to haggle with the censors and at times to strike some sort of a bargain. The scope of ' neutral ' subjects on which writers and scholars can write without ideological blinkers and self-censorship is greater than before October, despite regressive tendencies which restrict it.

On its part, the regime has found some compromise formulas to placate the intellectuals, measures serving as safety valves. One of them is the practice of ' limited editions ', i.e., the pub-

lication of certain works considered ideologically harmful in very small editions of a few hundred copies, so as to limit their influence to restricted circles of specialists and prevent them from reaching 'the masses'. The long-term effect of such operations may be less than satisfactory from the point of view of the regime, and it is therefore an open question whether they will continue. However, restrictions on freedom in Gomulka's Poland are always introduced gradually, and the party takes great care that they should not appear in a drastic form; infinite trouble is taken to save appearances.

This applies also to other 'intellectual conquests' of October. One of the most important among them for Polish writers and scholars was the new opportunity to resume cultural contacts with the West, to travel to France, Germany, Italy, Great Britain, and the United States, to study at Western universities and to re-establish academic exchanges. These activities were vigorously pursued after 1956, and, because of Polish currency restrictions, were in the great majority of cases made possible by the sympathetic and enlightened attitude of foreign institutions, universities, and foundations in providing grants for foreign travel and study. One can hardly overestimate the effect of these intellectual peregrinations on the mental make-up of the Polish cultural elite, in extending their knowledge, widening their horizons, and contributing to their polish—*le mot juste*—and sophistication.

The political dangers of fairly free cultural exchanges are only too obvious to the party *apparatchiki*, and for some time there has been a discreet tendency to increase control over them and to restrict them to the more reliable characters selected by the regime itself. Not long ago came the order to limit such travels, apart from approved exceptional cases, to three months. This would preclude the benefits derived from more serious studies, lasting at least an academic year, at foreign universities, studies which have enabled Polish social scientists, for instance, to fill the gaps in their knowledge resulting from years of Stalinist isolation. That currency difficulties are little more than a pretext can be seen from an article by Daniel Passent in the semi-official *Polityka* (12 November 1960). He complained that the number of students going abroad to study the humanities is too high (according to *Polityka* the Ford and Rockefeller foundations have given 483 grants to Polish students since 1957; 143 of them went to study the humanities), and that the representatives of the foundations 'have been guided by certain political considerations when distributing the grants'. This article was obviously an inspired reflection of the dispute going on between the Polish government and the two foundations. According to the Warsaw correspondent of the *New York Times*, the Polish authorities had long wished to control the selection of scholars for study in the West, and they have now restricted them to a list compiled by the Ministry of Higher Education, which has its own priorities. It is not yet known if candidates outside the official list will be able to obtain grants. Passent also complained that 'once the recipients of scholarships cross the border, they are left with virtually no supervision by the Polish authorities', and made a euphemistic allusion to 'the geography of travels' (in 1959, 47 per cent of the travelling scholars went to 'capitalist countries'). He therefore proposed that the selection should be made with the participation of the 'social agencies' (i.e., of the party representatives), and that 'the attitudes of our scholarship-holders abroad should be examined more closely, using for this purpose the cultural attachés of our diplomatic missions'.

OFFICIAL policy towards foreign publications remains erratic, though it too has gradually become stricter about their importation. This applies not only to journals and magazines, but also to Western books, plays, and films; the line is far from consistent and periods of tightening are followed by some relaxation, which does not however go so far as to restore the previous position.

Domestic publications are generally becoming duller and duller *pari passu* with the return of party control, but here also the situation is slightly more complex than a simple orthogenetic view of the post-October regression might suggest. Although the content of the press has gradually been emptied of independent views, care was taken to preserve a more lively form of presentation. While the popular press and literary weeklies have been falling into the

torpor of party uniformity (and losing their readership), they have gone out of their way to compensate for colourlessness by special efforts to improve presentation and by pushing, somewhat shyly, what in the West is called 'the human-interest angle'. The more specialised periodicals have been less affected by party interference, being more esoteric and limited in circulation, and have therefore retained more interest for their special categories of readers.

The intellectuals react in a number of ways, which can still be glimpsed in the press, even though they sometimes come through only negatively. Among the typical kinds of reaction one may perhaps single out the most prevalent. These can be termed, somewhat flippantly, the abstentionist, the evasive, the ethnocentric, the historiosophical, and the jocular. They exist side by side and also of course in mixed form. But although the proportions of the ingredients vary, taken together they make up a pretty comprehensive syndrome covering the attitudes of recalcitrant Polish intellectuals.

THE abstentionist reaction involves a conscious withdrawal from politics, an attitude most common among the youngest generation. It has a dual origin in the revulsion against politics of those who regard it as a dirty game in any circumstances, and of those who feel that politics are beyond control and therefore can bring only further personal disappointments. The result is concentration on personal affairs.

The reaction of evasion is related, but in principle very different. It consists of a temporary avoidance of politics as a matter of expediency rather than by preference, refraining from active political involvement because 'at the moment nothing can be done' and the best thing is to try to avoid politically unpleasant repercussions by concentrating on relatively 'safe' intellectual activities involving fewer risks of censorship and official disapproval. This attitude may also be connected with the ideology of Polish neopositivism, laying great store on 'organic work' and on the need to preserve intellectual standards. The optimists believe that such standards will survive anyway, the pessimists stress the need for outside help. Neither are really apolitical; both aim at a sort of historical waiting game, *la politique à longue haleine.*

The ethnocentric reaction is perhaps the most pervasive. It can be summed up in the extraordinarily strong tendency to relate every problem in almost any intellectual discussion, to Poland's national quandary. 'The elephant and the Polish question' has of course a long tradition in the history of Polish misfortunes, but it was never more prevalent than today. The point can hardly be over-emphasised.

The historiosophical reaction, unlike the ethnocentric one, does not look for precedents in Polish history of the nineteenth century, but in universal history, in order to arrive at some general conclusions on the ideological or ethical plane. The ethnocentric reaction can be best understood from Mr Jelenski's article. The other type of reaction can be illustrated here.

Leszek Kolakowski, once the spiritual leader of the Polish revisionists, reflects on the dialectical relationship between 'Orthodoxy and Heresy' in a chapter, so entitled, of his study of some Dutch heretics of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[1] He analyses the theological doctrine of Dirk Camphuysen as criticism of the ecclesiastical attitude developed in the Protestant churches after the Reformation, which made a new orthodoxy out of the old heresy. This serves as an opportunity for more general reflections:

> The assertion that heresy is a transgression beyond orthodoxy and can be defined as its function is historically false unless it is supplemented by the contrary assertion that orthodoxy is the function of heresy. The history of organised religious doctrines seems to suggest that the question of the priority of orthodoxy *vis-à-vis* heresy is of the hen-and-egg variety. If the concept of heresy is meaningless unless related to orthodoxy, orthodoxy itself 'becomes' orthodoxy, constitutes itself, and consolidates itself as a function of heresy.

Whatever the merits of this particular historical disquisition, it is clear that by looking at the past, Kolakowski, like other ex-revisionists, is trying to locate himself historically *vis-à-vis* the Gomulka regime and its newly reconsolidated orthodoxy. It is difficult not to

[1] 'Dirk Camphuysen and the sources of non-denominational religiosity', in *Archiwum Historii Filozofii i Mysli Spolecznej* (1960, 6).

detect contemporary undertones in his conclusion: 'The thought of Camphuysen is therefore the thought of Erasmus after a century of disappointments'.

ANOTHER representative of the disappointed generation, the literary critic Andrzej Kijowski, indulges in melancholy musings as he reads the secret correspondence of Mirabeau:[2]

> Mirabeau was an open believer in constitutional monarchy, but he did not limit his activity to speeches in the National Assembly: he was a paid agent of the court. He had no monarchic illusions, he knew that all the limited foundations of the royal power were destroyed. But he did not share the illusions of those others who were wasting their breath in the Assembly in an attempt to shape the republic. He knew the mechanism of power, and knew that it would be taken neither by those entitled to it by tradition, nor by those who presented the most reasonable principles for its exercise. He saw the new forces released by the revolution. He wrote: 'Public opinion has destroyed everything'. Hence the conclusion: 'It is therefore necessary to direct public opinion'.

Once again, it seems that more than a purely historical interest prompts such reflections. And this comes out quite clearly in Kijowski's conclusions:

> I am passionately interested in all those historical moments which constitute *expectations*, all the political 'eves'. I am passionately curious about those who at such moments lie, either in good or bad faith, about those who do not understand anything, as well as those who know everything but nevertheless tell the truth. . . . Is the situation ever so obvious that nobody talks nonsense? Has any monarch or any government had a minister of propaganda who was equal to his task at the moment of crisis? Can a change of label save the state, or a change of style change the culture? Is there anything to save in history? Perhaps only the traitors understand history well.

THE relation between humour and politics is far from simple, and so is that between humour and hypocrisy. If hypocrisy is the tribute paid by virtue to vice, political jokes and political satire are the inevitable concomitant of authoritarian regimes. Complete freedom is not the most favourable ground for political satire, which thrives on indignation. Neither is complete slavery. In a fully-fledged totalitarian state, which is an example of such extreme conditions, satire disappears completely, and only a sort of *Galgenhumor* remains in which the intellectual desperadoes relieve their gloom by exchanging jokes; the classical type was the one circulating in the Stalin era about a state competition for the best joke (first prize: 20 years). As Poland emerged from the depths after Stalin's death, political jokes and political satire came into their own.

Their number and character were not directly correlated with the relative intensity or relaxation of political pressures at any given time. There is of course a connection, but it is an indirect one. With the gradual improvement of political conditions until shortly after October 1956, the wave of political jokes subsided, but political satire emerged triumphantly in the columns of the hitherto moribund satirical weekly, *Szpilki*, in the students' theatres, in the press, and on the stage. On the other hand, after Gomulka's reconsolidation, satirical performances, now more and more subject to the heavy hand of the censor, lost their initial impetus, but political jokes, spreading with the speed of bush-telegraph from mouth to mouth, became once again a widespread phenomenon.

This is not surprising. 'If men tire of kings and priests, dictatorships and democracies, authority and freedom, it is because the officials themselves have become Pharisees.'[3] Under Gomulka, who seems to have no sense of humour, the party has once again raised euphemism to the rank of a national virtue, so that once again there is a temptation to unmask the Pharisees and to debunk the euphemism. Intellectuals naturally fall for this temptation and still have some opportunities to do so. This constitutes the fifth and 'jocular' reaction. And this is how it is described in the Warsaw *Przeglad Kulturalny* (15 September 1960):

> We have the most serious literature in the world, perhaps because the spiritual life of

[2] *Przeglad Kulturalny*, 10 November 1960.

[3] E. J. Oliver, *Hypocrisy and Humour* (London, 1960), p. 85.

the whole nation is based on jokes. Who in Poland does not find compensating outlets in jokes? There are no such people. Even those whom God deprived of the sense of humour pretend, because they must, that they appreciate jokes. Jokes have become a form of spiritual life. They join people into a community, they fraternise and unite everybody. I do not know if culture has become a common good in Poland, but I do know for sure that jokes have become such a universal good.

ALTHOUGH Poland is not exactly a sort of latter-day Austria-Hungary, with officials more annoying than harmful, the opportunities for such ' jocular reactions ' among the intellectuals still exist. A kind of Polish Roda-Roda and Jaroslav Hasek rolled into one is the young satirist Slavomir Mrozek, the author of the collections of short stories, *The Elephant, The Wedding in the Village Atomice, The Progressive Man,* and of the comedy *The Policemen,* some of which have been translated into English, French, and German. Recently there has been a certain shift in Mrozek's writings from satire to literary parody and pure humour. That has not prevented occasional troubles with the censor; recently he wrote a skit on the leading member of the former Natolin group, the celebrated Stalinist, General Witaszewski, commonly known as ' General Gaspipe.' (Before October Witaszewski appealed to a meeting of workers to break the heads of troublesome intellectuals with gaspipes.) After the General's reinstatement, Mrozek wrote a perfectly innocent story about a young boy with a strange addiction to gaspipes . . .

Another example of the jocular reaction taking a satirical form is the recent film ' Bad Luck ' by one of the leaders of the Polish ' new wave ', Andrzej Munk. It is a savage satire on both the pre-war and post-war political regimes; it got into trouble, and was refused release. Only after several scenes had been cut and the ending changed was it finally shown to Polish and then to foreign audiences. The hero, a petty opportunist who does his best to adjust himself to circumstances, is consistently unlucky and never makes progress in his career despite all his unsavoury efforts. The zealous party critics were not slow to detect a certain ambiguity in the film's attitude towards the hero; he is hardly a model of civic conscience, and that may be understandable in a capitalist state, but must be deplored in a socialist one.

This concern with civic virtue can perhaps be best understood in the light of the reaction to the performance of the American actor, Hal Holbrook, impersonating Mark Twain before a Warsaw audience. The loudest applause was given to Mark Twain's defence of lying: ' If governments spend all their time telling big lies, why shouldn't I tell an occasional white lie, especially in my own self-interest? '

WHAT is the cultural policy which produces such reactions? Official cultural policy since the reconsolidation, i.e., in the last three years, can be conveniently divided into two parts: the one dealing with governmental policy *vis-à-vis* the intellectuals and their more highbrow culture, and the other with policy *vis-à-vis* mass-culture. There are of course areas on the borderline or outside this division, but by and large it provides a simple framework within which to review the general field of cultural policy, particularly as there are indications that the party itself was influenced in its decisions by this distinction much more than in the Stalinist period.

The first category includes such items as the policy on the sciences, on higher education, on literary publications and the arts, and on cultural freedom in general (including access to foreign sources).

The second category covers educational policy at the pre-university level, policy *vis-à-vis* the mass-media, and, last but not least in Poland, the policy towards religion. Here we shall deal only with the first category.

Party policy on the sciences since October shows fairly definite tendencies which can be summarised as follows:

The natural sciences, generally speaking, have been liberated from ideological shackles. The situation here was stabilised, and post-October normalisation has not been upset by any marked tendency to revert to an ideocratic tutelage. Where the party retains its control over matters affecting science (financing, appointments, etc.), it does not go far beyond what is normally expected in the kind of bureaucratic structure in

which science inevitably finds itself today because of the need for outside patronage.

In the social sciences, which are of course ideologically much more sensitive, there is a clear retreat from the 'liberal' apogee of 1956–57, when freedom of thought was at its maximum, and psychology and history, sociology and economics enjoyed a marked revival. The party clearly realised that further uncontrolled developments in these disciplines would have an even greater corrosive effect on the doctrinal basis of Marxism-Leninism, and therefore took steps to put an end to 'methodological nihilism'. Professor Henryk Jablonski, the secretary of the Polish Academy of Sciences (and a faithful instrument of party control), denounced the 'servile attitude towards Western science and the disdainful one towards Soviet science' among Polish scientists, in his speech at the eighth general meeting of the Academy.[4] Gomulka himself, in his address to its Presidium in May 1960, said:[5]

> The social sciences in some degree are developing differently from other sciences, such as the natural sciences . . . because important work in this field is done by the party in order to direct the life of the nation correctly. Therefore the theoretical activity of the international revolutionary movement, including that of our party, has great scientific and heuristic importance. It is decisive for many basic branches of social science, such as philosophy, sociology, and political economy. Hence it is impossible to cultivate the social sciences fruitfully without fully absorbing the results of this scientific-heuristic activity of the revolutionary working-class movement, without uniting our efforts with this activity.
>
> Great harm was done to the development of the social sciences in our country by those scientific workers who denied the scientific value of the theoretical views developed by our party and by the international communist movement, on basic social, economic and cultural problems, and who advanced revisionist theories, nonsensical considerations of 'institutional Marxism', and the old, discredited social-democratic theories in opposition to the Marxist-Leninist position represented by our party. . . . The social scientists should be of great help to the party, enrich its theory and its knowledge of social reality, and share in the formation of its policy. But they can do so only if they are guided in their work by the theory and method of Marxism-Leninism, and draw their inspiration from the position and the activity of the party.

IN line with this attitude, great efforts were made to reintroduce into the universities the discredited courses on Marxism-Leninism. Here the party encountered not only the silent resistance of the academic community, but also technical difficulties in the shape of lack of reliable cadres to run the courses. (Most of the convinced Marxists went 'revisionist' in October; those who did not are in the majority of cases at such a low intellectual level that they would do the party more harm than good in the universities.) Efforts are being made to overcome this shortage, and the head of the High School of Social Sciences attached to the Party Central Committee reported with satisfaction in the party's theoretical organ *Nowe Drogi* (November 1960) that during the last three years fourteen of its students had received doctor's degrees (it has 402 students in all).

All the factors affecting the party's attitude towards the social sciences are operative, to a greater or less degree, in the field of humanities as well.

The policy on higher education is connected with the party's attitude to these various disciplines. There has been a tendency to reduce the number of higher educational establishments and to stabilise them at a lower though perhaps better level. (Their number fell from 84 in 1954 to 76 in 1958, and the number of students from 143,000 to 119,000.)[6] The present framework for party policy in the universities was adopted in November 1958, when the new decree on higher education was introduced.[7] It was strongly resisted by the academic representatives, as it once again limited the traditional autonomy of the Polish universities which they tried to reconquer in October 1956; it limits the prerogatives of the academic bodies (such as university councils), and gives the Minister of Higher

[4] *Nauka Polska*, 1958, 3.
[5] *Trybuna Ludu*, 29 May 1960.
[6] *Rocznik Statystyczny* (Warsaw, 1958), p. 402; *Concise Statistical Yearbook of the Polish People's Republic* (Warsaw, 1959), p. 145.
[7] *Dziennik Ustaw PRL*, 1958, No. 68.

Education the right to veto their decisions (for instance in university appointments). It also gives him a great many positive powers, amounting to virtual control over the universities (curricula, direction of research, administrative and financial arrangements, staff policy, etc.). The new decree does not revert to the Stalinist framework introduced in December 1951[8] (it shows some signs of compromise in its restoration of extra-university controls), but it is contrary to the spirit of the liberal additions to the 1951 decree adopted in September 1956.[9] At the same time, in November 1958, changes were made in the policy of grants, which according to the Minister had previously had an incorrect philanthropic bias; scholarships had been awarded 'both to those students who were socially active in the spirit of socialism and to those whose activity was hostile to socialism'.

Both these measures gave the party powerful instruments of pressure on scholars and students. To be fair in comparing the pre-October and post-October educational policy, one must of course take into account not only the institutional framework established by the decrees, but their actual implementation. So far they have been operated with a certain degree of restraint, in contrast to Stalinist practice. However, the instruments of control, pressure, and intimidation have been re-established and can be used in case of political necessity.

IN the field of literature the writers held their own until December 1959, when a new presidium of the Writers Union was elected under party pressure at the annual Writers Congress held in Warsaw. The presidium now includes some of the zealots discredited in the Stalinist period, such as Kruczkowski and Putrament (called Gabriele Denunzio in Poland); it is difficult to know whether the outgoing President Slonimski who agreed to remain in the Presidium and the new one, Iwaszkiewicz, who is a past master of adjustment, will have many possibilities open for some sort of compromise.

One such opportunity was presented to the congress by the main speaker, the ex-Minister of Higher Education, Zolkiewski, who tried to rehabilitate 'socialist realism' in literature by using the term to cover such writers as Brecht and Gide, the young Ehrenburg and Butor. He asserted that 'the political inspiration of the party is indispensable to writers'; but these appeals generally fall on deaf ears and make little change in general literary attitudes. The censorship can prevent some works from appearing, and persuade authors to modify others, but it cannot positively induce them to write again in the 'socialist realist' style. Like the 'New Faith' as a whole, socialist realism is dead in Poland. The Minister of Culture Galinski writing in *World Marxist Review* (November 1960, p. 60), complained that 'the changes effected in our cultural work after the eighth plenary meeting of the Central Committee did not bring results straight away and were not immediately understood by all'.

What party pressure could and did achieve by control and censorship was to deprive the literary weeklies of much of the interest and vitality they regained shortly before October. Gradually, by banning some papers and establishing others, and by changing editorial boards, it contributed to the general dullness of literary periodicals (with some honourable exceptions); boredom and verbosity once again reign in their columns. In 1957 the circulation of *Przeglad Kulturalny* was 75,000; in 1959, 26,000; that of *Nowa Kultura* has fallen during that time from 52,000 to 22,000. The literary supplement to the party organ, *Trybuna Ludu*, established under the title *Trybuna Literacka* when the party found itself deserted by the writers, was so boring (it was filled by the third-rate scribes) that it had to be liquidated in April 1959.

In this field, as in the field of cultural freedom in general (including foreign contacts), not all the loopholes have been closed, but Polish writers and intellectuals have to look hard for the few that remain. Foreign trips are becoming more and more a prize for good behaviour, and recently several scholars were refused permission to attend scientific functions and international conferences abroad.

What then, in the light of this brief review of the Polish cultural scene since the consolidation of the Gomulka regime, are the prospects for the future?

It seems that a sort of uneasy equilibrium has been reached in which the intellectuals find

[8] *Ibid.*, 1952, No. 6.
[9] *Ibid.*, 1956, No. 41.

themselves increasingly uncomfortable, but in which the party is also unlikely to go beyond certain limits. Each blow has to be softened; policy in this respect is not simply one of straightforward repression and dictation, but a tangled, complicated, and not always consistent maze of moves and acts. The *apparatchiki,* pushed by the logic of power, which they exercise against the will of the population but with its temporary tacit consent, find themselves affected by the milieux in which they operate. Of these, intellectuals, writers, scholars, and artists are perhaps the most difficult to mould; having survived the Stalinist repression, they are unlikely to be culturally transformed by Gomulka's incomparably milder policy of cultural restraints and pressures, however annoying. In comparison with the 'previous period' they seem mere pinpricks (although of course they are much more than that), and it is unlikely that they will have any more lasting effect on cultural attitudes than the preceding policies.

Moreover, the post-October tightening of controls over culture may have one unintended effect. Since—unlike Stalinist practice—it consists of half-measures, it leaves a wider margin for adjustment. It may have forced the intellectuals out of the field of current policy and left them few opportunities for influencing the contemporary scene in a direct way. But, by the same token, it has forced them to concentrate on long-range possibilities while there is still breathing space to work on them. This may contribute more in the long run to the preservation of the traditionally Western cultural patterns in Poland than a temporarily futile political activity. A solid work in any intellectual field (which does not reach the 'masses') may have little immediate effect, but it is bound to maintain the standards which ultimately decide what the cultural profile of the nation is going to be.

In this respect, the burden of the preservation of these standards and values rests on the older and the middle-aged intellectuals. The former fulfilled this task under Stalin and, as October showed, they were successful in passing them on. The danger of a break in continuity now turns, of course, on the youngest generation, politically apathetic, ideologically disappointed, and often amazingly ignorant. Therefore the older Polish intellectuals, instruments of the transmission of Western standards in a country of Eastern Europe, need as much help from outside, from the West, as possible. It should be remembered that political change may be difficult, but cultural change is even more difficult, as nations do not easily give up their cultural identity.

WHITE EAGLE TODAY AND YESTERDAY

K. A. Jelenski

FOUR years have elapsed since the 'Revolution of October'. The hopes of the revisionists have long been dead: the 'co-existence' of the divergent philosophic attitudes is badly strained. The opportunities for an objective study of Polish realities promised by the new upsurge of sociology, have become restricted to a few university circles working behind closed doors and without adequate means of research. Polish economists have been unable to apply their new ideas to an industrial machine running in bureaucratic grooves and subjected to political requirements. The government once again expects artists and writers to supply a 'socialist realism' which hardly dares utter its name, but now it is the carrot that is brandished rather than the stick. Writers and painters still sulk under this discredited conformism, but their hearts are no longer in the new experiments that they once projected into an open future. If the citizens are no longer much afraid of the police, the police have nothing at all to fear from the citizens.

For all that, Poland is the only satellite country that has managed to create and to preserve conditions for convergence between the 'legal country'—the statutory power expressing itself throughout the institutions as a whole—and the 'real country', the economic and social, the political and religious forces of the nation. The October 'Revolution' of 1956 was the culminating point of this convergence. The peculiar features of the present Polish phenomenon express an underlying—and tolerated—contradiction between the ideas and the institutions, a compromise between the spontaneous energies of the nation and the facts of the regime. It is a tacit compromise, accepted after the apparent victory of freedom over the regime, in order to safeguard, against the Soviet menace, the essentials of what had been won.

There is a tendency, in the West, to see this situation as wholly novel, to consider it only in relation to the Stalinist past. But, important though the Polish development may be, as the possible precursor of a post-Stalinist Eastern Europe, it has antecedents in a more distant past. And it is in that perspective that we now propose to view the paradoxes that preside over Poland's present destiny.

OUR Western friends, or even Polish exiles when they return from the Poland of today, show signs of a number of preconceived ideas which have falsified their judgments, and which those whom they talked with in Poland did not take the trouble to correct, either from indolence, or national solidarity, or doctrinaire spirit. For example:

> The Poles are a heroic people, prone to rash revolts, devoted to anarchy at home and to struggle with powerful neighbours abroad. However can they suddenly have shown themselves so reasonable, so ready to accept 'Reasons of State'?
>
> The Polish Right has always been nationalist, and intransigently opposed to foreign oppression.
>
> The Poles are a profoundly religious people.
>
> Pilsudski was a man of the Right, corresponding to Horthy in Hungary.
>
> In 1919, Poland took part in the aggression against the USSR, with counter-revolutionary intentions.
>
> In 1945, Poland underwent a revolutionary transformation.

These affirmations, and a good many others, are some of them half-truths and some the reverse of the truth: let us therefore approach the Polish question by taking a few soundings in the past; not so much with the aim of presenting a coherent picture, as to expose the mass of contradictions that have to be taken into account. Here are some of them:

> The people, who by an overwhelming majority are against the present regime, support it against their will, and recognise themselves in it.

A regime committed to the international communist ideology was driven, in 1956, to assert its national independence against the USSR, to which it owed its power.

One of the main reasons why the Poles support Gomulka and his policy of alliance with the USSR is what they have at stake in the western territories and the Oder-Neisse frontier. Yet those territories represent the realisation of a dream which, before the war, was entertained only in the traditions of the extreme Right.

Poland, in a state of arrested evolution, is brooding over its historic past. In this reverie, the shades of Wielopolski, of Pilsudski and others are called upon to play surprising and contradictory parts.

The key word in Gomulka's Poland is ' Reasons of State '. It is in the name of this consideration that the anti-communist Poles voted for the lists drawn up by Gomulka for the elections of January 1957. And it is, at bottom, for these same reasons of state that there is a tacit understanding between the people and Gomulka, for he alone enjoys the confidence of Khrushchev and can safeguard the essential conquests of October 1956—the de-collectivisation of the farm lands, the truce with the Church, the end of domination by the police.

The political sagacity of which the Poles have thus given proof has aroused some astonishment in Western observers. For the conventional idea of the Poles is that they are a ' nation-mad ' people, given to deeds that are perhaps heroic, but senseless.

In fact, the two tendencies of ' senseless rebellion ' and of political compromise have co-existed—or succeeded one another—all through the history of Poland in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. ' Reasons of State ' do not date from yesterday, even in Poland. What is well worthy of note, however, is that the appeal to ' Reasons of State ' in Poland is traditionally characteristic of the Polish Right; that is, it is by working on the historic reflexes of the Right, and referring back to the examples of statesmen of the Right, that the average Pole rationalises his approbation of Gomulka.

Up to the end of the nineteenth century, Polish historians used to present an idealised version of the history of their country prior to the Partitions. The *Res Publica* of nobles (one million out of 18 million inhabitants) was supposed to embody an ideal of tolerance, liberty, and justice. Whatever was ' national ' was good; only ' foreign influences ' were bad: and this arcadian Sparta (the Polish nobleman saw himself as a Cato in a landscape of the Georgics) perished only because of a conspiracy of the wicked. Further to reinforce the good conscience of the Poles, the three empires which partitioned their country were all reactionary and autocratic; whence the conclusion that their alliance was a plot against the Polish ' ideal of liberty '. This conception survived throughout the Romantic period, and found its extreme expression in the ' messianic ' idea of Mickiewicz, who exalted Poland as ' the Christ of the nations '. It became confused in the course of the nineteenth century with the liberal ideal of the Springtide of the Peoples. It tended to neglect the elements of external politics and the primordial fact that Poland is situated between Germany and Russia; the messianic dreams about a divine justice and the liberal ideas of progress helped to confirm the Poles in an intransigent revolt against all their oppressors. All Polish insurrections have been marked by this hope of conquering in spite of the disparity of forces—a hope that has sometimes bordered on the absurd, as in 1846 at Cracow, when an army of 600 men declared war on Russia, Prussia, and Austria, all at once.

IT was against this idealistic nationalism that there arose, towards the end of the nineteenth century, a group of historians, jurists, men of politics and conservative journalists, all working in Cracow under the Habsburg monarchy, in favour of a ' realistic ' conception of collaboration with the occupying powers. A great historical painting by Matejko, the Polish Meissonier, represented *The Prussians' Homage* —the ceremony that marked the secularisation of the Teutonic Order. The last Grand Master, Albrecht Hohenzollern, is kneeling before King Sigismund I of Poland to acknowledge him as sovereign while all the Polish nobility stand around radiant with joy: only the king's fool, Stanczyk, is gazing pensively into space. The contemporaries of Matejko interpreted this as

proof of a political intention: Stanczyk, they said, in his red cap and bells, foresaw the Prussian Empire which was being born at the moment of this ceremony. The realists of Cracow borrowed his name; it was as 'the Stanczyks' that they set out to revise the history of Poland and drew new lessons from it. These men of the 'Cracow School'—aristocrats or literary members of the upper bourgeoisie, imbued with a conservative liberalism—were never popular with their compatriots, who quickly forgot even their names. Nevertheless, it is to them that modern Polish historiography owes its beginnings, and above all the verdict that any Polish foreign policy must take that country's geographical position into account.

The historian Bobrzynski, the most influential member of the Cracow school, discredited one by one all the myths ascribed to Poland before the Partitions. Are the Poles proud of the religious tolerance of their ancestors in the sixteenth century, when the rest of Europe was plunged into the religious wars? That is an anachronism, said Bobrzynski; not even the idea of toleration existed in Poland, nor anywhere else, before the eighteenth century. If the Poles did not persecute the Calvinists or the Arians, that was simply because the central power was paralysed, and the nobles were indifferent to any general ideas. The freedom of the Polish *Res Publica*, its democratic character? The votes of the nobles were all for sale to the highest bidder; their democracy was no more than a name for the rivalries of the big feudal chiefs. The morals of the Polish nobles were pure, they were generous and uncompromising? What nonsense! cries Bobrzynski; let us rather enquire why every scheme of reform failed because they refused to pay the taxes. And it is to the Poles themselves, their anarchy and their hatred of any strong central power, that the school of Cracow ascribed responsibility for the partition of Poland.

The myth of Polish innocence—the messianic myth—having been dispelled, it is in political terms that the history of Poland has to be studied. Here the school of Cracow brought about an inversion of values. For the Polish patriots it was Kosciuszko, with his peasants armed with scythes, who was the hero of the epoch of the Partitions, whilst the great criminal was the last king, Stanislas August Poniatowski, who 'sold' Poland to his previous mistress, Catherine the Great. The Cracow school demonstrated that Stanislas August surpassed most of his compatriots by his intelligence, his sense of responsibility and his political talent; that he had explored every means of strengthening the state, and tried alliance with Prussia and with Russia time after time before giving in to the Partitions. Similar reasoning was brought to the defence of Prince Adam Czartoryski, friend of Alexander I, who dreamt of a kingdom of Poland federated with Russia. They upheld the example of Lubecki, minister of the 'Kingdom of Poland' to which the Congress of Vienna had guaranteed a large autonomy—Lubecki organising foundations for a modern economy against the 'madness' of the young revolutionary cadets who launched the insurrection of 1830. They rehabilitated the Marquis Wielopolski, a loyal subject of the Tsar who relied upon patient development, who hoped to regain for Russian Poland the autonomy it had lost after the defeat of the insurrection, and who said, when he was hooted by the people of Warsaw, 'One can do everything *for* the Poles but nothing *with* them!' And they criticised the radical patriots who ruined his hopes by organising the insurrection of 1863.

Now, since the conference of Yalta, all the 'realist' thinking of the non-communist Poles (in exile as well as in Poland) who were believers in the 'Czechoslovak solution' of co-operation with the Russians, refers back to the same prototypes. To persuade the government-in-exile to collaborate with the USSR, Ksawery Pruszynski wrote, in London, a biography of the Marquis Wielopolski: this was invoking the *bête noire* of the Polish Left to the aid of the communists! In Poland, Aleksander Bochenski, a friend of Pruszynski and, like him, one of a group of young conservatives who had wanted, before the war, to link up with the traditions of the Cracow school, wrote a *History of Stupidity in Poland* which exalted Czartoryski, Lubecki, and Wielopolski, and sought to show that independence is not an absolute good in the life of a nation and that the Poles must rely either upon Germany or upon Russia. Finally, the most anachronistic of all the Poles

in exile, the very aurochs of the aristocratic liberal-conservative tradition, Stanislaw Mackiewicz, one of the last leaders of the government-in-exile in London, who denounced the Russians, the English, and the Americans all with equal vigour—he, too, finished by returning to Poland in 1957, after having published a brilliant justification of the king Stanislas August Poniatowski.

THE Cracow school discovered a law that governs the destiny of Poland. Its political importance is a function of the relations between Germany and Russia. Poland can exist only when these relations are bad; its independence is threatened whenever an alliance unites its two powerful neighbours. The Partitions were preceded by a period of revival in Poland, based upon an alliance with Prussia. But Prussia wanted Pomerania as the price of this alliance. The Diet refused, and Prussia betrayed Poland in 1791 by encouraging Russia to proceed with the second Partition. This betrayal by Prussia, then the attitude of Prussia and Austria towards the insurgents of 1830–31, and then Bismarck's threat to assist Russia in crushing the insurrection of 1863, and Rapallo, and the Ribbentrop pact—all these were so many fateful moments for Polish diplomacy. To get out of this dilemma, which compels them in some sort to depend on one or other of their traditional enemies, the Poles have sought two ways of escape. One is the 'federalist' idea of Pilsudski between 1919 and 1920, which consisted in the 'great design' of weakening Russia by constructing a system of alliances between Poland, an independent Ukraine, and Lithuania: but one cannot in the twentieth century resuscitate the commonwealth of the Jagellons. The other consists in putting all their hopes in an alliance with the West—France, England, the United States. This was the policy of the Polish emigration between 1832 and 1864, the effort of the diplomacy-in-exile of Czartoryski (which, from his domicile in the Isle of St Louis, was called the 'policy of the Hotel Lambert'). It was, in part, the policy of independent Poland between 1919 and 1939—the Franco-Polish pact, Pilsudski's suggestion to France of a preventive war against Hitler in 1933, and the alliance with Britain in 1939. It was also the basis of the action of the government-in-exile in Paris and in London in 1939 and 1945. Yet all the sympathy, all the encouragement, and all the guarantees of the West have always proved impotent in regard to Russia or Germany. There would have to be some exceptional circumstances for this 'western alliance' to bring any effectual aid to Poland—such circumstances as Pilsudski foresaw when he wrote to Paris, in 1914, on the eve of the war that was to bring independence to his country: 'The Polish question will be resolved in our favour in the happy event of Germany's conquering Russia and being itself conquered by France'.

The decisions taken at Yalta, followed by the powerlessness of the West to assist the insurrection in Warsaw in August 1944—when the Germans trampled out the last fire of Poland's 'insensate heroism', while the Red Army frigidly looked on—and, finally, the helplessness of England and America when the agreements of Yalta were themselves swept away in Poland by the faked referendum of 1945: all this has definitively extinguished any Polish belief in the efficacy of alliances with the West. That is one reason for the 'wisdom' of the Poles, compared with the 'rashness' of the Hungarians in October 1956. The Hungarians have had to attribute their misfortune partly to their own mistaken decision. Poland itself had been 'the country without a Quisling'. Roosevelt had said it was 'the inspiration of the world'. The Poles knew instinctively, in 1956, that they could count on nothing but their own strength.

There had been a comparable atmosphere in Poland after the repression of the insurrection of 1863. Then, beaten to the ground, stripped of all illusions about the efficacy of the help that Napoleon III had offered to movements of national independence, the Poles fell back upon a policy of 'organic reconstruction', of economic development. Their positivist philosopher Swietochowski wrote, in 1884:

> Let us expect nothing from political revolutions, from wars, from treaties or from the benevolence of others, but put our trust in our own vitality. Let us fill all the vacant posts, take advantage of every opening, dig ourselves in wherever we can. Let us open every window wide towards Europe and let

its breezes change the air in our stifling dwelling.

Not without reason are people in Poland today—especially in the catholic and liberal circles that support Gomulka—talking about 'neo-positivism'. You can find the ideas of Swietochowski in a whole series of articles published in the Polish press between 1957 and 1960—articles which recognise the fixity of the international position and the necessary primacy of the Party, whilst they demand a truce to ideological discussion, a national union in deeds, economic reform directed to greater efficiency, and open doors to the West for the sake of cultural and scientific renewal. The concept of 'organic work', which dominated the ideology of the Polish bourgeoisie from 1864 to 1914, has regained its value in the Poland of Gomulka.

'Reasons of State' that dictate an alliance with Russia, or even its temporary domination, are not, therefore, new to the Polish mind. They are however reinforced, since 1945, by one weighty argument. By tracing the frontiers of the new Poland further to the west than the Poles themselves had ever dreamed of doing, Stalin at Potsdam achieved a master-stroke of policy: he thus condemned them to remain faithful to the Russian alliance—at least, so long as the frontiers on the Oder and the Neisse remain unrecognised by Germany and the West—apart from all considerations of political or social regime. The Poles know that, whatever ideological principles they prefer, they have at present no alternative to the foreign policy of Gomulka. It was horror of the Stalinist tyranny alone that drove the Poles to revolt against the regime. And even during the Stalinist period, there were some elements of the reactionary Right—disguised as 'catholic progressives' of the Pax group—who collaborated with the regime in the name of the famous 'Reasons of State'. Paradoxically, if the Poles ever thought they saw a possibility of getting rid of the regime, it still depended upon their confirming the Russian alliance, not contracting out of it. Certain Polish catholics did, indeed, imagine a 'Finland solution' for Poland. They even argued, in 1956, that if the party had no authority, if it could not keep the situation in hand, might not the Russians prefer a government of catholics which, after all, would at least have real authority over the nation? This reasoning was perverted by the tendency, common among anti-communists, to underestimate the ideological bond between the leaders in the Kremlin who could never, in this manner, act as the abstract Machiavellians of an imperialism.

HAVING thus reviewed the political examples which lead the Poles to accept their place in the Soviet bloc in terms of a traditional 'Russian alliance', let us now try to outline the complementary process which enables the nation to accept a government formed from a minority party and imposed by the Red Army.

National Communism is one of the most paradoxical of contemporary phenomena. It would be even more so, if the history of the last 40 years had not gradually accustomed us to the Great-Russian nationalism of the USSR. For the original communist conception was not that of a revolution realised within different states. According to Marx and Engels, capitalism of itself created the conditions of world unity, and upon that universal stage the revolution was to bring about the disappearance of the national superstructures. Within this socialist universe Marxism not only expected states to disappear; it predicted—somewhat vaguely—that the state would wither away. Gradually, as the Russian revolution proceeded, and it could be seen that communism was not going to be realised according to the predictions of Marx, another conception developed, that of the voluntary accession of each new communist state to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which was conceived not as a geographically defined area, but as a free federation of all the communist states of the world. The annexation of the Baltic States by the USSR in the name of this principle, finally made a monstrous mockery of it.

The assertion that there was a 'Polish way', as there is a 'Yugoslav way' or a 'Chinese way' to socialism, with the same insistence upon national sovereignty and upon 'equality between all socialist states large or small', was a new response to this challenge unforeseen in history.

Here we have, at the same time, a victory of nationalism within a movement which was originally and dogmatically internationalist, and also a return to internationalism, since this same movement emerges after a long period in which it had been reduced to the function of subserving a foreign imperialist nationalism—that which Stalin had made of the USSR.

From this point of view, the history of the Polish labour movement deserves to be studied anew. It was its nationalism, its adoption in advance of the principle of a 'Polish way' to socialism, which from its origins distinguished the Polish Socialist Party from the international socialism out of which the Communist Party emerged. While the party of Gomulka continues to claim descent from Marchlewski—a social-democrat who became a communist—its national policy in 1956 derives from the idea first represented by Pilsudski, an idea which survives in the mind of Poles if not in the reality of their country.

The beginnings of Polish socialism were only partly connected with the idea of national independence.

In spite of the patriotism of the radical wing of the Polish emigration to France after the defeat of the insurrection of 1830, in spite of the sympathy of liberal European opinion towards the 'cause of Poland', in spite of the attitude of the First International, even in spite of the attitude of Marx himself, who had stood for Poland against Russia, the Polish socialists who professed belief in independence were but few in number around the middle of the nineteenth century; they had no mass following, not even any political organisation. This was because the nationalist idea of an armed struggle against the Russians was in itself a rallying point strong enough to attract the progressive intelligentsia and some of the workers. The first intellectuals and workers to be committed to socialism were recruited from among the few to whom the economic revolution seemed more important than a national insurrection—all the more so since they expected a post-revolutionary society to eliminate the very causes of the oppression of nations. These 'internationalist' socialists therefore predominated when Polish socialism began. Their leader Warynski wrote in his journal *Egalité*, published in Geneva: 'We have nothing in common with the demand for the independence of Poland'. And K. Dluski asserted in the same journal that 'Polish patriotism has done nothing for the working class, and would have done nothing for it if our insurrections had been crowned with success. . . . Independence regained would have helped no one but those who already held privileged positions due to economic exploitation and who want political liberty too . . . the idea of Socialism is greater and more universal than that of patriotism'. At a socialist congress at Geneva, after the reading of a letter from Marx and Engels ending with the words 'Long live Poland', this same Dluski cried 'Down with patriotism!'

But the realities of the revolutionary struggle gradually persuaded Warynski and his party not, indeed, to take independence as their goal, but to recognise the importance of the struggle for political liberty. After several terrorist plots, a vigorous repression by the Tsarist police in 1883–84 virtually destroyed the young party. Six of its leaders were condemned to death and Warynski to hard labour, in which he died in 1889. Thenceforward, Polish socialism developed in a nationalist direction. The International Socialist Congress of 1891 expressed the hope that a single socialist party would be created for the three Polish territories under Russian, German, and Austrian domination; and in the following year, in Paris, a congress of Polish socialists, representing the few socialist organisations active under the three occupying Powers, joined in a 'Foreign Association of Polish Socialists' whose main objective was an 'independent democratic republic'. This was to be based upon direct elections, universal suffrage, and secret ballots for a popular legislature. There was to be equality of rights for all nationalities that might federate with the republic, equality of all citizens, freedom of speech and association, free compulsory education, abolition of the armed forces, and arming of the whole people.

The decisions taken at Paris were taken up in Poland, little by little, and it was in this way that a 'Workers Committee of the Polish Socialist Party' was constituted in 1893—the first steering committee of the PPS, which continued to represent Polish socialism until its

compulsory fusion with the Communists in 1947, and of which Cyrankiewicz, the present prime minister of Poland, was a member.

ONE of the two members of this first steering committee of the Polish Socialist Party was Josef Pilsudski, whose powerful personality coloured Polish socialism up to the first world war. The image of the old Marshal —the dictator of Poland whom ill-informed journalists still compare with Horthy—has almost entirely effaced (even among Poles) that of the young revolutionary. It is true that Pilsudski himself declared to his old comrades, on the eve of the first world war: 'We have travelled together along this tramway called socialism, but for my part I alighted at the stop called Independence'. It is also true that the leading part played by Pilsudski in Polish socialism at the beginning of the century was a sore point—after he had come to power—both to his supporters and to the socialists who contested his dictatorship. Pilsudski came of an old family of Lithuanian nobility; he was born on his father's estate of some 27,000 acres; when the insurrection of 1863 and exile in Siberia had gone far to ruin the family fortunes, Josef Pilsudski entered upon his career as one of those impoverished nobles who formed the nucleus of the intelligentsia of that time. Radicalism was the order of the day in the universities, and the young Pilsudski was soon involved in a plot to kill the Tsar Alexander II, which he paid for, in his turn, as an exile in Siberia. It was there that he took to socialism, more as an epigone of Polish romanticism than as a student of historical materialism. Pilsudski had no deep knowledge of Marxism, and when he came to govern Poland he showed a complete lack of interest in economic problems. But in his youth he took part in the revolt against social injustice which was led by the radical wing of that generation. He was disgusted by the servility of the rich nobility towards the Russian oppressor, and he felt that, after the set-back of the insurrection of 1863, and in view of the collaboration of the Polish leaders with the oppressors, barely concealed under the platitudes of patriotic idealism, socialism now remained the only favourable ground for doing battle against Tsarism.

Anyone wishing to sum up the history of socialism in Poland in the two first decades of this century, could do so in the form of a dialogue between Pilsudski and Rosa Luxemburg. The latter—with Julian Marchlewski—was the ringleader of the Marxist and internationalist wing of Polish socialism organised in the 'social-democratic' group; it never managed to become a mass organisation, but fought the PPS in the socialist International, while in the bosom of the PPS itself an argument was always going on between the more 'nationalist' Right and the more Marxist Left.

Rosa Luxemburg, a thorough-going Marxist, combated the idea of Polish independence with the same relentless logic and the same intense belief in socialism that brought her into opposition to Lenin over the issues of revolutionary spontaneity and communist democracy. The 'social-democrats' maintained that, since the Polish economy was split into three, each integrated into a different state system, one could strive for the liberation of the working class only as part of the working class of Russia, Germany, and Austria. Rosa Luxemburg considered that the independence of Poland would, indeed, be contrary to the future interests of the working class. What would become of the textile industry of Lodz, she asked, without the Russian market? She wrote, in *The Workers' Cause* (a Polish journal published in Paris), that 'recognition of the principle of national independence by socialism is an element imposed upon the workers by the intelligentsia'. Rosa Luxemburg and her friends were specially close to the German socialists, and accused the PPS of destroying the unity of socialism by its activities in the area of the Prussian occupation.

Pilsudski expounded his ideas in *Robotnik* (The Worker) which he published clandestinely, first at Vilna and then at Lodz. In this he wrote, about 1900: 'The Polish proletariat, thanks to its numbers, its class-consciousness and its strength, can easily attain the level of the Western proletariat and advance with the same rapidity towards its final goal—the socialist system. But dependence upon Russia, even if it were to become a constitutional Russia, would retard the progress of our movement'. . . . 'That is why the Polish worker ought

to strive for " a Polish republic, free and independent ", in which there will be only two camps —that of the Polish workers, and that of the Polish capitalists '. In that free Poland, ' liberated from foreign influence ', victory ' would soon fall to the Polish workers '.

POLISH ' bourgeois ' historians have striven above all to demonstrate Pilsudski's attachment to the idea of national independence, as if his struggle within the working-class movement could be ascribed solely to pursuit of the patriotic ideal. The socialist historians could not forget his betrayal of socialism, and were prone to minimise the part he played. The communist historians in Poland have—until very recently—practically expunged him from the record of the working-class movement. It is however interesting to observe that the PPS and Pilsudski were not always so intransigently insistent upon national independence. In February 1905, the seventh congress of the party, under the influence of the revolt in Russia, declared itself in favour of an organic relationship between Poland and Russia in the event of a revolutionary victory. This position was somewhat modified later on. In putting Pilsudski at the head of the armed struggle of the workers in Poland, the steering committee of the party announced that the PPS ' is aiming at the creation of a democratic, independent Polish republic '; but the same declaration added that the party ' is not, in the present revolution, waging a war for independence '. It described the idea of a national armed insurrection as ' utopian ', and affirmed that ' the party will continue to carry on a revolutionary struggle in solidarity with the proletariat of the entire Russian State, for the liquidation of the Empire and the creation, upon its ruins, of a republican and federal regime '.

In 1905, it was Pilsudski, and those who were to be the ' colonels ' in his regime after the war, who took revolutionary action and carried out certain plots themselves. The Polish Right—the conservative ' nationalists ' — called this ' banditry '—it was beneath the ' national pride '; the positivist philosopher Swietochowski deplored this ' accursed generation '; the writer Henryk Sienkiewicz cried out: ' this banditry sullies the good name of Poland '.

Pilsudski gradually withdrew from socialism as he saw the war coming, in order to ripen his plan for an armed struggle against Russia, on the side of Austria. His ambiguous shadow obscured the destiny of independent Poland. Polish socialism had other leaders quite as firmly committed to the idea of national independence. And it was not during the time of the nationalist masquerade imposed by the Stalinists, but indeed in October 1956, that this idea of national independence was born again in a new form, and in the party of Gomulka—the implacable enemy of the PPS.

Two years ago, a young Polish communist historian, Josef Sieradzki, devoted a series of articles in the weekly *Przeglad Kulturalny* to the Polish-Soviet war of 1919–20. He draws particular attention to the Soviet proposals for peace made to Poland in January 1920, commenting enthusiastically upon the declaration in which Lenin made the offer:

> We can understand, said Lenin, at a meeting of Cossacks on 1 March 1920, this hatred of Russia that fills the hearts of the Poles; and we tell them that we will never go past the frontier that our armies are now occupying, which is, moreover, still far from any land inhabited by the Polish nation.
>
> This document, writes Sieradski, is an incontestable proof of the deepest intentions that were entertained by the leader of the October Revolution towards independent Poland. This is the truth behind the efforts of Soviet diplomacy to bring about good-neighbourly and peaceful relations with Poland. . . . It is also an inestimable psychographic (sic!) document, with its subtle understanding of the Polish psyche (' the soul of Poland!') which the great Russian, the revolutionary as pure as a tear ' without fear and without reproach ', knew how to interpret and which he took into account in his calculations as a man of politics. Finally, it teaches an important lesson: how to destroy the obsessions and prejudices inherited from the past and apply the principles of socialist teaching to the self-determination of peoples. Alas! adds the author, let us confess it with shame—it was Poland that knew not how to profit from this generous offer, it was Josef Pilsudski who sabotaged the peaceful efforts of Soviet diplomacy. . . . That is a painful truth; it is hard to look it in the face—but the truth it is.

What innocent idealism we find in this curious Marxist historian! The enthusiasm aroused in him by what could have been no more than Lenin's indulgence in oratorical language, and is, from a Marxist point of view, simply foolish ('the soul of Poland')—is not this stirred up by a spontaneous gratitude to Lenin for having discerned and admitted the Polish 'hatred of the Russians' as a kind of stable psychic element?

In 1919, the few Polish communists associated the advance of the Red Army with the progress of the Revolution: they would have been the last to have any feeling of solidarity with a government and an army that they regarded as instruments of the bourgeoisie. And this young Polish communist, in 1958, is identifying himself not with Lenin, not with the Red Army, but with the Poland of Pilsudski, since he feels 'shame' for the 'Polish aggression'. If Lenin was 'a revolutionary as pure as a tear', it was, apparently, because he had been ready to commit himself definitively to respect the territorial integrity of Poland regardless of its social system. Between the Polish historians of the Right, who suspect Lenin of duplicity, and this young communist historian, one cannot tell at first sight which is the farther removed from any Marxist reasoning. But then, between 1919 and 1960, the internationalist illusion in its Leninist form was completely dispelled. If the young Polish communist now feels a solidarity with Pilsudski and not with Marchlewski, or Radek, or Dzierzynski, also Poles who had chosen revolution, it is no doubt in part because he is not a revolutionary but a young theorist, shaped by the dominant ideology of his country, which happens to be communism. It is, however, very much more, because he knows 'the sequel'; because he knows that Stalin succeeded Lenin; because, in his subconscious, the USSR and Russian imperialism remain inextricably linked together. And he is thinking of the Poland of Gomulka, when he so naively simplifies 'the socialist teaching of the self-determination of peoples'.

WE have tried to study a few paradoxes of the Polish Left throughout its history. Let us now return to the Right, to see how the Poles were faced, between the two wars, with the choice between a liberal and multi-national tradition and one that was more recent, reactionary and nationalist.

A Poland with frontiers upon the Oder and the Neisse, turned against Germany, allied with Russia, a Poland without national minorities, in which the number of Jews, in particular, has diminished from three and a half million to about fifty thousand, a Poland endowed with an authoritarian government, and in which Catholicism—conscious of its national function—enjoys great prestige: that is the Poland of today. It is also the paradoxical realisation of the dream of Roman Dmowski, the father of modern Polish nationalism, founder of the National Democratic party, ancestor of the near-fascist groups of before the war, enemy of the socialists and *a fortiori* of the communists.

The two men who had the most influence upon Polish history in the present century were Pilsudski and Dmowski. To the socialism of Pilsudski's earlier days, Dmowski opposed a nationalist doctrine that reduced Catholicism itself to the cement of internal cohesion. Against Pilsudski's implacable demand for an armed revolutionary struggle against Russia, Dmowski upheld the idea of conciliating Russia, and dismissed the notion of armed struggle for independence as 'old-maidish hysteria'. He also endeavoured by demagogy to divert the anti-Russian feelings of the Poles into anti-Germanism and anti-Semitism. In 1913 the nationalist organ *Gazeta Poranna* declared that the Poles had celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the insurrection of 1863 'by a declaration of war, but this time against the Jews'. It was, indeed, Dmowski's party which developed anti-Semitism in Poland in the racial, aggressive, and vulgar form unknown until the end of the nineteenth century. Invited by Casimir the Great, the last of the Piast dynasty, to settle in Poland, where they found a haven from the Spanish, Portuguese, and German persecutions, the Jews had lived there entrenched in their own language, religion, and customs, and yet involved more intimately with the life of the people—if only because of their numbers—than in any other country of Europe. Aliens though they were, a symbiotic relationship developed between the Poles and the Jews, who also regarded the plains between the Warta and the

Dniester as 'the land of their fathers'. That symbiosis was not due only to the Jews' entrenchment and the Poles' toleration of foreigners. The Cracow school, as we saw, have exposed what is factitious in the myths of the tolerance and democracy in the *Res Publica* before the Partitions; but there was in fact a strong liberal tradition in Poland, represented by the conservatives on the Right and by the socialists on the Left. Dmowski rejected the Polish liberal tradition *in toto*. He wanted to transform a patriotism that belonged to the federal tradition of a multi-national state—the sort of 'Commonwealth' in advance of its times that the kingdom of the Jagellons represented—into a modern nationalism, an ethnic conception of a Fatherland. He claimed inspiration from the Piasts, the first Polish dynasty, which had come from the West, gradually pushed eastward by German pressure. Like all modern nationalisms, that of Dmowski was of petty-bourgeois origin. A great number of impoverished descendants of noble families, pouring into the towns, mixed with the artisan class and tried to earn a living in commerce and light industry. Hence the popularity of anti-Semitic slogans, in a class which accused the Jews of monopolising commerce.

IN the conflict that pitted him against Pilsudski, Dmowski was the loser on the plane of power. But it was his previsions about the victory of the Allies that were realised. After the Russian Revolution Dmowski went to Paris, where he set up the Polish National Committee, and was a signatory, for Poland, of the Treaty of Versailles. In the first years of Polish independence, until Pilsudski's seizure of power, Dmowski's National Democrats at times participated in the Government, but in the main they led the opposition of the Right to governments of the Left or the Left-Centre. Their party was frenziedly opposed to Pilsudski. However, with the passage of the years, and above all after the deaths of the two statesmen, an attempt was made to reconcile their ideas—or their warring ghosts—in an idealist pseudo-dialectic. Polish patriotism presents these two stars as a unique binary constellation in the historical heavens, as though their struggles and hatreds were ordained to serve a common cause—a 'love of the Fatherland' conceived as an empty abstraction.

The partisans of Pilsudski had no coherent ideology: his companions in revolutionary struggle and in the struggle for independence were content with a blind fidelity to 'the Chief'. Others, who joined the governmental party after the seizure of power in 1926, formed a heterogeneous group, ranging from liberal conservatives to sceptics of the Left, from advocates of a federalist policy to *étatist* bureaucrats, among a majority of opportunists pure and simple. Pilsudski's increasing self-isolation, the habit which grew upon him towards the end of his life of letting no one know the motives for his political decisions, diminished the sense of responsibility in this group, fascinated by the prestige of the mysterious, misanthropic old man, by his curious intuition in matters of international politics, which in an earlier century might have been enough to make him a great statesman.

After the death of Pilsudski, his successors, all adrift, but assured of continuing in power by the new anti-democratic constitution, sought to acquire some ideological foundation at any cost. It was then that Dmowski achieved victory over Pilsudski. The 'Camp of National Unity' formed in 1937 professed a thoroughly nationalistic ideology. This was the period of the alliance between the Government and the fascist groups of the 'Phalange' led by Boleslaw Piasecki. The alliance was of short duration—shorter than that which this same Piasecki contracted later on, as leader of the 'Catholic Progressives', with the Stalinists. We must remember, however, the struggle over the *numerus clausus* for Jewish students in the universities, when bands of 'nationalist' students ran amok armed with razor-blades, flick-knives, and revolvers, smashing the windows of Jewish shops, beating-up Jews in the streets, and forcing the doors of their homes. These young toughs wore in their buttonholes the sword of Boleslaw Chrobry, the Piast king who laid the foundations of Polish greatness (Bierut, the first president of communist Poland, bowed down before the tomb of this king in 1947, doing homage to him as the forerunner of the 'new Poland'). They sang the nationalist song *The Oath*—'we are the Polish nation, we are the

Polish tribe, we are the royal descendants of the Piasts'. (In 1947 the communist deputies intoned the same song at the opening of the first Polish parliament after the war.)

THUS, it was by reverting to some of Dmowski's slogans that the Polish People's Republic was born. But Polish Stalinism had other peculiarities.

Under the Stalin regime the Hungarians used to say: 'They are building Stalinvaros'—'They are rebuilding Budapest'. The Poles, on the other hand, said: 'We are rebuilding Warsaw', 'We are building Nowa Huta'. These different ways of speaking express an appreciable difference. In Hungary, as in the other satellite countries (except perhaps Czechoslovakia for special reasons), the majority of the nation felt completely alienated: reduced in every domain to the status of objects, they could in no way identify themselves with the hated regime imposed upon them. In Poland the same regime, no less imposed and no less hated, had nevertheless managed to conserve, in certain domains, a sense of national solidarity. Right at the beginning, it seized a unique opportunity of arousing a feeling of community throughout the nation when it decided to rebuild Warsaw, which the Germans had rased to the ground with the tacit consent of the Russians. There was no sufficient argument from efficiency, no material reason, for this decision. By transferring the capital to Lodz, for instance, the gigantic effort that the rebuilding of Warsaw represented in terms of capital and labour could have been directed to ends more consistent with communist theory—the promotion of heavy industry, for example. But the Polish Communists were determined, at the same time, to satisfy a need—patriotic, sentimental, in fact idealistic—of the whole people, who were able, on the threshold of a new epoch, to find in this project a common cause. Another thing that united the communist leaders with the whole people—and with the nationalists above all—was the defence of the new Western frontiers along the Oder and the Neisse. Upon this point all Poles, in exile as well as in Poland, upheld their detested Government against the Germans, against the Allies, against the Vatican itself. Finally, compulsory industrialisation, absurd in Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, is much less so in Poland, enriched as it now is with the raw materials of the lands annexed from Germany. During the twenty years of their independence between the wars the Poles believed themselves, wrongly, to be a Great Power. The rout of their cavalry under the avalanche of steel from German tanks and aeroplanes has now taught them to measure power by industrial capacity. The myth of industrialisation, to which all the underdeveloped peoples today are looking as a universal panacea, a solution for all problems, was especially persuasive in Poland. If the effort to reproduce the vast industrial structures of Soviet Russia on a smaller scale was absurd, certain 'grandiose' achievements like Nowa Huta were impressive to the Poles. It was not until after the obvious failure of the Six-Year Plan, when the economists could freely criticise the absurdities of the system, that its waste of resources loomed larger in the public eye than its successes.

These are all reflections of a peculiarity in the Polish Communist Party which escaped the notice of foreign observers and has since become of capital importance—a peculiarity determined by its attitudes towards the USSR on the one side and the Polish nation on the other. The Polish CP was undoubtedly more suspicious of the USSR and of Stalin, and readier to identify itself with a 'national' policy, than the communist parties of other satellite countries; and this for two series of reasons, one deriving from its own history, and the other from the circumstances in which it seized power.

The former, linked with memories of the ignominious dissolution of the Polish Communist Party in 1938 and the assassination of its leaders by Stalin, gives a certain authenticity to the theme of the 'Polish road to socialism' between 1945 and 1948 This theme declared itself (at least in a negative manner) even at the height of the Stalin period, by the refusal to execute Gomulka, and by several initiatives taken by the Polish Stalinists alone, gestures unparalleled in other satellite countries.

The other circumstance which favoured a national orientation in the Communist Party of

Poland is more extraneous to it; it was part of the general effort to don nationalist costume which communism made all over the world after the last war, but nowhere more than in Poland.

Although the stages of Sovietisation followed one after another—between 1945 and 1948—in the same manner in Poland as in Hungary, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia, there was a considerable difference in the language held by the communist leaders, and even by the Soviets, towards the Polish people and those of other satellite states. The Polish nation is the only one in Eastern Europe which never compromised with the Nazi occupation. The communists consequently found it more difficult here than elsewhere to employ their regular tactics for seizing power, which begin with the 'anti-fascist coalition', proceed to the 'national front', and end with the total domination of the party. In Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania they could pose as liberators of the people, not only from the German occupation but also from a national bourgeoisie and bureaucracy which had, at least in part, collaborated with the Nazis; it was therefore easier for them to present their fight against 'reactionaries' in a patriotic light.

In Poland, where all the political parties had joined in the resistance, where the Home Army and the underground parliament depended upon clandestine delegations from the legal government-in-exile, the communists were far from being able to claim a monopoly of patriotism: they were obliged, at first, to try to popularise a falsified account of their own participation in the resistance to the occupying Power, and afterwards to bid higher and higher for the support of nationalist sentiment. Their task was to create an atmosphere in which all the nationalist and other conditioned reflexes of the average Pole would react in favour of the regime. Nothing, in fact, could have been less 'revolutionary' than the patriotic *ethos* and external trappings of the communists of Poland after their seizure of power.

WE have purposely refrained, in the foregoing pages, from referring to the special problems of the 'Polish October' or to the discussion of 'revisionism': the prototypes by which the Poles are more or less consciously influenced in 1960 are, we think, of earlier origin. The enduring truce between the regime and the nation, the continuing convergence between the 'legal country' and the 'real country', in spite of the ruin of the hopes aroused in 1956—these strike one as the salient features of the Polish situation; and we have tried to shed light upon it by looking to the past for the examples of behaviour which induce the Poles to resign themselves to the regime and to Soviet hegemony, not simply as necessary evils but as a reasonable solution in view of their 'geopolitical' situation. Similarly, it is in the past that we have found explanations for the fact that the men in power themselves are less alienated from the national community than are the communists who govern other satellite countries.

What is the state of 'opinion' in the Polish intelligentsia? The communist minority governs, more disillusioned, and feeling itself less 'guilty' (because less alienated), than in other countries of the Soviet bloc. The revisionists have seen their dream of a working-class democracy fade, and they cannot profess conversion to social-democracy: they are Luxemburgian communists, or social-democrats, and cannot recognise Khrushchev as one of themselves. United with the last of the radical and liberal Mohicans by a common aversion to totalitarian rulers and reactionary subjects, they feel at ease in the *avant-garde* reviews and in the Warsaw cafés, but have little hold on the country.

The Catholics of the Pax group—ex-fascists and ex-Stalinists, directly sponsored by Moscow and indulged by Gomulka (though they were his frantic enemies in October 1956)—are more like a 'Mafia' than a political group, their ideas being as little coherent as their action is clever. But they appeal only to what is the equivalent of a provincial petty bourgeoisie.

Without doubt, it is the Catholics of the *Tygodnik Powszechny*, the official organ of Cardinal Wyszynski (whatever may be their respective popularity) who give the most conscious thought to the themes which, in a vague and inarticulate way, are haunting the minds of the majority of officials, technicians, engineers, teachers, and clergy. One common

denominator of this thinking is that it cannot be universal, since historical generalisations and practical aims are in contradiction with its essential decisions. Anti-Russian, the Poles believe that nothing but their alliance with Russia can guarantee their western frontier: anti-communist, attracted to the West, a good many Poles cannot help wishing for the West's withdrawal from Berlin.

These themes have lately found expression in some articles published in the *Tygodnik Powszechny*. K. Studentowicz writes, in an article entitled—of course—'The Polish Reason of State' (4 October 1960):

> The continuation of the cold war might not only do the greatest harm to our national interests but also play into the hands of the irredentist Germans of the West. I write this as my personal opinion, from an independent and critical point of view in respect to the Party that is governing Poland. But we are living at a specific moment when the Party line coincides with the nation's 'Reason of State' upon the most essential point of all: that is, the necessity of keeping a territory indispensable to the maintenance of the biological strength of the nation. . . .

Nothing could be clearer! Without any ambiguity Studentowicz also explains the reasons why a 'Western alliance' could hardly be favourable to Poland, in spite of all the sympathies of the Poles towards the West:

> If we had found ourselves in the Western sphere of influence after the second world war, it would have been impossible for us, in the light of the facts and forces which the sequel has revealed, to have had our just demands upon Germany fulfilled . . . Only the nations of the Soviet Union, who had also suffered from the Nazi crimes, could give us such definite and strong support in this domain. But in the future, too, we can count upon support only from our Eastern allies. This makes our political alliance with the Soviet Union irrevocable, independently of all the other problems, which are of secondary importance compared with those of our national existence and its indispensable territories.

To put it briefly: according to one of the most representative members of the 'Znak' group, which claims to be 'independent of, and critical towards the Party' (and indeed is so), this country is not only at present, but also in the future, 'irrevocably' committed to political alliance with the USSR, whatever its own regime may be. This 'geopolitical' calculation, based upon classic conceptions of foreign policy, is coupled however with the hope, shared by numerous Western thinkers, that the exigencies of industrial society will tend gradually to diminish the differences between the two blocs:

> Socialist and capitalist industrial organisation are making towards a practical unity . . . There is reason to believe that the collective systems may become free societies, while the free societies are evolving towards a collective economy.

Two ways of thinking are here combined in what represents a state of mind that is particularly widespread in Poland. A classic 'nationalist' conception, a residue of the nineteenth century, is held to demonstrate that the Russian alliance is essential to Poland: and, perhaps in compensation for what may be depressing in such a conviction on a long view, some universal and sociological arguments from Western ideologists are adduced, in order to show that, even without changing sides, Poland might attain to greater freedom.

THE value of such a belief, to the government of a country where the majority of citizens are hostile to the regime, but which does not want to have further recourse to the worst totalitarian methods, is obvious. That is what is underlined, again in the *Tygodnik Powszechny* (4 September 1960), by the most influential of Polish journalists, Stefan Kisielewski:

> I believe that Poles who are not Marxists and have a different philosophy, play a particularly important part, if they have a real understanding of the new situation, of the necessity of the alliance with the USSR, and its natural consequences.

And in this article Kisielewski develops at length a thesis that could be summed up in a very few words—that the support of the Catholic independents upon this essential point (for is not the regime itself a 'natural consequence' of the 'alliance' with the USSR?) is so useful to the government that the latter, in return, may well allow ample freedom to the

Catholics and their publications. And indeed it is because of the support, albeit limited, that Catholics accord to the government, that the Church in Poland enjoys an exceptional status. But some truths are better not spoken out loud. The *Polityka* (17 September 1960) says of the articles of Studentowicz and Kisielewski that 'it looks as though the Catholics want to present an invoice for their support of our foreign policy'.

It is, of course, the Catholics of the 'Pax' group who are the most irritated by the arguments published by Catholics who support the regime; they feel that friendship for the Kremlin is their monopoly. Their journal, *Slowo Powszechne* (6 September 1960), criticises the position taken up by the *Tygodnik Powszechny* and declares that:

> Both Marxists and right-thinking non-Marxists who are patriotic, appreciate the value of the ideological bonds uniting the socialist countries—the alliance between these countries is based, not only upon common interests, it is not just simply a 'tactical and strategic' alliance, but above all an ideological alliance.

The party itself feels a certain embarrassment about its part-time supporters, so indispensable but inconvenient. In an article entitled 'Reason of State' in the *Przeglad Kulturalny* (22 September 1960), W. Zaleski explains the position of the party rather ingenuously. It is good and useful, he says in effect, that Polish opinion should be won for the cause of the alliance with the USSR. The independent Catholics play an important part in this. All the same, it is annoying when the emphasis is laid upon the extra-ideological motives for this alliance. It may make a bad impression abroad. . . .

WE have given close attention to this problem because it seems to us especially characteristic of the ambiguous attitude of the Polish intelligentsia towards their historic situation. Poland finds itself today with what looks like a closed future. The recrudescence of appeals to 'Reasons of State' derives from rationalisations which would make a virtue of necessity. Passive objects of a historical situation, the Poles would like, by accepting it, again to become active subjects. But in awakening to this, they also revive the political fiction of the 'balance of powers' which is no longer applicable on a local scale. In universal terms, they pretend, now that Poland finds itself on the margin of History, that History is of little importance; all that really matters is to plough the land, bring Polish children into the world, and remedy the most flagrant of their economic absurdities.

In the background, they cherish a hope that the communist bloc will evolve naturally towards greater freedom. That is a hope founded upon Western analyses of industrial society, and on the belief that the social transformation it has brought about must, in the end, extend to the political character of very different regimes.

The party is pragmatic and prudent, careful to carry out Khrushchev's words of command, ready to support him against an opposition which the Poles identify, rightly or wrongly, with the influence of the Chinese. The revisionists, sceptical and disappointed, have either returned to the official ideology, or isolated themselves—a kind of internal emigration. The Catholics are becoming 'Russophiles' in order to make the best of a bad job, and regard the problems of communism as hardly their concern.

There are two ways of conceiving Poland's prospects in the future: first, with reference to its 'external' alliance with the USSR, the ex-German territories, and Poland's membership of the Soviet bloc; secondly, in relation to a possible evolution of the communist universe which might allow Poland to seek and pursue its own path. Considering merely its geographical location, it might appear that Poland, from the standpoint of 'foreign' politics, is doomed to be a passive object, a function of the balance between the two agglomerations of world power. But, seeing what happened in October 1956, and seeing also that the margin of liberty allowed to the Poles is, even now, greater than that in any other country in the Soviet bloc, may it not also seem that Poland could play a more active part in the evolution of the communist universe? Paradoxically, however, the Poles want to be active just where they have hardly any power even over their own destiny; and resign themselves passively to 'wait and see' in the domain where they seem called upon to exert an influence.

WARSAW NOTEBOOK

William E. Griffith

SITTING across from me in his comfortable apartment in Warsaw this last summer, one of Poland's former leading revisionists remarked, 'The situation here is getting normal. You know, it's not bad, it's even quite good—but it's totally without hope!' This remark is another version of the old Imperial Austrian proverb. 'The situation is hopeless but not serious'—a proverb that kept recurring to me throughout my stay in Poland. Yet the situation there in the summer of 1960, from a non-communist viewpoint, had definitely worsened, particularly in culture, economics, and foreign policy. Are Poles oblivious to these losses, whistling while Rome burns, or what is the explanation for this paradox of worsening being called normalisation?

* * * * *

Poland today is a country of spent passion. Apathy, hopelessness, indifference to politics, rejection of any ideology and retreat into private life dominate the scene. Even foreign observers, both those left-wing intellectuals who had hoped that Polish revisionism signalled a rebirth of 'true Leninism' and those others who thought Gomulka's coming to power presaged decisive progress towards Polish freedom, parliamentary democracy, and independence, have lost most of their hopes and dreams. Now may therefore be a good time to attempt a balance-sheet of Poland at the beginning of the sixties.[1]

First, though, how did Poland get where she is today? The 'Polish October', preceded by the Polish thaw, was caused by a combination of elite party disaffection and economically and nationalistically-induced mass discontent, which came to the surface only because of the succession struggle in Moscow in 1953 and Warsaw in 1956, and the concomitant collapse in Poland of mass police terror. Gomulka's return to power in 1956 represented an attempt by the majority of the party leadership to avert a mass revolt and the collapse of the regime; its success was assured by Khrushchev's decision to accept it, by Gomulka's popularity and organisational skill, by the lesson of the Hungarian Revolution, and by the co-operation of the Roman Catholic Church with the new communist regime in keeping the situation under control.

The gains of the Polish October may be summarised in two categories, decisive and peripheral. Of the four decisive ones (the ones which Gomulka from the beginning genuinely believed in as distinguished from those he was forced to accept), the most decisive of all was the collapse of police terror and the restoration of personal security and freedom of private conversation. The other three decisive gains were the partial internal autonomy of the Polish Communist Party as against Moscow, the *modus vivendi* with the Church, and the collapse of agricultural collectivisation. The two peripheral gains, those which Gomulka did not particularly sympathise with and which did and do not, in my opinion, decisively determine the picture of Poland today, were the drastic cut in capital investment and the springing up of the workers' councils, and, secondly, the greatly increased cultural freedom of publication and performance.

TWO extended trips to Poland, in the summers of 1959 and 1960, have given me some opportunity of examining on the ground the status of these gains today. In brief, the decisive ones have essentially been retained, although somewhat attenuated in some sectors; the peripheral ones have been largely lost. To begin with *the* decisive one, the absence of police terror: although there were this last summer the first faint signs of resumption of some security police questioning of Poles concerning their talks with foreigners, freedom of private conversation (as distinguished from freedom of public speaking and publication) remains substantially intact. The autonomy of the Polish Party *vis-à-vis* Moscow also remains, in my opinion, substantially as it was in 1957. There have, of course, been changes in party policies and operations. In foreign policy Gomulka has

[1] The best recent study is a series of articles by Viktor Meier in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 10 January 1960 *et seq.*

completely aligned himself with Khrushchev, notably (with full Polish popular support) in their common anti-German policy[2] and in Moscow's controversy with Peking.[3] Within the Polish Party Gomulka reigns supreme; factionalism is a thing of the past (as in Moscow), and the scene is dominated by the competition between various shifting groups for Gomulka's favour.

What retrogression has occurred in Poland has arisen, in my opinion, primarily from Gomulka's, and not from Khrushchev's, initiative. The return to influential positions of ex-Natolin personnel, the political general Witaszewski, and the centralist economic *apparatchiks* Szyr and Tokarski, and the departure of such relative liberals as Morawski arose from Gomulka's desire to re-establish tighter discipline; Witaszewski profited from the defection to the West of the intelligence officer Col. Pawel Monat, and Szyr and Tokarski from the meat crisis of late 1959. In all three cases their political allegiance as early as 1957 had shifted towards Gomulka and away from such still degraded Stalinists as Mazur.[4] Church-state relations have become notably more tense than a year ago, and regime harassment of the Church is certainly on the increase.[5] Nevertheless, the Polish Church still incarnates the *pays réel* for the overwhelming majority of Poles, and the regime (the weak and still demoralised *pays légal*) shows no signs of contemplating a complete break in Church-state relations. In agriculture, the 'agricultural circles' which Gomulka began expanding in 1959 have continued to grow, but so far they operate as genuine cooperatives for the joint use of machinery. Gomulka's ultimate objective in agriculture remains collectivisation, but, in spite of the directly opposite tendency in the rest of Eastern Europe, it seems unlikely that the next few years will see its resumption by force.[6] At any rate, the Polish peasants apparently do not think so; their confidence, as evidenced by the continued high price of land and horses and of agricultural building construction, remains high.

In economics and culture the picture is one of retreat from the October 1956 gains. Decentralisation and workers' self-government through workers' councils, the prime ingredients of the 'New Model' which Polish economists so hopefully put forward in 1957, have both been strangled at birth by Gomulka, and the Polish economy continues to drift in near-stagnation, with neither a market structure and a rational price system nor the apparatus of Stalinist coercion to give it direction and drive.[7] Capital investments in heavy industry have continued to rise slowly, workers' norms have been raised, and the meat crisis of autumn 1959, due to faulty planning, was met by a deflation so sharp that, while food and consumer goods reserves are high again, real wages have been significantly, although not drastically, reduced.[8] (Even so, the Nowa Huta and Zielona Gora demonstrations in the spring of 1960 arose from primarily religious, not economic, causes.) This drift and lack of any real improvement in the economic sector largely accounts for the atmosphere of apathy and hopelessness so characteristic of the country today. In the cultural field,

[2] Cf. Halperin from Warsaw in *Münchner Merkur*, 23 September 1960; the sermon by Cardinal Wyszynski at Malbork, in *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 25 September 1960; K. Studentowicz, 'The Polish "Raison d'Etat"', *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 4 September 1960.

[3] This was discussed at the VI Plenum of the Party central committee in September 1960; see its authoritative reflection in the unsigned editorial 'Problems of Peace and Socialism', *Trybuna Ludu*, 27 September 1960; cf. Stehle from Warsaw in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 20 September 1960.

[4] Cf. the excellent 'Gomulka in Retreat', *The Economist*, 1 October 1960. Note also the return to the political scene of Zambrowski, Albrecht.

[5] For an Episcopate pastoral letter on the subject (prepared but not read) see Halperin from Warsaw, *Münchner Merkur*, 29 September and 1 October 1960, and Stehle from Warsaw in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 20 September, 6 and 8 October 1960. The text of the letter, released by the Inter-Catholic Press Agency in Vienna, is in the *Dziennik Polski* (London), 12 October 1960, and of the communiqué of the Episcopate protesting publicity given it abroad in *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 9 October 1960. For a detailed summary of regime harassment of the church, see *La Libre Belgique*, 30 September 1960.

[6] This is most recently evidenced by Gomulka's speech at the VI central committee Plenum (*Trybuna Ludu*, 15 September 1960). See also Mieczyslaw Jagielski in *Nowe Drogi*, September 1960.

[7] See J. M. Montias, 'The Polish "Economic Model"', *Problems of Communism*, March–April 1960.

[8] The cost-of-living index, according to *Biuletyn Statystyczny*, August 1960, rose between July 1959 and July 1960 (1955 = 100) from 108·9 to 111·5 for staple foods, and from 107·5 to 114·9 for other consumer goods. Average monthly wages fell from 1599 zloty in June 1959 to 1583 in June 1960. Overtime decreased 20 per cent in the first half of 1960.

censorship, varying from complete in the daily press and radio to somewhat less severe in book publishing, has been effectively restored; Polish newspapers and magazines today are again dull, totally pro-regime, and increasingly less read; foreign newspapers are less readily available; abstract art, although continuing to flourish, has been denounced by the regime; academic research is more closely controlled [9]; and cultural exchange, at least with the United States, has been (allegedly only temporarily) limited.

HAVING said all this about the public surface of Polish intellectual life, one must immediately add that the reality is far different. What is more important, it is a quite new kind of reality in a communist country, one which may perhaps best be described as 'post-revisionist'. Polish revisionism, i.e., the conscious attempt to revitalise and revise Leninism while remaining differentiated from democratic socialism, is dead. What is more, most of its leading figures, with whom I discussed this problem at length, maintain not only that it is dead (and that they have become what amounts to democratic socialists) but, in the more radical version of their analysis, that it never could have succeeded anyway, whether or not Poland had remained communist or obtained genuine national independence and a democratic parliamentary system. Most of the former revisionists, both in party and literary circles, have out of a mixture of coercion and choice retired from any political activity, for which in any case they see no prospect in the near future. A minority of opportunists and careerists have begun again to support the regime, but this time with a privately expressed cynicism which passes belief. The proud ideological and intellectual tradition of the Polish Communist Party, going back to Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Radek, has, at least for the present, collapsed completely. The present party ideologists and propagandists, indeed almost the whole party (with the exception of some older 'true believers' like Gomulka), are now mostly cynical opportunists, men for whom communism is at best a system which the country cannot avoid and which at least brings rapid industrialisation for Poland and, above all, power and perquisites for themselves.

Polish communism today is without ideology and without intellectuals, which it completely disregards. In contrast to its past history, Poland is now being run, without the intellectuals and even without the intelligentsia, by *apparatchiki* such as Gomulka, who are not of the intelligentsia themselves, and who are at best indifferent to the traditional role of the Polish intelligentsia, that of representing and leading the nation. (As my ex-revisionist friend also remarked to me, 'Under the Sanacja they persecuted us a little and bought many of us; Bierut and Berman persecuted many and bought others; but Gomulka is indifferent.') This almost structural frustration of the Polish intelligentsia, and particularly the intellectuals, arising out of their current virtual exclusion from the actual leadership of the country, is one of the main causes of their hopelessness and apathy.

So far the picture presented of Polish intellectual life has been essentially a negative one—i.e., what it is not. As to what it is, the major point to be made is that it has rejoined European culture. As was shown in Hungary during the thaw and, most dramatically, during the Revolution, so in Poland during the thaw and since, the intellectual and ideological trappings of communism in a Soviet colony turned out to have been an opaque film, which, once peeled away, revealed the traditional pattern of contact and interaction with Western culture as a whole. Although it neither questioned the nationalisation of heavy industry, the agrarian reform, or the end of pre-war authoritarianism, the Polish October, like the Hungarian thaw and Revolution, marked essentially the revival of traditional nationalist, patriotic, Western culture patterns. Since October 1956 Western influence has gone much further in Poland; its effect, both on elite and mass culture, was perhaps the most striking thing I noted in Poland this past summer. The Polish intellectual elite (like the Yugoslav) is again completely a part of European and American intellectual life. America has become the main influence on Polish social scientists; Paris remains the main source of literary and artistic inspiration. Foreign travel

[9] For the increased regime influence over the Polish Academy of Sciences, see *Trybuna Ludu*, 4 February 1960.

in both directions (Poles to the West and Westerners to Poland), plus easy access to foreign publications, have been the two main factors in restoring Polish intellectual life to its Western orientation; but once the fear and terror faded away Polish intellectuals would have returned to their Western allegiance in any case.

STRIKING as Western influence on the Polish elite is, however, I was even more impressed by its influence on the masses, and particularly on the students and youth. It is fashionable in the West to decry the vulgarising and levelling influence of Western mass culture phenomena, and some aspects are certainly far from attractive. I would suggest, however, that their influence within the communist bloc, and particularly in Poland (and Yugoslavia), is almost entirely positive. Be that as it may, the influence of Western mass culture in Poland is certainly almost all-pervasive. Men's and women's dress, women's hair styles, the universal popularity of Western popular music (ranging from rock 'n roll to the most esoteric varieties of jazz), the desire to be alone and to be let alone, the search for leisure time, the extreme distaste for any sort of organised mass demonstrations, the indifference if not hostility to any ideology: all these typical phenomena of Western mass culture are increasingly prevalent among Polish youth and students today, and are beginning to spread among some of the more prosperous workers. The adherence to these Western mass culture patterns is enhanced by the universal reaction against the 'fake' mass culture of pre-1956 Poland: the communist youth demonstrations, the 'Socialist realism' in art, music, drama, and the cinema, and all the other grey, dreary, forced aspects of Stalinist colonial totalitarianism. In a certain sense, therefore, the mass culture fetish of not having an ideology has become an ideology-substitute. In retrospect, this spread of Western mass culture patterns has been one of the most important and least recognised achievements of the Polish October, and one of the best guarantees against the regime being able, at least in the near future, to revive the dead ideology of Marxism-Leninism. The longer these mass culture patterns have to spread and consolidate, the more difficult any such revival will be; indeed, almost all observers in Poland with whom I spoke felt that the point of no return in this respect had already been passed, and that revival was out of the question.

Mass culture is primarily a product of industrialisation and the availability of mass communication media. Although in this respect industrialisation may through mass culture produce a barrier against ideological revival, is it not also likely, as is normal in any industrialising society, to produce a differentiation and disintegration of the group consciousness and cohesion of the intelligentsia? Most Polish sociologists today feel that this is unlikely in the near future. The potential threat of the USSR (and, Poles believe, of Germany) to Polish independence seems likely to keep alive the traditional representational (and defiant) role of the country's intelligentsia.[10] Nor has the great influx into the Polish intelligentsia of sons of workers and peasants significantly changed its cohesion and behaviour patterns; they have been rapidly and completely absorbed into it.

FINALLY, what of the relevance of Polish history and tradition to the present situation of apathy, hopelessness, and anti-ideological mass culture behaviour patterns? Is not the contrast with traditional Polish messianism and romanticism too great? Without attempting any definitive answer to this paradox, one can point out that messianism and romanticism, risings and slaughter, are not the only tradition in modern Polish history. Certainly the final partition of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century produced in the next half-century a series of plots, risings, and repressions. However, even in the period immediately preceding the rising of 1863 there was developing a current of thought quite unsympathetic to any such catastrophic solution. After the disastrous failure of the 1863 rising, this current became

[10] On the complex and controversial problem of the Polish intelligentsia, see Jozef Chalasinski, *Przeszlosc i przyszlosc inteligencji polskeij* (Warsaw, 1958); Jan Szczepanski, 'Changes in the Structure and Functions of the Intelligentsia', *International Social Science Bulletin*, XI, 2 (1957); Alicja Iwanska, ed., *Contemporary Poland: Society, Politics and Economy* (New Haven, mimeo. 1955); and (the most recent *study*) K. A. Jelenski, 'The Genealogy of the Polish Intelligentsia', *Soviet Survey*, July–September 1959.

quite naturally much stronger and led to the development of a doctrine called *praca organiczna* (' organic work '), which may be defined as economic cooperation with the Russian (and other) occupiers for the sake of industrialising Poland, while making no ideological, religious, or national compromises.

Today the doctrine of *praca organiczna* is both easier and harder for Poles to accept than after 1863. Easier, because Russification and Russian occupation are, since 1956, less present than after 1863, and because the thermonuclear threat has removed war as a desirable means of change; harder because there is no equivalent for the late nineteenth century surge of industrialisation to give Poles a positive and possible goal towards which to work. Nevertheless, there is, Poles feel, no other possibility. Communist ideology is dead, and the Communist Party continues to hold power in Poland because Poles recognise that it is the only alternative to Red Army tanks. Authority and legitimacy remain primarily incarnated, as during the decades when Poland was partitioned, in the Catholic Church. Revisionism is dead, and the revisionists, themselves democratic socialists in conviction but with no hope of being able to put their beliefs into practice, increasingly accept *praca organiczna* as the only possible position to take.

It is, however, neither a dramatic nor an heroic one; its virtues are those of patience and persistence rather than of courage and self-sacrifice. Now that the thermonuclear threat has ruled out the possibility of any rapid change through war, and that internally-originated change seems unlikely at least so long as Khrushchev (and Gomulka) are in power, Poland looks to another tradition in its history, a tradition which helps it to bide its time, to preserve its patriotism and religion, and to wait, without exaggerated hopes or a sense of crisis, for better times.

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POLISH LITERATURE AFTER OCTOBER

Z. A. Grabowski

THE political thaw after the October 1956 events did not last long, and this also applies to the domain of culture. Outspoken works—like Hlasko's *Cemeteries* and *Next One to Paradise,* or Iwaszkiewicz's *Take-Off*—no longer appear. Writers unwilling to write ' for the desk and posterity ', and impatient of delays in publishing their books, resort to trimming their works in a way that enables them to pass the test of censorship. The Poles have learned the art of adaptability in spite of their rebellious spirit; this, again, is nothing new to them, as they have a long record of living within an imposed order. Both in politics and in literature they have learned the precepts of minimalism, of not reaching for the stars, and although eager to know about all the novelties from the West, and the most recent fashions, literary or other, in London and Paris, they are politically infinitely more adult than they were before the war. It might be said that the unrequited love for the West in matters political has greatly diminished; some say that it has even been extinguished; but the cultural attachment to the West and to the ideas of intellectual freedom it represents, persists.

Only against such a background of disappointment with the results of October 1956, of the silent adoption of a policy of minimalism, of prudence and general caution, against the backcloth of a political retreat from Western orientation and of realistic appreciation of Russia's power as a constant in Polish affairs, of recognition of the stern truth that nobody from outside will come to their rescue—only against the background of such diverse feelings can one understand the literature of present-day Poland.

Of the respected elders of Polish literature, Slonimski (who played a courageous part in the October rebellion) seems to be more and more inclined to look back in melancholy and to recall the past. Some of his new poems are of penetrating bitterness and sadness; he seems to be a man gazing across a wasteland of hope into uncertainty. The humanistic strain is still there, but he has lost his crusader's ardour. Iwaszkiewicz, poet and novelist and excellent editor of the *Tworczosc* (Creation), a monthly which must still be ranked as the finest literary publication in Polish, has shown in *Take-Off* that he can master the new technique and can be no less outspoken than Hlasko himself; this shattering short story, written as a kind of rejoinder to Camus, is missing from the last volume of Iwaszkiewicz's short stories *Tatarak.* It is a significant omission, as it was a brutally frank report on what may now be called Poland's *hora de verdad.* Iwaszkiewicz has lost nothing of his literary deftness; he is one of the Polish writers whose work shows steady and continuous progress.

Parandowski, a noble writer nurtured in the best classical tradition, indefatigable in his pursuit of the charms of the Hellenic world, has written a novel which seems to be a sequel to his pre-war novel *Heaven in Flames.* But while the pre-war story presented the drama of the collapse of faith, the recent novel, it is said, tells of its rebirth. The novel has not yet been published; and there have been rumours about difficulties in having it printed. Parandowski excels, as in the old days, in the art of the essay: he is certainly the finest Polish essayist and one wonders whether the novel form is not slightly alien to him. He is not at his best in building up dramatic tension and portraying clashes of temperament. By nature he is a master of repose, harmony, and grace, and his language and style—like those of Iwaszkiewicz and Dabrowska—shine in the present-day jungle of tortuous, artificial prose.

Dąbrowska recently published a collection of essays on Conrad—a rather meagre gathering of mostly pre-war critical studies, slightly dated—and a volume of impressions of books and travels. The latter is a sheer delight because of its lucid and classically balanced prose. There were rumours, too, about Dabrowska's difficulties with the censorship. It seems that she is restricting herself to small-scale writings, and the hope that she may still complete a vast panorama of wartime and post-war Poland may not be fulfilled.

THERE is a definite decline in the fortunes of the historical novel, which flourished immediately after the war for reasons not far to seek. The new Polish state born of the ashes of the second world war was trying to pick up the threads of its history and wanted to find some sort of *continuum* (the same is true of the celebrations of Poland's millennium; the Poles seem intent on reasserting their traditions and strengthening their roots); secondly, as somebody said, past history was the safest of subjects. There are no further works by Grabski or Golubiew, who delved into Poland's distant past, and it is significant that with these writers silent, and Kossak-Szczucka, who returned to Poland some years ago after a brief stay in the West, turning towards more limited vistas after ambitious plunges into medieval history, the best historical novel was put out by the emigré Parnicki. His *Word and Body* seems to provide a coda to his most unusual cycle of novels about the ages of crisis in the fate of the ancient world, and may suggest comparison with the work of Robert Graves; but though he is also fascinated by the problem of political power, he has a technique of his own; and *Word and Body* is a subtle structure with several layers of meaning.

In the *roman des moeurs* Tyrmand could not continue his venture into contemporary life begun by *The Evil One*, a psychological thriller which augured well for this competent and clever writer. His second novel, *Seven Long Voyages*, was published only in an English translation; it had no chance of appearing in Poland. It is a better effort than the first: the structure is concise, the conflict clearly defined. It is a book of great frankness in matters of sex, a rather new departure in Polish literature which has on the whole maintained (apart from the occasional outbursts of Zeromski, Danilowski, and Kaden) a self-imposed discipline about erotic problems. The new literature is free from the hypocrisy and romantic evasions of the old; and this can also be said of that welcome newcomer, K. Nepomucka, who in her novel with the ironical title *The Imperfect Marriage* has dealt very brutally with matters of sex. Some see in her the heir to Zapolska, a novelist and playwright whose *Pani Dulska* (the Polish version of Mrs Grundy) remains a classic of the Polish theatrical repertoire; Nepomucka, like other young authors, is in rebellion against the old hypocrisy of the middle-class Polish *milieu*.

What about the group of writers, now middle-aged, who acquired prestige after the war and from whom great things were expected? To this generation Rudnicki, Andrzejewski, and (to some extent) K. Brandys belong, and Zukrowski, the youngest of them. Rudnicki, whose pre-war *Rats* created a stir, has achieved in his stories about the Warsaw Ghetto a grandeur and psychological penetration which place him high among the writers about the Jewish tragedy. This seems to be the climax to his achievements; his excursions into more recent times have an air of inadequacy, although *Blue Notes* has the charm of a certain dreamy naïvete; for he can evoke with undeniable force the feeling of being lost in the wide world.

Andrzejewski won fame with his novel *Ashes and Diamonds*, which in its film version won high praise in the West. Though the novel's structure perhaps lacks cohesion and contrast —much better created in the memorable film—it was not only topical but also caught the sense of tragic turmoil of the immediate post-war period when Poles had not yet found their feet. Andrzejewski then switched his attention to history, and in his *Darkness Covers the Earth* (translated into English as *The Inquisitors*), tried to analyse the conscience and mind of Torquemada, a figure who has attracted many writers (among them Dostoevsky). This excursion into history was not a study in escapism, for it has a powerful topical implication. The style is sharply pointed and economical, unlike the writing in *Ashes and Diamonds*. In his latest story, *The Gates of Paradise*, this fascination with history reasserts itself: it is about the children's crusade, told in language reminiscent of the musings of Mrs Bloom in Joyce's *Ulysses*. The river of narrative, flowing without any punctuation, seems intended to suggest the rumbling march of the crusaders. The wisdom of the choice is questionable, for whereas in Joyce's work the style fits the contents like a glove, and the flow of consciousness is superbly captured, in Andrzejewski's story it strikes the reader as a contrived *tour de force*, as though he wanted to show that he, too, could do it (personally, I don't think he has succeeded). But he is a man of great artistic ambitions (it is rumoured that

he is writing a very long saga) though perhaps most at home with smaller units. His novel deals frankly with the problem of homosexuality, which again amounts to surmounting a taboo, for Poland cannot boast of a Wilde or a Gide, and has been content until now with delicate innuendoes.

K. BRANDYS, one of the foremost representatives of the official line in literature, has in his *Matka Krolow* (recently published in English as *Sons and Comrades* by Allen & Unwin, London, 1960) offered a kind of apologia for people who believe in communism without flinching. His *Letters to Mrs. Z.* is written with fluency, though one wonders why he chose that form; was it the easiest way to avoid committing himself? He gives the impression of a man feeling his way, who does not yet know where to direct his steps—a predicament shared by other writers whose god had failed.

A volume of Zukrowski's short stories published after the war, dealt with the campaign of September 1939; they revealed a writer of first-rate ability, but he has not fulfilled their promise. His reportage about the Far East is well written, his reminiscences of youth touching, but he has produced neither a novel nor a story of the calibre and intensity suggested by his early work.

Choromanski, whose pre-war novel *Jealousy and Medicine* (translated into English), was remarkable for its psychological virtuosity and haunting prose rhythms, returned a few years ago to Poland and has since published three books. One of them, actually finished after the war but started before it, *The Red Cross Hospital,* returns to his favourite subject of disease and is in parts brilliant; the volume of short stories, *Man and Woman,* collects his pre-war stories, and is excellent by any standard. His third book, about a South American revolution, is a sad let-down; Choromanski seems to have exhausted the mine of disease and psychopathy on which he drew, and to have turned to mannerisms.

Two trends must be mentioned in this cursory examination of the literature of Poland: the fondness for memoirs and diaries of past times, and the vogue of the travelogue. Poland was never rich in the memoirs which have been such a marked feature of English writing, though there were several excellent memoirists like Pasek and Rzewuski. Now—moved in all probability by the impulse to escapism and by nostalgia for old times—the fashion for memoirs is in full swing, illustrated by the popularity of Chledowski, a savant and a *grand seigneur* with several volumes about the Italian renaissance to his credit, the cultured, well-written memoirs of Wysocki, a familiar figure in the 'Young Poland' movement before he embarked on a diplomatic career; and the memoirs of Bohdanowicz, a minor but very lively courtier in the wings of the *Hofburg;* the favour they enjoy can be explained only by a longing for the departed glory of kings and excellencies.

Never was the thirst for travelogues greater; and never before were so many books—both original and translated—about foreign lands published. This too can be classed as escapism, but the phenomenon is by no means limited to Poland; it seems characteristic of our uncertain epoch. Into this category Dygat's charming novel *The Journey* may be put; he had published more ambitious novels, like *The Bodensee,* but then settled down as an ironic observer of everyday life. Breza's *The Brass Gate,* a *reportage intime* about the Vatican which is far superior to Roger Peyrefitte's superficial and often irritating work, is an anti-Catholic commentary in diary form.

AMONG the younger writers, Hlasko's departure for the West left a cruel gap. Since then he has published nothing, and may thus confirm the verdict of those critics who saw in him another Rimbaud, silent after a precocious start. Others claim that Hlasko, whose sombre colours recall Gorki, will write again when he returns to Poland; that he is so deeply-rooted in his country and so indifferent to what happens elsewhere, that he can write only about Poland. This may be so, for there is no doubt that in his mental make-up and in his emotional propensities he is essentially non-Western. Of the other younger writers we should mention Bratny, whose epic about the Warsaw Rising, *Columbuses, Class 1920,* commanded respect by its sincerity of tone, and whose more recent story *Happy Be the Tortured One,* is much

slighter; and Krzyszton's *Heaven from Stone*, a narrative about people buried under débris in the basement of a Warsaw house during the Rising and an able study in suspense.

Newerly, another representative of the socialist-realist school, author of *Souvenir from a Cellulose Factory*, has recently come out again with a book with a Chinese background, *The Forest Sea*, which malicious tongues call 'In the Desert and in the Jungle after Mao Tse-tung' (Sienkiewicz once wrote a Polish classic for teenagers, *In the Desert and in the Jungle*).

Although hundreds of volumes of poetry are being published, and new poets seem to pop up every month, their influence and striking power appears less today than during the crucial October days, and even less than after the first world war. There is no group like the brilliant *Skamander* trio of Tuwim, Lechon, and Wierzynski; no school like that of Peiper; and no poetic manifestos like those so fashionable some forty years ago. Poets tend more and more towards a solitary existence; some—like Wazyk—are silent; others—like Jastrun—make only infrequent appearances. Przybos, once an innovator, has preserved his nobility of tone and crystal-clear asceticism, but he writes rarely and his main interest seems to be shifting to painting. Woroszylski's *Wanderjahre* is a work of telling bitterness; perhaps the most revealing of all in its undisguised disappointment. Wat's recent poetry—the scenes are of Paris and Sicily—achieves moments of impressive clarity. His come-back was one of the greatest surprises of recent years.

Bialoszewski offers us the spectacle of an esoteric poet of real talent; it is in the world of surrealist painting that one can find a proper measure for his elusive craft; he is the Paul Klee of poetry. Noteworthy too among the poets is Rozewicz, whose bold imagery often recalls St. John-Perse, and Herbert, who exploits the borderland between poetry and philosophy. Two women poets—Buczkowna and Kamienska—follow the poetic tradition of the late Maria Pawlikowska, Poland's Madame de Noailles, a writer of acute observation and precise emotion. They are not exactly cerebral, but are able to use intellectual discipline to harness their emotions.

Reportage *pur sang* is practised by Wankowicz, who returned to Poland from the United States. Wankowicz is enormously popular; besides his rather humdrum reports about America and other lands, he has written a novel about the fate of Canadian Poles. He is indeed a prolific, often a garrulous writer, and though the volume of output must be admired, he lapses more and more often into tedious repetitiveness.

Wankowicz was accorded full honours in Poland, but no such gesture was made to emigré writers with the exception of Parnicki, who is published by the *Pax* organisation and a few others. Although emigré authors like Gombrowicz, Radzyminska, and Sydor Rey were earlier published in Poland, this trend has been virtually halted, and recently emigré writers have not appeared on the lists of publishing houses. These seem to have adopted a once-bitten-twice-shy attitude; their self-imposed censorship has become more marked since their recent experiences with the official censorship.

LITERARY criticism and theatre criticism maintain good standards; there are no critics of the calibre of Stanislas Brzozowski, who some fifty years ago wrote his famous *Legend of Young Poland*, but there is no dearth of excellent and well-informed judges. Stawar, who even before the war tackled literary questions from the standpoint of Marxism, has applied his craft to a serious analysis of Sienkiewicz. After a long silence Wyka returned to literary criticism and published several well-documented essays on contemporary poetry. He is particularly perceptive and informative on young poets and many of them (*e.g.*, J. Harasymowicz) owe their early discovery to this writer. A young critic Andrzej Kijowski is probably the critic least affected by the ponderousness acquired during the 'Stalinist night', the bureaucratic, pseudo-philosophical jargon practised by the official Soviet literary pundits. Bienkowski, too, an expert on French poetry, does not seem to have caught the bacillus of 'soc-philosophy'. The vitriolic critic Sandauer, who made a ruthless onslaught on Andrzejewski and Rudnicki in his *Without Preferential Tariff*, has himself in a volume of essays on poetry, indulged in what some would call a 'soc-realist' attitude;

his admiration for that quixotic genius Gombrowicz, the *miles gloriosus* of Polish literature, is highly exaggerated. Gombrowicz, who lives in the Argentine, but whose books have recently been imported into Poland, has often—and wrongly—been regarded as the latest the West can offer; but his jocular and irreverent style is a welcome antidote to pomposity.

As to the theatre, there are plenty of translations but very few original products. Kruczkowski, who once showed real abilities in his drama *The Germans*, only to deteriorate into tendentious melodrama about the Rosenberg trial, has not demonstrated his full powers in his new play, *The First Day of Freedom*. Morstin, an old hand whose first plays were staged around 1910, cautiously evades contemporary problems in his latest pleasant comedy. Swinarski's witty talent has been exercised on classical themes (Jason, Antigone), while Zawieyski has been silent after his excursion into the cinema. Skowronski's comedy, *The Jugglers*, seems to be one of the most daring ventures in the Polish theatre of late. It is a pity that Brandstaetter cannot display his real range: his plays about Rembrandt and the fraudulent Polish mystic, Towianski, revealed a writer of great seriousness of purpose, and his play *Silence* presented a powerful indictment of the Stalinist period. Satirical theatres are still flourishing; Lec's *Unkempt Thoughts* (recently published in West Germany) shows what can be done in the very restricted medium of 'maxims' that he chose, while Mrozek's *Policemen* must be recognised as one of the most arresting fruits of the recent theatrical harvest. Let it be added that the Warsaw monthly *Dialogue*, in which many original and translated plays appear (it also has an excellent chronicle of foreign productions) has established itself as one of the best publications of its kind in the world.

THE vogue for translations continues; books are published which would scarcely have had a chance of being put out commercially in Poland before the war. The serious gaps which existed in this field, from the works of the Greek philosophers to St. Augustine and 18th century English novels, have been almost filled. It is a stupendous effort which cannot be disregarded, and is accompanied by an increase in the number of good translators, some of them quite outstanding. The range of these translations—from Portuguese to Chinese—is astonishing, too.

Weekly literary papers—combined, as usual in Poland, with politics—have not recovered the terrain won in 1956, when they had a circulation of 150,000 or so copies; this position has not been maintained. Their circulation has dropped not only because they had to put a brake on their freedom of expression—some, like the once courageous *Zycie Literackie*, have lost their audacity; their higher price has also contributed to the drastic decline in circulation. (Poland has no tradition of literary monthlies like France or England.) Even such fine papers as *Tworczosc* now have a limited circulation; most weeklies have become dull and tame, and are plagued by too long and too complex articles written in pseudo-scientific jargon. *Tworczosc* is in a class by itself; its literary chronicle, collated from many European countries, is one of the best to be found anywhere in Europe.

On the whole, although the literature of the last few years has not produced masterpieces—for which literature is always waiting—a fairly good average level has been maintained; vigorous writing may be curbed, but it is not crushed. And even in the darkest moments literature in Poland proved to be the first line of defence of its entity as a European, if not entirely Western, nation.

Correction: We regret an error under *Our Contributors* in our last issue. Mr. S. V. Utechin is Senior Research Officer in Soviet Studies at the London School of Economics. In his review in our last issue, p. 117, column two, lines 33–34 should read: 'to include a comparatively minor church historian, Kapterev, among historians who "firmly established the Russian historical tradition"'.

A NOTE ON POLISH MUSIC

Stefan Kisielewski

POLAND now has a most interesting body of composers, belonging to the middle and younger generation. In recent years attention has mainly focused on the latter, who, having embraced various extremely *avant-garde* theories, such as pointillisme and electronic music, by now have a number of major international successes to their credit. These young enthusiasts of all that is newest in music have established lively contacts with leaders of the same school of thought in the West, like Karlheinz Stockhausen, Pierre Boulez and Luigi Nono. Stockhausen's and Nono's repeated visits to Warsaw; our composers' participation in the celebrated annual festivals and courses of contemporary music at Darmstadt and Donaueschingen; finally the growing importance of the annual 'Warsaw Autumn' music festival—all these have been expressions of the increasingly active role played by the young group of Polish 'post-Webernists' in this country's cultural intercourse with the West.

The present position is in fact something of a surprise, when one compares it with the isolated and indeed parochial state of Polish music from the middle of the nineteenth century to as late as, say, 40 years ago. After Chopin and after the death of Stanislaw Moniuszko (1872), the creator of Polish national opera, Polish music for many years lacked the stimulus of a single powerful personality, and in a country oppressed politically and partitioned by its three neighbours, there was not even any concert life to speak of.

The work of Mieczyslaw Karlowicz (1876–1909) was the first gleam of a renaissance in Polish music, but this was already part of the twentieth century. An outstanding master of the symphony orchestra, a neo-Romantic who took Wagner, Richard Strauss and Skriabin for his models in harmony and orchestration, Karlowicz left a number of fine and mature, even if no doubt eclectic, symphonic compositions. The development of his great talent was cut short by his untimely and tragic death while skiing in the mountains.

Still, Karlowicz's pioneering work was carried on, with a vigour not seen in this country for many years, by a group of younger men, who had all made their débuts at the beginning of this century and called themselves 'Young Poland in Music'. The members of this group were Karol Szymanowski, Ludomir Rozycki, Grzegorz Fitelberg and Apolinary Szeluto. From the time of their first public performance at a joint concert in Warsaw, followed by one in Berlin (1906), they impressed their personality on the country's music, exerting a powerful influence on their juniors. The group's leading figure and the true father of modern Polish music was Karol Szymanowski (1882–1937). A vitally important role was also played by that life-long enthusiast of new music and their indefatigable performer and propagator, the conductor Grzegorz Fitelberg (1879–1953).

Szymanowski's was a rich, flexible and versatile personality. A modern Romantic, he, too, started from eclecticism and—digesting successively the influences of Strauss, Skriabin and Debussy, and also the rather short-lived impact of Stravinsky (the ballet *Harnasie*)—arrived towards the end of his life at a very personal specific synthesis—a blend of what was then regarded as the modern style with certain features of Polish folk music, in which he followed, as he himself said, in the footsteps of Chopin. His most important work was probably the oratorio *Stabat Mater*, music transparently clear, stripped of all embellishment, immaculately polished in its style.

Szymanowski, who was viciously attacked by the conservatives, exerted a spell-binding influence on the young. An influence, incidentally, which was intellectual rather than stylistic. He showed them how to unite the current of Polish music with the European mainstream, emphasising the necessity of mastering the modern composer's craft—the indispensable tool of technique. The centre, where in the years after the first world war this new musical idiom was being forged was, of course, Paris: the Paris of Ravel, Stravinsky, Prokofiev, Roussel and so

many others. And it was Szymanowski who first proclaimed the soon famous slogan: For new musical knowledge, to Paris!

In this way, out of the seeds of the Paris studies grew the new school of Polish composers. It included Jan Maklakiewicz, Kazimierz Sikorski (an outstanding teacher, educator, in later years, of a whole generation of composers), Stanislaw Wiechowicz, Michal Kondracki, Piotr Perkowski, Tadeusz Szeligowski, Boleslaw Woytowicz, Tadeusz Kassern, as well as some who were then beginning their careers: Grazyna Bacewicz, Roman Palester, Antoni Szalowski, Andrzej Panufnik and Michal Spisak. A great influence on the formation of the group's modernistic neo-Classical sympathies was exerted by Nadia Boulanger, the famous teacher of composition, Stravinsky's friend and collaborator.

A striking feature of the group was their complete lack of contact with that other 'nursery' of the new international style, the twelve-tone Viennese school, led by Schonberg and his disciples, Alban Berg and Anton von Webern. This musical trend was at that time almost wholly unknown in Poland and the sole follower of the twelve-note technique, Jozef Koffler, was a lonely figure, enjoying neither success nor understanding. And yet it was the Vienna school which was destined to prove the most fertile, and Anton von Webern is now regarded by the world's musical *avant-garde* as their ideological precursor.

After the second world war, the stylistic centre of gravity of Polish music became stabilised somewhere along the Stravinsky-Bartok line; it was marked by a certain retreat from the *neue Sachlichkeit* and neo-Classical persiflage to the expressionism of the last works of Bartok. Zhdanovist esthetics, though widely discussed and propagated by some musicologists, found no active followers among the leading composers and had no influence whatever on the style and character of Polish musical productions. Among other characteristic musical developments of the post-war years should be noticed the widespread cult of pure jazz among young people; this cult was once half-secret, but today it is open and very intense.

Many new and interesting composers now appeared on the scene. In Poland there were Artur Malawski (1904–57), Witold Lutoslawski (probably the most gifted of the Polish composers now active), Boleslaw Szabelski, Grazyna Bacewicz (the world's only woman composer of that standing), Zbigniew Turski and others. Some composers settled permanently abroad: Antoni Szalowski and Michal Spisak, both still adhering to the neo-Classical tradition, in Paris; Roman Palester in Munich; Andrzej Panufnik in England; Constantin Regamey, the Swiss composer of Polish descent, in Lausanne; Michal Kondracki in New York.

The younger generation, who first entered the musical arena in the years 1946–50, have so far been writing along more or less the same lines, in the traditional Bartok-Stravinsky 'modernist' idiom. Among this group one should perhaps mention Kazimierz Serocki, Tadeusz Baird, Jan Krenz, Stanislaw Skrowaczewski, Wlodzimierz Kotonski and Wojciech Kilar.

Somewhere around the year 1954, a musical idea quite novel to this country, even though by then widely talked about in the world at large, began to ferment in the minds of our youngest composers, some of whom were still pursuing their musical studies. This idea was to have a complete renewal of the musical language by way of a total organisation of the sound material through the use of the twelve-note technique, either in its older, Schonbergian edition or in the Webernist, 'pointilliste' interpretation of today.

The main exponent of the new trend was the Cracow composer and theoretician Boguslaw Schaffer, author of three widely-discussed books, *New Music, An Almanac of Twentieth-Century Music* and *An Almanac of Contemporary Polish Composers.*

Apart from Schaffer, the idea of 'total renewal' also gradually gained ground among a group of young music critics in Warsaw, of whom Bohdan Pociej has shown himself to be the most profound.

Theory was followed by practice. The twelve-note camp was now joined by Baird, Serocki and Kotonski, as well as by their senior, Szabelski. At the same time even younger adepts of pointillisme appeared on the scene, some of them extraordinarily gifted, such as Henryk Gorecki, Krzysztof Penderecki and Witold

Szalonek. Experimental trends investigating the very source of sound—electronic music and *musique concrète*—also found their adherents: Jozef Patkowski, head of the electronics research department of Warsaw radio, Wlodzimierz Kotonski, and the composer and conductor Andrzej Markowski, a vigorous populariser of the new ideas.

Last year's 'Warsaw Autumn' Festival, which included performances of a number of Polish and foreign pointilliste compositions, became a manifestation of this new movement in Polish music. The Festival was striking testimony to the decisive turning-point at which this country's musical vanguard now finds itself. It is, of course, hardly possible at this point to try to make prophecies about Polish pointillisme, other experiments, and their future prospects. Obviously, what is most interesting is whether, and to what extent, it will become our own national contribution to the international musical renewal. However, one must be patient and wait for an answer to this question. History, as usual, will have the last word. But, in ending, it does seem worth stressing once more that the activities of our front-rank composers and their contacts with their counterparts in other countries do certainly constitute a major element of the greatly desired cultural co-existence between East and West.

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SOCIAL POLICY UNDER GOMULKA

Janina Miedzinska

Workers' Self-government

AT first it looked as though the October upheaval of 1956 would bring about important and lasting changes in labour relations in Poland. One of its most significant features was the appearance of the workers councils which began to emerge spontaneously in factories as early as the summer of that year.

It is easy to understand the reason for this movement, which arose partly from below and partly in response to the initiative of the 'revisionist' intelligentsia. For a number of years the workers had suffered from the appalling organisation of factory labour and from managerial inefficiency, to which the so-called social promotion, i.e., appointment of managers on the basis not of their qualifications but of their political outlook and party membership, had greatly contributed. This caused great wastage and constant loss of output, reflected in the first instance in the extremely low level of workers' earnings. The workers wanted, therefore, to gain some influence over the organisation of production in enterprises, believing that by eradicating the most blatant faults they could help to improve their own difficult economic situation.

In the revolutionary climate prevailing at the time, these endeavours found formal embodiment in the Decree of 19 November 1956 on Workers Councils. According to this decree, the formation of workers councils was to be strictly linked with greater autonomy for individual enterprises, which until then had been directed from above even in the most trivial details. The workers councils and the increased autonomy of individual enterprises were to be basic features of the new economic model and of the 'Polish way to socialism'.

The decree gave to the workers councils elected directly by the factory personnel, fairly wide powers. They were to have some influence over the management of the enterprise, its organisation and development, over the annual plan of production, the scale of earnings, working regulations, and so on.

A great number of workers councils came into being: by the end of 1957 they numbered more than 5,600. Some of them, in spite of being short-lived, produced tangible results, but these were confined almost exclusively to the so-called 'experimental enterprises'[1] which were temporarily given more rights and greater autonomy, and which were able to introduce some fundamental changes in the organisation of production.

However, the majority of the workers councils soon found themselves in a difficult situation, not only because of their lack of experience but in the first place because of the slow tempo of change in the economic model, change which was deliberately curbed from above, and after the original wave of enthusiasm disillusionment and discouragement set in. But this was not the decisive factor which settled the fate of the workers councils. The party, split during October, was unable to oppose them, even though it realised the dangers inherent in their spontaneous emergence. The party first tried to check the movement, to influence elections to the councils in order to infiltrate them with party majorities; in this it failed. In many councils the number of party members was negligible and very rarely exceeded 50 per cent. The attempt to capture the councils from within by creating disciplined party nuclei inside them also failed.

The party was therefore compelled to find other means of rendering the councils harmless. Direct liquidation would have been difficult to implement as it would have marked too blatantly the reversal from October. Therefore a less obvious method was found in the establishment of so-called 'workers self-government', within which the workers councils would have very little say.

For this purpose a Decree on Workers' Self-Government was introduced in December 1958. It replaced the Decree of November 1956 on

[1] Such as the automobile factory in Zeran, well known for its prominent participation in the October movement.

Workers Councils and substituted in their place the so-called Congress of Workers' Self-Government.

The congress, which meets quarterly, is a very large body. It is composed of all the members of the party committee in each enterprise, members of the local trade union organisations, and of the workers councils where such still exist. Where they do not exist self-government is made up solely of party and trade union cells.

In places where the workers councils have survived they were put under the direct supervision of the party and the trade unions, which now control them through nominated officials. The trade unions, which previously had taken no part in the activities of the workers councils, were now given wide powers over them, and as in the meantime the party had been able to regain control of the trade union movement, which after October tried to become autonomous, it had nothing to fear from entrusting the trade unions with the supervision of the workers councils. According to the new decree the trade unions were to ensure the smooth functioning of the councils, lay down their election rules, determine their size and term of office, conditions of dissolution, and the scope of their activity. In short, under the new balance of power, the workers councils altogether lost their independence.

The Decree on Workers' Self-Government also differed in scope from the earlier decree; now the main emphasis was on 'social control' and on the 'educational functions' of workers' self-government, such as raising the standards of labour discipline, increasing productivity through socialist emulation, eradicating pilfering, and so on.

In these circumstances the workers have shown little interest in the activities either of the self-government congress or the workers councils, which are in any case slowly disappearing. The quarterly meetings of the congress are a ritual occasion; the workers do not take part in the discussions, and in many enterprises all important matters relating to self-government are dealt with by proxy, i.e., by a committee of four, consisting of the director of the factory, the secretary of the party organisation, the chairman of the trade union organisation, and the chairman of the workers council. This is far removed from the idea of workers' participation in the management of enterprises which workers' self-government was ostensibly designed to implement.

Trade Unions

A SIMILAR retreat from October has occurred in the field of trade unionism. Before October the trade unions, then strictly modelled on the Soviet pattern, were a willing tool of the party, dealing exclusively with matters relating to production and productivity. As was later candidly admitted: 'In the name of the economic plan, which took priority over the needs and the rights of the workers, the trade unions continually tolerated brutal violations of the law, particularly in the social sphere'.[2] Consequently, when the idea of workers' self-government began to emerge, the mood prevailing among the workers made it imperative that the workers councils should be formed outside and apart from the trade unions, which were by then thoroughly discredited.

The same revolutionary mood and pressure from below also began to change the character of the trade unions themselves. New slogans were put forward, calling for an overhaul of the organisation of the unions and clamouring for changes. These were to be in three directions: first, more freedom from direct party control—the trade unions no longer wanted to be a party 'transmission belt'. Secondly, there was to be a change in the scope of union activity which, instead of exclusive preoccupation with the fulfilment of the economic plan, should be directed to defending the workers' interests. Thirdly, there was a demand for change in the organisation of the unions themselves in order to get rid of their bureaucratic structure and to secure greater autonomy for individual unions. These hopes found expression at the IX Plenum of the central committee of the trade unions in November 1956.

Both the hopes and the achievements were short-lived. After six months the party, now

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[2] *Przeglad Zagadnien Socjalnyeh*, November 1956, 'For agricultural reform and reform of the working methods of the trade unions'.

stronger and more consolidated, no longer permitted the trade unions to escape its direct control. Once again it tried to steer their activities towards the sphere of production. An illustration of this reversal was given in an article by the new leader of the trade union central committee, published in June 1957. It contained a warning against 'revisionist' tendencies within the trade union movement, against the attempts to resurrect 'obsolete social-democratic theories denying and minimising the role of the party'.[3] It stated categorically that the unions should not restrict their activity to problems of the workers' livelihood but should take a firm grip on questions connected with production and make a determined effort to improve the functioning of the economy as a whole.

In July 1957, on the basis of these directives, the XI Plenum of the trade union central committee reasserted that 'the Polish Communist Party is the vanguard of the Polish working class, playing the leading role in the life of the nation and the country'. The party was now ready and able to subordinate the workers councils to the trade unions, now once again obedient.

Labour Discipline

CONSIDERABLE changes did, however, follow October in labour relations within enterprises, after the Decree on the Socialist Discipline of Labour, introduced on the Soviet pattern in 1950 and held in great contempt by the workers, was annulled. Under this decree absence from work without cause of up to three days' duration was punishable with a fine, amounting to twice or three times the worker's daily earnings. After an absence of four days in any one year the worker had to face trial and was liable to six weeks imprisonment. The courts were overburdened with such cases and special divisions were established to hear them.

It was not, however, only the letter of the law which subjected the workers to such severe discipline. The pressure came from all directions; from the factory management, the trade unions and the party cells within enterprises, and as in the coal mines from the secret police as well.

[3] *Przeglad Zwiazkowy*, June 1957.

It had been hoped that this pressure would increase productivity. During the period of far-too-rapid industrial expansion from 1950 to 1956, the workers were expected to increase their effort while the level of earnings remained too low for subsistence.

This state of affairs was bound to end as the revolutionary mood began to spread; one of its first visible signs was the street demonstration by the workers of Poznan in June 1956. In response to it, as early as September 1956 a new decree replaced the 1950 decree on labour discipline and the atmosphere in industry immediately became less tense. Labour discipline was relaxed, but at the end of 1957 and in 1958 there was an increase in the rate of absenteeism without cause and absence due to illness which continued to grow steadily from year to year. The government attributed this excessive absenteeism to the disappearance of administrative pressure on the workers. It was obvious that the artificially maintained discipline had to be relaxed once the atmosphere of terror and the fear of severe punishment had disappeared from the factories. The whole subject is still widely discussed in Poland, and the prevailing opinion is that this extremely complex phenomenon has a multiplicity of causes, social, economic, and other.

Above all, absenteeism reflects the extremely bad state of the organisation of production.[4] One characteristic feature is the uneven flow of supplies of raw materials, which in turn causes bottlenecks in the process of production, followed by periods of frantic activity in an effort to fulfil the output plan.[5] This hardly conditions the worker to steady work; it creates in his mind a constant image of chaos, disorder, and indiscipline.

The level of earnings, though slightly higher than before October, is still so low that the worker is compelled to look for additional

[4] *Zycie Gospodarcze*, 11 September 1960: 'In many branches of our industry, in spite of technical advances, the organisation of labour not only has not improved but is relatively worse than it was 20 years ago'.

[5] A survey carried out in a number of steel factories in 1959 revealed that in many of them periods of idleness due to bad organisation of production and uneven flow of supplies of raw materials amounted at times to 40 per cent of the total number of working hours.

sources of income and this, of course, is another cause of absenteeism. Bad labour relations, the absence of safety precautions, deficient hygiene, constant violations by the administration of rules relating to the protection of labour, also contribute in no small measure to the high rate of absenteeism, give rise to a spirit of discontent, and foster a 'couldn't care less' attitude on the part of the workers, and result in a high rate of absenteeism either without cause or excused by the slightest ailment.

So long as the present system of management continues, there is no hope that these conditions will change; the press has asserted that 'excessive absenteeism without cause has become a chronic ailment of the Polish economy'.[6] The government is trying to cure it by again tightening up labour discipline. Under a directive issued in 1957, regulations on labour discipline were to be replaced by internal rules within each enterprise laying down punishments for absenteeism without cause and for being late for work. These punishments were to be graded: first an admonition, then a warning, and only then were fines and other sanctions to be applied. In February 1960 this directive was given a much sharper form; enterprises were directed to impose fines for a first offence.

The social security regulations introduced in the past few years have also been aimed at tightening up labour discipline. The rules governing sick leave on the basis of a medical certificate have been made more strict, and increased sickness benefits for families are payable only if the worker has not been absent without due cause for one day a month. This last rule causes particular hardship to workers with low earnings and large families, in whose case an increase for dependants is a considerable addition to their earnings.

Labour Legislation

THE CHAOS which reigns in the sphere of labour legislation is an outstanding feature of labour relations in Poland. Although a number of regulations on labour safety introduced in the inter-war years are still in force, they are constantly being supplemented by new regulations which only too often contradict each other. It is stated that they number more than ten thousand; the figure is formidable in itself, and even venerable legal experts get lost in this maze.[7]

Before October, the methods applied often violated the principle of legality; decrees were revoked by virtue of a subordinate order, such as directives, resolutions, or circulars from individual ministers. This state of affairs could hardly foster respect for labour legislation in individual enterprises, where the regulations in force were often completely disregarded. It was not only the state of the law itself which led to the violation of regulations on labour safety. The fact that there was no supervision by the government also contributed in no small measure to this process.

For a short period, immediately after 1945, the pre-war government labour control commission continued to function. Its structure was uniform all over the country and it had wide supervisory and penal powers; all regulations on labour safety came within its scope. However, in People's Poland the existence of such a commission proved to be inconvenient, as it would have interfered with the fulfilment of the production plan which had to be met at all costs, regardless of the workers' safety. The commission was therefore gradually liquidated and finally ceased to exist altogether in 1954. It was replaced, following the Soviet example, by the so-called technical inspectorate of labour, attached to the trade unions and organised on a branch basis. Being split up among different unions, this inspectorate lacked a uniform policy; its penal powers were restricted and its supervisory powers limited to questions of safety and hygiene. In this way most of the regulations on the protection of labour remained outside its sphere, which resulted in their open and universal violation, particularly those relating to the protection of the labour of women and young persons.

In the course of heated discussions on the subject which followed October, demands were put forward for the re-introduction of the

[6] *Przeglad Zwiazkowy*, October 1959: 'Absenteeism —the Unknown Continent'.

[7] *Glos Pracy*, 14 June 1958: 'Let us build a dam against the flood of circulars and regulations'.

government inspectorate, with its old structure and powers. So far, however, these demands have not been met and open violation of labour legislation is an everyday occurrence.

Safety and Hygiene

TRADE UNION inspection of labour has produced no results in the field entrusted to it concerning safety and hygiene. Legal chaos reigns also in this sphere, making it hard to know which regulations are still in force and which are not. Recently as many as 934 regulations on labour safety and hygiene were enumerated, of which at least 25 per cent are obsolete.

The picture is no brighter in individual enterprises. Alongside the trade union technical inspection of safety and hygiene there has existed since 1950 a large body of safety and hygiene officers, beginning at the ministerial level, through intermediate organs, down to individual enterprises. These officers are usually ill-equipped for their job, being untrained. There is also a separate body of sanitary inspectors, and the overlapping of functions does not help to improve working conditions in factories where the management, being solely concerned with the fulfilment of the production plan, tend to ignore these matters.

It is not surprising that both the technical journals and the general press are constantly concerned with the increasing number of accidents at work, particularly major accidents, and the increase in the number of working days lost from illness caused by bad working conditions. A great deal has been written about the lack of special installations for extracting steam and harmful dust not only in the old factories, but also in the newly built ones. Where such installations were put in they were either not suitable or were not in use. The results of a survey carried out in 1960 in 835 factories in the most heavily industrialised area—around Katowice—can serve as an illustration. The inspection commission found that in 600 factories the ventilating apparatus was not being used either in order to save electricity or because the apparatus was dismantled and the electric motors used in production.

Factory managers are treated with such leniency for violation of rules relating to safety and hygiene that they have little inducement to honour them; in fact they are better off paying a small fine and then receiving a bonus for overfulfilment of the production plan.

Working Hours

ALTHOUGH today as before an 8-hour working day and a 46-hour week is obligatory in Poland, workers in factories do excessive overtime in spite of the regulations which forbid this.[8] This state of affairs is mainly due to the irregular pace of production in factories, as after each bottleneck it is necessary to make up for the lost time by working overtime.

Nevertheless considerable improvements have been made in this area. Before October workers were being paid for overtime at the basic rate even though they were supposed to be paid at a rate 50–100 per cent higher. Often they were not paid for overtime at all. Since October, however, the workers are not only paid according to the existing rules—although not always and not everywhere—but in an effort to make up for the wrongs done to them in the past, a decree was issued in November 1956 authorising the payment of retrospective claims. These claims consisted mainly of sums of money owing to workers for overtime.

Soon after this decree came into force, the claims reached an estimated total of 9 milliard zlotys, which would have placed a very heavy burden on the Treasury. As, moreover, it would have been very difficult to check the authenticity of these claims, accumulated over so many years, a retreat was ordered and in March 1957 a new decree abolished all retrospective claims; this naturally aroused great resentment among the workers.

An attempt was also made to amend a rule which had operated extremely unfairly—the resolution of 1951 on unlimited working hours —and which was never made public. In striking contrast to the decree on working hours, this resolution laid down that an 8–10-hour working day did not apply to workers in so-called managerial positions, to whom overtime was not payable. The term ' managerial position ' was given

[8] According to these regulations overtime should not exceed 120 hours per worker per year; permission has to be granted before overtime can be introduced at all.

a wide interpretation and was applied to a whole range of middle and lower factory personnel, foremen, stockkeepers, and so on.

After October the government tried to introduce some reforms in this field. In 1958 a suitable clause was inserted in the decree on working hours, but its ambiguous formulation did not satisfy the categories of labour affected, who felt that the decree continued to provide the basis for their exploitation, particularly the middle and lower ranks of factory personnel.

Protection of Female Labour

DURING the period of rapid industrial expansion (1950–55) which caused a great shortage of labour, the large-scale recruitment of female labour was encouraged. Both the party and the trade unions, under the guise of advocating equal rights for men and women, backed the campaign strongly, even where it meant that women would be doing very heavy work.

The picture began to change from the beginning of 1956. The press admitted that grave mistakes had been made by confusing the concept of equal rights with the employment of women in occupations not compatible with their physical make-up; the social pressure was removed, but in fact very little changed in the field of post-October labour legislation or in the practice concerning female labour.

The only radical change was the discontinuation of female labour in coal mines, where, following the Soviet example and contrary to the practice in the whole civilised world, women had been employed since 1951.[9] During 1956 and 1957 a few thousand women ceased to work underground, and such work was formally banned when a revised index of jobs designated as unsuitable for women was published. But they continued to be employed in a number of other unsuitable jobs; the regulations authorising the employment of women on night shifts (with the exception of pregnant women and mothers of children under one) is still in force. So are the regulations forbidding factory managers to exempt women from night work in factories where three shifts are worked, and there are many such factories in Poland. It should be remembered that in Poland a married woman who goes out to work feels the double burden of household duties and outside work much more than her counterpart in the West, because of the shortages of consumer goods and the lack of labour-saving domestic appliances. This makes it even more difficult for a working housewife to rest during the day after a night shift.

An interesting illustration of this problem was given in a debate in the Sejm in 1959, when it was tentatively suggested that the number of hours on night shifts worked by women in the textile industry, where female labour constitutes 63 per cent of the total labour force, should be reduced from 6 to 5 nights a week, the change being made gradually, starting with one night shift less a month. But even this proposal received no attention.

Women still continue to be employed in a number of jobs which before the war were designated as unsuitable for them. They are still exposed to poisonous substances particularly harmful to females. The regulations introduced in 1951, according to which it was permissible to employ women where there were noxious gases and odours, provided their concentration in the air did not exceed a specified norm, were retained. Since, however, in most factories there is no extracting apparatus, this stipulation is quite unrealistic; a case was reported from Lodz in which 40 women employed in a radio and televison factory suffered from poisoning, and it was found that the concentration of noxious gases in the air exceeded the norm 40-fold.

Juvenile Labour

BOTH BEFORE and after October the problem of youth employment defied solution. In 1957, in search of additional labour power, and following the Soviet example, the school-leaving age was lowered from 15 to 14. An effort was made to justify this premature employment of young persons by the argument that the young people were learning a trade, and between the ages of 14–16 were only working as apprentices.

In practice, however, there were no facilities for learning in factories; there were no special workshops where instruction could be given; no schools attached to factories, and nobody in the

[9] The law forbidding the employment of women in coal mines was passed in Britain in 1842.

factory to take any interest in the scheme. As at the same time the provision of further education was no longer made compulsory, and the whole network of evening schools was liquidated, the young people were in fact employed as workers and straightaway allowed to work for piece rates. Under these conditions a clever young worker was able to earn more on piece rates than an old trained worker and therefore regarded training with contempt as it would not improve his earning capacity.

Enterprises solely concerned with production ceased to observe the law on the protection of the labour of young persons, and as there was no organ of control there was in fact no protection of the labour of young persons. After October this practice—or non-practice—was referred to as one of the most deadly sins of the past few years. In July 1958 a decree was introduced to correct the mistakes of the past.

The new decree left the school-leaving age at 14 but retained the fiction of apprenticeship in factories, and proposed its extension to embrace almost all working persons under 18. Extremely detailed regulations were drawn up, but nothing practical was done to enable enterprises to organise technical tuition or to encourage them to take an interest in the training of young persons. It is not surprising that an enquiry carried out in 600 enterprises a year after the introduction of the decree revealed that the new principles were not being implemented; similar revelations are to be found in the press in 1960.

Young persons are still employed mainly as workers, on piece rates; they do not attend night school, for although it has once more become the duty of enterprises to provide further education it is not easy to rebuild schools which have been dismantled. Nobody carries the responsibility for ensuring that the young persons are employed in accordance with the regulations, which are in fact ignored everywhere. Young persons are employed on night shifts, work overtime and in jobs designated as unsuitable; they are not given medical examinations and so on.

The decree of 1958 not only did not produce positive results; it led to a state of affairs in which factories unwilling to assume the tiresome duty of providing training try to avoid employing persons under 18 altogether, and the number of young persons actually employed has been falling from year to year. In 1957 there were already 46·5 per cent of those between 14–17 neither at school nor at work. The situation could become quite tragic in the coming years, as in 1965 the number of young persons between these ages will be twice as high as in 1957.

Summary

THE CHANGES which have taken place in Poland since October in the field of industrial relations have not been far-reaching. The relaxation of administrative pressure and iron discipline could not by itself remove the source of conflict, eradicate the feeling of discontent among the workers, or change their negative attitude to work, expressed in the high rate of absenteeism.

The level of wages still remains very low, conditions of safety and hygiene are still poor, there is no instrument for protecting the workers. The bad state of organisation of work and lack of interest on the part of the management in the workers' welfare and in the methods of improving industrial relations also give rise to conflicts and tensions. Today, as before, 'the Plan has become an end in itself, the highest directive, regardless of the social cost of production'.[10]

Lately, however, although slowly and cautiously, and with a bow to Marxism and Leninism, the press is beginning to pay some attention to the human element in the process of production, recognising that the abolition of private ownership and socialisation of industry (the word nationalisation is not used) do not by themselves remove antagonisms. Lately a few industrial relations centres have been attached to factories (only a few in the whole of Poland), but it is doubtful how much ground such advanced methods will be able to gain.

Industrial sociologists, who after 1956 were allowed to study Western literature on the subject and to do some research in Poland, have found little scope for the practical application of their ideas, and with the reimposition of party controls it is not likely that they will be more influential in the immediate future.

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[10] *Zycie Gospodarcze*, 22 February 1959.

'Dangerous Streets'

WAYWARD YOUTH ON THE VISTULA

Antoni Pospieszalski

THERE was a time when, in the People's Democracies, there were no such things as, say, railway accidents or robberies. There was also no juvenile delinquency. Such incidents and situations were excluded as a matter of principle from the news. What there was of the usual sorrows afflicting the life of any modern society was due to the vile machinations of American spies, or could be brushed aside as insignificant remnants of bourgeois morality. The overall picture was one of a harmonious society marching in brotherly love towards the twin ideals of peace and socialism.

In the last few years a more realistic picture of life under communism has begun to emerge, or rather to find its way into the national press and official pronouncements. And so juvenile delinquency has also been discovered. It has been conceded that Russian educators and the Komsomol have a major problem on hand in the form of the Moscow *stilyagi,* and that the streets of Warsaw swarm with gangs of hooligans of a rather dangerous kind. In the mid-fifties Leopold Tyrmand wrote a novel presenting a detailed and intimate picture of the Warsaw underworld in which juvenile gangs played a major part.[1] The novel, though perhaps too longwinded for a successful thriller, served as an eye-opener and became a best-seller in Poland (and was paid the compliment of being translated into English and several other languages). About the same time the problem of juvenile delinquency became the subject of serious research by criminologists, sociologists, and social workers. The present book by C. Czapow and S. Manturzewski under the picturesque title *Dangerous Streets* appears to be the most ambitious attempt in this field so far.[2]

The problem of juvenile delinquency is not easy to define with any degree of precision; it has some extremely fuzzy edges. At one end it passes imperceptibly into childish pranks; indeed, there are cases where 'juvenile delinquency' seems to be no more than a spectre conjured up by stuffy middle-aged respectability. At the other end it is indistinguishable from adult professional crime. Nevertheless, there remains a sizeable hard core of juvenile delinquency with some peculiar characteristics of its own. It appears to be a form of youthful rebellion against accepted social standards. What distinguishes it most sharply from ordinary criminal conduct is the fact that these juvenile excesses often have no external motive or purpose. If it is theft it is divorced from the desire for material gain; if it means inflicting bodily harm or outright murder, it is not out of hatred for the victim; if it is destruction, destruction is not a means to an end but an end in itself. The motivation is purely internal, the offensive acts spring from a deep-rooted complex of socio-psychological factors which scientists and educationists are trying to unravel with the help of such concepts as 'low threshold of frustration' or 'maladjustment'.

As such the problem seems to be a feature of our epoch. Though present in the years between the wars, it has come markedly to the fore since the end of the second world war. Again the edges are not clearly defined. Were there no juvenile delinquents in the past? What about the youthful crooks of Dickens' world in nineteenth-century England? For all our sympathy, would it not be correct to say that such delightful heroes as Tom Sawyer and Huckleberry Finn were in fact very close to what we should nowadays call juvenile delinquency? Or, to go further afield, what about the followers of young Alcibiades, destroying or defacing statues at night in ancient Athens? Statistical records only reach back a few dozen years, and even those relating to our own days are a far from reliable guide as to whether the number of crimes (as distinct from cases brought to court) has been increasing or not.

THE book under review touches upon all these questions, though of course it cannot give definite answers. In fact, the authors try to give the reader the broadest possible view

[1] L. Tyrmand, *Zły* (Warsaw, 1957). English translation, *Zły* (London, 1958).

[2] C. Czapow, S. Manturzewski, *Niebezpieczne ulice* (Warsaw, 1960).

of all the issues involved: psychological, social, educational, statistical, and historical. To this end they have marshalled an imposing literature on the subject, mainly English and American, but also a fair number of Polish studies. Unfortunately, they seem to get a little lost in the wealth of material. Part of the trouble seems to be the dual authorship and lack of coordination. The same aspect of the problem comes under discussion again and again in different contexts, and tends to degenerate into mere summaries of often conflicting views held by different writers. Seldom are the authors able to extricate themselves from the maze, and offer a reasonably unified view of their own. But despite these shortcomings, the parts of the book devoted to the general issues provide a useful background for the rest, which is an original contribution by the authors of *Dangerous Streets*.

For what is interesting in the book is not its generalisations, but its particulars. Messrs Czapow and Manturzewski were not content to read and summarise books. They went out to meet the Warsaw hooligans personally, to talk to them, to live with them, to study them—and to help them. This is what is called 'the participant observation method', and its results give their account the ring of truth and authenticity. By far the most exciting passages in the book are the detailed reports of encounters with members of this or that gang, sometimes of exploits in which they took part, written down, so to say, in the heat of the moment. We get a series of extremely vivid portraits of a number of Warsaw hooligans more or less deeply involved in crime and other forms of delinquency, all of them with rather picturesque names: Atomek (Little Atom), Klarnet (Clarinet), Sledzik (Little Herring), etc. In all, the authors were in touch with 15 gangs and 74 boys, though not all get detailed treatment in the book.

There is in addition a rich assortment of short memoirs, autobiographical sketches written by boys and girls in their teens, and other documentary material bearing on the causes of juvenile delinquency. One most interesting item is an extract from an autobiographical novel written by a (presumably reformed) delinquent. With extraordinary insight it tells the story of a diffident boy, haunted by a sense of his own inadequacy, who develops into a powerful gang leader, and finds fulfilment and glory in rowdy exploits and violence.

The participant observation method abounds in risks for the investigators. It requires not only a fair measure of physical courage (there are casualties in gang warfare), but also a good deal of moral courage and common sense. The investigator must get sufficiently involved to win the confidence of the boys; on the other hand he must know where to stop, and, above all, in the midst of rows, drinking orgies, and sexual licence he must keep cool and observant. On the whole it seems that Czapow and Manturzewski played safe and kept well on this side of the invisible borderline, but they certainly penetrated deeply enough to achieve their purpose. They are never observers only; throughout they show genuine concern and sympathy for the objects of their study, and are always on the look-out for opportunities to break the vicious circle. They try gentle methods of re-education, in some cases with notable success (Sledzik).

What is the upshot of this inquiry? The most general conclusion is that Polish hooliganism is true to form. It is a local instance of the general complaint which seems to pester, in varying degrees, any modern industrial society. The symptoms are the same as, say, in England or America; it is genuine hooliganism as characterised by its lack of ostensible purpose, crime for crime's sake (cf. the American 'rebel without a cause'); its roots are traceable to the same psychological and social disorders. The local variety has, of course, some distinctive features, though these are very difficult to define. Perhaps it would be better to say that it has its local colour and forms. A typical exploit, for instance, is what is called 'a hunt with a kid'. This is how it was explained:

> There are usually three of us: myself, Mundek, and Bolek. Bolek, who is 12, is the kid. He usually starts the game. He challenges a passing student. We follow behind and pretend not to know him. Bolek hurls abuse at the chap. If that is not enough, he may kick him or knock his cap off. When the student reacts we get at him: 'What do you think you are doing? Beating a child? You blackguard . . .' and we knock him down. Sometimes the public even encourages us.

It is all completely gratuitous. I quote this example because in the book the 'hunt with the kid' serves as a standard reference. It illustrates perfectly the utter senselessness of it all.

Of course, not all exploits have this 'classical' form. There may be a spurious motive in the form of a lack of money or food or entertainment; but then this lack can be created at will by reckless spending. Atomek has been provided by his kind patrons with a cosy job in their Youth Club, but all the same he is penniless most of the time; this state of permanent destitution does not prevent him from having a holiday with a girl in the most fashionable Polish health resort of Krynica, though presumably not in anything like a fashionable hotel. The Polish hooligan is an expert in bypassing laws and bye-laws and their representatives, including tram conductors and railway guards.

LOOSE sex relations are a matter of course, and often provide the necessary pretext for a street fight. Here is Atomek again, speaking to one of his preceptors (Atomek is a very colourful figure and he is most extensively portrayed in the book, but he seems to be typical enough):

> I've found something. Export quality . . . Not for once only, for I need something regularly. We were standing last night outside the Moskwa cinema, and here comes a dolly. What a dolly! A chappy goes to her and takes her under the chin. Then she says: 'Go away, brute'. So I come in and I says: 'My colleague will kindly stand off—yes or no?'—and he gives me one in the snout. So now the other boys came in and we licked him thoroughly. So the goods are procured. She thanked me very much and we went straight off to the cinema together . . . . So you see, I came to ask for some 40 zlotys advance, if possible, and two days off, because . . . you know what I mean . . .

These are a few glimpses of the surface phenomena. The authors, of course, try to penetrate in each case to the underlying causes. But the overall conclusion appears to be that whatever ostensible causes of delinquent behaviour can be pinned down, they seem to play no more than a subsidiary part. Broken homes—yes, but youthful rogues spring up also in the bosom of highly respectable families; bad education—certainly, but often the rowdies have more than average intelligence. And the same goes for bad housing, squalor, and poverty.

There is, however, one set of conditions, at least in Poland, which seems to be more directly connected with juvenile delinquency than any of those mentioned above. In Poland the trouble is particularly pronounced in highly industrialised areas or areas which are in the course of intensive development. Warsaw rising from its war-time destruction is, of course, a melting pot of people from all over Poland; so is Nowa Huta, the brand new steel-town on the outskirts of Cracow; Wroclaw in the Western Territories is the new home of thousands transplanted from behind the Curzon Line; Lodz and the Silesian mining district are traditional centres of industry. In all these places juvenile delinquency is rampant. On the other hand it is relatively absent in the more settled provinces of Great Poland and Pomerania; there is very little of it in Poznan or Bydgoszcz.

Contrary to what might have been expected, there is no evidence that juvenile delinquency in Poland is directly connected with communism and lack of political freedom, although communist methods of forcible industrialisation may have contributed to it. The authors are relatively uninhibited about the political realities of the country (particularly with regard to the not too distant Stalinist past), and where necessary take them into consideration.

There is, for instance, an interesting chapter on the history of a workers' hostel attached to the famous motor works at Zeran near Warsaw, which played such a prominent part in the workers' movement during 1956. It shows how, in the atmosphere of the 'thaw' preceding the October upheaval, a community of rootless and irresponsible rowdies begin to show a serious-minded and intelligent interest in their work, in the economic performance of their establishment, and the great social and political issues which faced the country at the time. Indeed, the story of the Zeran hostel might be construed as an oblique demonstration of the regime's responsibility for juvenile delinquency. As soon as the largely delinquent young workers attained a sense of freedom, as soon as they were free to respond to the flow of ideas, apathy and irresponsibility gave way to enlightened concern; but to do this would not be quite fair. The change in October 1956 and the part the Zeran community played in it were due to a complex set of exceptional circumstances. The political excitement of the period undoubtedly provided for many young people a useful alternative to the baser excitements of the street, but there is nothing to warrant the

belief that democratic politics will *always*, and in more normal circumstances, present itself to young rowdies as the more attractive of the two. If that were so the democracies should be free of the scourge of juvenile delinquency.

There is in the book some indication where the true responsibility of the regime lies: namely, in the false facade of a socialist society virtually without problems which could hardly admit so much as the existence of an ugly rash on its face, let alone appreciate its true proportions and devise counter-measures. This is a valid charge, fairly clearly indicated by the authors, but this is not to say that the roots of Polish hooliganism are in any sense political and that lack of political freedom is to blame for this particular social disease.

However that may be, the fact remains that Polish hooliganism owes nothing (at least directly) to the communist masters. In the understandable enmity between the Warsaw rowdies and the Citizens' Militia there is not a trace of political antagonism. The nearest a young delinquent comes to expressing political disapproval is the statement that he might try to smuggle himself abroad. But this, we feel, is no more political than the wish of an English boy to go as a stowaway to New York. Similarly the hooligan's taste for jazz or colourful ties does not imply any appreciation of American democracy.

While this is true of the hooligan pure and simple, it is not necessarily true of the allied specimen of the young dandy (who may also be a delinquent), loosely termed the ' Bikini-man '. It is certainly not true of still another variety of rebellious youths who go under the name of *wdechowcy*. This untranslatable term comes from a slang expression meaning that the person concerned is no fool. The typical attitude of these young people is one of detached scepticism about everybody and everything. As such they are, no doubt, the product of the crude ideological pressure to which the young generation were subjected in school and in the Communist Union of Polish Youth before the inglorious collapse of that organisation after October 1956. The direct cause has largely disappeared (though it would be rash to say that it has disappeared for good), but the attitude persists. The *wdechowiec* is too shrewd to indulge in criminal activities, but—according to the authors—he nevertheless presents a major educational problem, perhaps more difficult to overcome than straightforward juvenile delinquency.

This seems to be an unduly pessimistic assessment: considering how numerous the *wdechowcy* are, very pessimistic indeed. Perhaps the authors, honest as they are, unwittingly reflect the deep-seated despondency of communist officialdom where youth is concerned. Communist educators are ready to return to the methods of straightforward indoctrination, but are held back by the memory of the meagre and perverted response which they evoked in the past. A recent investigation carried out by the Polish Radio has shown that young Poles are on the whole eminently practical and pragmatical in their approach to life, but at the same time shot through with an equally practical and pragmatic idealism. It would seem that the scepticism of the *wdechowiec* is in fact no more than a singularly pronounced form of this general pragmatism. It may worry believers in an ideologically unified society, but to the unprejudiced observer it looks healthy enough.

However, this is marginal to the main theme of the book. Where juvenile delinquency is concerned, the present writer is reluctant to share the easy optimism of its final conclusions. If the book has proved anything, it is that juvenile delinquency in Poland, as indeed all over the world, cannot be ascribed to any definite set of conditions or causes. Improved housing, better education, more cultural facilities and better youth services may help, but they will not eradicate the evil. Its roots lie much deeper; they lie, as the authors have so ably shown, in the attitude of the individual to certain basic values and standards. It is a truism that we are living at a time of the relentless revision of all standards. This is not a bad thing in itself: in science, in art, in political and social philosophy, it has produced some excellent and eminently desirable results. However, in the field of morals and religion the results look less attractive. The right to search and to judge for oneself is not confined to a competent elite; under democracy, even under a People's Democracy, everyone is engaged in the search. The poor in spirit are also encouraged not to accept anything on authority, be it the authority of the parent, the teacher, the government, or of a genuine elite. This is the predicament of moral freedom. For the weakest among us, especially the young, this moral atmosphere is a bit too rarefied and they get thoroughly tipsy. This phenomenon we call juvenile delinquency. At bottom matters are as simple as that.

THE POLISH ECONOMY 1961

I

New Models and Old Dilemmas

J. M. Montias

NO one in Poland harbours serious hopes these days for a 'new model' or for basic institutional reforms. After the third party plenum in October 1959, when Gomulka called for a tightening of reins over the economy, any further discussion of the merits of decentralisation and market systems would have been out of place.[1] The more intellectually nimble of the Polish economists, particularly those in responsible positions, have reconciled themselves to this situation. The present system of centralised allocation, they argue, can be mended and improved 'from the inside'.

Western economists are perhaps more sorry about the euthanasia of the Polish model than the Poles themselves. It is easy for us to believe that any liberation from centralised controls, any step taken towards the revival of markets, must be 'good for them': Wouldn't these reforms bring Poland closer to the ideal archetype, the classical competitive model, towards which all properly behaved capitalist systems also aspire? We are fortified in our beliefs by our observation of the flagrant waste that goes on in the Soviet-type economies and by our ability to detect its causes: the lack of a properly articulated price system and the absence of suitable incentives. But this is only a diagnosis, not a cure. If, as many economists believe, prices cannot be set rationally in an economy unless the supply and demand decisions of producers are free from controls, then it may do more harm than good to move to an in-between position, just a few steps closer to a market economy; for such partial reforms will sever the old lines of direct command before remote controls have been perfected to take their place. On the other hand, complete decentralisation may be undesirable for a number of reasons: it may hinder the rapid spread of new technologies among plants; it is likely to cause a falling off in the coordination of investment decisions; it will tend to diffuse some of the economic and political power hitherto engrossed by the central authorities.

Once we grant the sovereignty of the political authorities to deploy resources as they see fit—to drive forward their industrialisation plans predicated on the development of heavy industry, to direct the bulk of the foreign trade of the country towards the Soviet bloc, to maintain an expensive defence establishment—there is not so much to be said in favour of institutional reforms. Indeed, the ends may have a decisive influence on the choice of means to attain them. Take, for example, the long-range plans. Much has been written in Poland about the disproportions created by the Six-Year Plan and about the need for improved co-ordination in the second Five-Year Plan (1961–65). One of the main sources of disproportions in the past was the rapid expansion of armament industries during the Korean war which went beyond the capacity of the economy to produce the fuels and metallurgical supplies necessary to support the added burden.[2] This increased

[1] In a recent article in *Problems of Communism* ('The Polish "Economic Model",' March-April 1960), I discussed the evolution of the Polish economic system since 1956. My conclusions were the following: (1) The price system for producer goods has not been sufficiently improved to permit any far-reaching decentralisation tending towards the reactivation of markets. (2) The delegation of economic powers by the Planning Commission to lower echelons in the economic administration and to enterprises caused a falling off in coordination which has made it necessary gradually to withdraw these concessions. (3) The powers of the workers' councils have been so curtailed that they have lost the purpose for which they were originally conceived of protecting the worker's welfare and increasing his participation in running the affairs of his enterprise.

[2] Stanislaw Kuzinski, *Glowne proporcje rozwoju gospodarczego Polski Ludowej* (Main proportions in

pressure on the raw-material base of the country made it necessary to reduce coal and zinc exports and reinforced incipient balance-of-payments difficulties. As a result serious shortages developed in the supply of essential industrial imports. Another source of disproportions was the sudden decision made at the ninth party plenum in the fall of 1953—in line with Malenkov's new course—to step up the output of consumer goods and to make drastic cuts in the investment programme. The completion of many projects essential to a balanced development of industry was delayed, with obvious consequences. Whether the authorities had resorted to centralised or decentralised methods in carrying out these sweeping changes in social priority, some dislocation would have ensued. More efficient methods might at best have made the transition smoother. Some economists go so far as to argue that only central controls can make the kind of rapid adjustments called for during an industrialisation drive, the price system being too delicate an instrument to steer the economy during periods of stress.[3] Direct commands, as long as they are reasonably consistent with each other, are sure to bring off at least the main adjustments dictated by new circumstances.

IF we could be sure that the next three five-year plans, whose main lines have already been traced in the long-range programme prepared under the direction of Professor Kalecki, would unroll smoothly, that neither tactical reversals nor any other vicissitudes would disrupt the course of their execution, the case for institutional reforms would be much stronger. But judging by the recent past, we have no reason to count on the stability of the planners' premises. The decision made in 1959 to back up the newly-formed 'agricultural circles' with farm equipment caused important revisions to be made in the second five-year plan. The collectivisation of agriculture, if it once got moving, would prompt a great many more changes. In 1959 and 1960, the political authorities revised their scale of priorities in favour of a more rapid expansion of heavy industry, which may have to be paid for in future years by a slower pace in the construction of housing and in the improvement of consumer goods supplies. (The planners are counting on more output in heavy industry without any curtailment elsewhere, but they have made it clear that the brunt of plan failures would fall on the low-priority sectors.) In anticipation of the demanding tasks that lie ahead, the plans for 1959 and 1960 have already been revised upwards. Due to the disproportions which have developed in the meantime, the supply situation of enterprises consuming electrotechnical equipment, steel, and concrete pipes, and a variety of non-ferrous metals, has been steadily deteriorating.

One basic difficulty is that variations in the planners' demand seem to depend not only on internal conditions in Poland but also on the rest of the Soviet bloc. There has been a remarkable correlation ever since 1949 in the investment outlays of the People's Democracies, which have been sensitive to political developments in the Soviet Union as well as to tensions within individual countries in the bloc. It can hardly be a coincidence that investments in industry rose at about the same rapid pace from 1949 to 1952 in Poland and in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Rumania, started declining a few months after the death of Stalin, rose in 1956, fell in 1957 in the aftermath of the Polish and Hungarian events of the previous year, picked up again in 1958 and rose sharply in 1959. The proportion of total industrial investments falling to heavy and light industry also varied in about the same manner in these countries.[4] Poland's long-range plans, it would appear, can no more be insulated from events in the rest of the Soviet bloc than from the tribulations of her own political life.

Whether we are inclined to approve or to criticise the strategy behind the recent trend towards centralisation, we have to concede that the new policy has yielded short-run dividends

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the economic development of People's Poland) (Lodz, 1960), pp. 49–51.

[3] See, for instance, Michal Kalecki, 'Rady robotnicze a centralne planowanie' (Workers' councils and central planning), *Nowe Drogi*, 1956, 12.

[4] Evidence for these parallel trends can be found in the yearly *Economic Survey of Europe* (United Nations, Geneva) and in the statistical yearbooks of the different countries. A similar pattern can also be observed in the evolution of employment in the construction industries of the People's Democracies.

for the regime. Until mid-1959 financial discipline had been breaking down: wage expenditures systematically exceeded plans; outlays on decentralised investments, whose relative importance had been rising since 1956, were swelling beyond control; enterprises and their immediate supervisors in the economic hierarchy were no longer willing to abide by the limits on costs and materials imposed by the Planning Commission. Since the reins have been pulled in, the financial situation has materially improved. Outlays on wages, which had risen by 10 per cent in the first half of 1959, compared to the same period in 1958, rose by less than 2 per cent in the first half of 1960. The wage fund was actually lower in July 1960 than in July 1959. New measures to regulate above-plan wage expenditures, together with a revision of norms and piece rates in a number of industries, turned the trick.[5] There has been almost no increase in decentralised investments this year, as enterprises and local people's councils wishing to expend their own funds have had to register their projects with the banking network and financial ceilings have been clamped on all applications. Measures aimed at tightening up government expenditures are also paying off. As of July 1960, a significant budget surplus was anticipated for the entire year. There has been an unusually good correspondence between the rise in monetary circulation and the flow of goods sold to the population, though as we shall see below the composition of market supplies is still far from satisfactory.

THESE measures, it may be objected, are not incompatible with the revival of the price system as an instrument for guiding allocation; they may even be essential to such an operation. But in point of fact, recentralisation has been applied indiscriminately to physical and to monetary controls. The rationing of producer goods has been broadened and consolidated. A number of materials which had been informally distributed by sales organisations are now again balanced by central organs and dispensed by them. The associations (*zjednoczenia*) created in April 1958 to take the place of the old central boards of industry, which had been unpopular because they tended to boss producing enterprises instead of representing their interests, are now reverting to familiar routine—channelling pressures from their industrial ministry to subordinate enterprises. In the recent past, production plans have become more strained; allotments of the material needed by factories to meet their output targets have been pared to minimal levels; and many stocks of critically scarce inputs are said to have been cut below the danger point.[6] The intermediate echelons of the economic bureaucracy are once again 'fighting for the plan', straining for short-run gains instead of concentrating on long-run measures to improve efficiency, as their task had been envisaged a couple of years ago. The crux of the problem, one eminent specialist in supply problems explained to me this summer, is whether the setting of ambitious targets, followed up by stringent administrative pressure to carry them out, is likely to coax out enough fresh output (by eliminating slack and compelling producers to uncover hidden 'reserves') to make up for the frequent production breakdowns and for the other disruptive consequences of overcommitted plans. After many years of observing the system in practice, my informant still was not sure of the answer. As for the party leaders, the *tempo prestissimo* evidently suits their temperament and offers more scope for their organisation talent.

If the Poles cannot hope to change the system radically, they can still look forward to 'marginal improvements'. Fortunately, they can take their cue from the Russians themselves,

[5] The instructions of the government on the revision of norms seem to have been carried out with a vengeance in certain factories. A writer in *Zycie gospodarcze* suggested in July 1960 that 'there is no absolute rule which says that earnings should fall in the first period following the introduction of norms for as many as half the workers on piece-rates, as occurred in a number of plants' (1960, 35, p. 3).

[6] Industrial stocks had risen to a fairly comfortable level in 1957. This was partly a matter of policy—a higher level of stocks helps to compensate for the imperfect co-ordination of supply with production plans—but it was also due to a slackening in the level of investments. In 1959 the rise in industrial production, according to the official index, was 50 per cent greater than the rise in stocks. The level of stocks has been held to a critically low level in metallurgy, machine-building, and in the chemical industry (*Wiadomosci Narodowego Banku Polskiego*, 1960, 7, pp. 316–17).

who have been tinkering with novel ways of co-ordinating their plans and making them more efficient. Warsaw economists have hailed L. V. Kantorovich's book on linear programming and the allocation of resources as an epoch-making contribution, which it was, at least by Soviet standards. Economists attached to universities and planning organs have also experimented with input-output methods, both as a tool of analysis and as an aid in constructing internally consistent plans. The Department for Economic Research of the Planning Commission has made pioneer studies in the application of input-output to the co-ordination of the material balances. For the first time in the history of the Soviet planning system, traditional trial-and-error procedures are being subjected to systematic enquiry by qualified technicians. Their first report reveals that an astonishingly large proportion of the total output of manufactured products cannot be traced to its ultimate destination (as inputs for further processing or as final demand). The Planning Commission has little or no information on the output or the allocation of a number of 'auxiliary products' which are essential to certain industries. Incomplete coverage of the planned economy seems as important a cause of poor co-ordination as the inability to mesh the supply and demand for goods which *can* be tracked down. The authors of the report favour the extension of central balancing and rationing and suggest that a greater effort be made to collect up-to-date statistics for the Planning Commission's guidance.

The recentralisation of the last year checked the drift towards inflation without coping with the structural maladjustment that makes the Polish economy so susceptible to inflationary pressures. No fundamental improvement can be expected until the marketed output of farm products has caught up with the urban demand. Only then will the bulk of purchasing power released by new investments revert to industry (in the form of sales of industrial goods), instead of competing for a limited food supply and raising prices on the peasant market.

FOR many years the Polish peasantry has carried less than its share of the industrialisation burden, but particularly since 1956, when the government, staking on a voluntary increase in the marketed food supply, cut down compulsory deliveries and raised procurement prices. To finance the growth of heavy industry, the treasury has had to rely increasingly on purchase ('turnover') taxes levied on the industrial goods sold to the population; but this source of finance is limited by sluggish demand conditions. The production costs of clothing, shoes, and durable goods in state factories are high; choice in retail stores is limited, and quality is generally unsatisfactory. (All this could hardly be otherwise in view of the neglect of these industries during the Six-Year Plan and the failure to renew and to expand their equipment.) In the past, the lack of alternative sources of supply compelled the population, whose stocks of goods had been depleted by the war, to take whatever merchandise retail stores offered. Under conditions of repressed inflation, where almost all consumer goods were priced below their supply-and-demand equilibrium, there was no difficulty finding clients for the available supplies. Nowadays, however, co-operatives and private shops, though still hedged in by government discrimination, have more attractive goods to offer than before; clothing and shoes received in gift packages from abroad are competing with domestic production. State shops are finding it increasingly difficult to clear their inventories. On the other hand, the authorities are reluctant to make deep cuts in the retail prices of industrial goods for two reasons: first, these rebates would reduce tax revenue, which is needed to finance the state's investment outlays; second, they would mainly redound to the benefit of the peasants, who already buy a disproportionate share of these goods. The Ministry of Internal Trade tried last year to accelerate sales of shoes and textiles by making moderate reductions in their prices. Now it is resorting to advertising campaigns, attractive window displays, and other makeshift devices to keep its goods moving.

Another obvious remedy for the lack of demand would be to raise industrial wages and let the city people get their fair portion of the benefits of the new course. But this would not work because workers spend such a large part of their income on food: higher wages would merely tend to aggravate the meat shortage,

which was only mitigated by the substantial price increases decreed in the summer of 1959, and perhaps bring on a crisis in other foodstuffs as well. As the extra wages would spill over onto the peasant market, the private farmers would be gainers in the end just the same.

It would be possible to raise urban real wages, if the peasants could be induced to sell more food without getting more industrial goods in return. One way to do this without the use of force would be to increase farm productivity. Agriculture would have to be provided with more means of production. The state would need to earmark a large share of investment funds to supply farmers with equipment, insecticides, and fertilisers (possibly through the intermediary of the 'agricultural circles'). Another way would be to invest more funds in consumer-goods industries, so as to bring down their production costs. Much lower prices could then be charged without reducing tax revenue. (The Poles might be willing to eat less if they could get high-quality clothing and durable goods at reasonable prices.) Either solution would deprive heavy industry of its lion's share of the country's fresh capital and would tend to slow down its growth. This would be intolerable to the communist authorities, who feel that Poland cannot afford to be outpaced by its socialist neighbours in the development of its productive forces.

The reader familiar with the debate on industrialisation which flared up in Soviet Russia in the mid-1920s will have recognised a parallel with Preobrazhensky's dilemma.[7] Wherever small family farms prevail, peasants can choose the extent of their participation in the market according to the terms of trade (the relative prices of industrial consumer goods and foodstuffs) with which they are confronted. The state cannot offer the peasants more advantageous terms—by lowering prices of industrial goods—without reducing the speed of its industrialisation drive. The essential institutional question in Poland today is no longer whether socialised firms should be guided by central commands or by price incentives, but whether the collectivisation of agriculture, which had been Stalin's answer to Preobrazhensky's dilemma in 1928, will have to be carried out—by persuasion or by administrative pressure—to increase the urban food supply and to force the peasants to bear a bigger share of the industrialisation burden. In view of the long-standing opposition of the peasants to collectivisation, which may lead to violence and destruction of property if coercive measures are applied, the regime may have more to gain—or less to lose—by not precipitating matters in the countryside. Since the immediate effect of a collectivisation drive would be to reduce food production, and probably marketings for urban consumers as well, political opposition in the cities might also be dangerously exacerbated. This would be a heavy price to pay for uncertain future gains.

[7] Cf. Alexander Erlich, 'Preobrazhensky and the Economics of Soviet Industrialisation', *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, February 1950.

II

Policies and Prospects

Alfred Zauberman

THE start of the sixties is a convenient vantage point for viewing Poland's economic panorama. It marks a watershed dividing one generation — say three decades — into equal parts: one of actual post-war growth, the other covered by the Polish vision of long-range development which is embraced by the Polish programme reaching out into the middle of the seventies.

By Poland's pre-war economic growth we mean her industrial growth. To see it in fuller dimensions we should perhaps go further back

in her economic history. By the end of the thirties — on the eve of the second world war — Poland had only succeeded in regaining the level of industrial production reached a quarter of a century earlier. In contrast to the inter-war epoch — heavily affected in Poland, as elsewhere in the world, by the Great Depression— the post-1945 era was one of dynamic industrial expansion. How fast it actually was is a highly controversial question. Official statistical series would tell us that at the threshold of the sixties Polish industrial output was between six and seven times as large as it was twenty years earlier. But for a variety of technical reasons — on which I shall not expand here — the Polish Soviet-type method of measuring progress has a built-in strong upward bias: my own attempt at a recomputation of the Polish statistical series (by methods and conventions generally accepted in the West) has led me to believe that the actual rate of post-war industrial growth was something like a half of that officially claimed. In comparisons such as this, one must of course also bear in mind the effect of the drastic geographic transformation of Poland's economy: the loss of the industrially poorest areas in the East, compensated by territorial gains in the West which, it is estimated, may account for about a quarter of the country's industrial aggregate. Indeed a mere statistical figure can hardly do justice to the tremendous contribution these territories have made to Poland's achievement. To sum up, while truth in these matters is only very relative, it is safe to say that the conscious drive, helped by the territorial changes, resulted in multiplying several times Polish industrial capacities and outputs. With a population still about one-sixth below that of 1938, this record is *pro tanto* still better when expressed on a per capita basis.

Economic growth is almost always a painful process. It has been particularly so in the case of Poland. Though almost continuous — it showed a marked deceleration after an initial spurt — it has been neither even nor smooth. Nor has it been inexpensive by whatever yardstick — economic or extra-economic — its price is measured (nor, let us add, is this unique in the world's economic history). The economic mechanism of highly centralised planning and control, which was transplanted to Poland after the war, undoubtedly favours growth. It tends to institutionalise it. But by its very nature it is itself a source of severe frictions and recurring disequilibria. It generates a chronic state of high tension: one could indeed define the economy shaped by it as a high tension system; in this sense it entails considerable waste as a concomitant of growth. It might well be argued that in these terms the price for growth exacted from a country of Poland's size and type is relatively heavier than that for either a very vast and by nature richly provided country, such as the Soviet Union, or for one — such as, say, Czechoslovakia — which adopted it at a later stage of industrial development and where a better and more balanced factor-endowment helps to mitigate the strains and stresses generated by the system.

The latter point is highly relevant, and indeed any analysis of Poland's economic past and future must, to a great extent, turn on the question of the correlation of productive factors.

TO begin with the human element: the territorial changes referred to, plus the operation of deliberate policies, have resulted in considerable shifts in Poland's manpower. Between the end of post-war rehabilitation (concluded by 1950) and the late fifties, non-agricultural employment reached about three-and-a-half million, which means that it had roughly doubled. The industrial labour force of 3.7 million was four times the pre-war figure (in both cases building is counted in as a branch of industry). The rise in numbers has been accompanied by a significant 'pro-growth' repatterning. In 1938 industries directly connected with investment accounted for 400,000 workers and employees, making up rather less than one-tenth of the industrial total. Twenty years later, with one-and-a-half million on their pay-roll, the share of these typically 'growth' industries was almost exactly doubled. There was a parallel decline in the proportion of agricultural labour in the nation's manpower. There are great technical difficulties in giving adequate statistical expression to the change, but in very broad terms it may be said that the ratio of those 'active' in agriculture—admittedly a rather vague term — dropped from about two-thirds to about a half of the national total.

Almost from the start of the first post-war

development period, that is the beginning of the fifties, it became an official tenet that the three processes — the agrarian reform carried out as soon as the guns were silenced, the resettlement of the new territories, and industrialisation — had done away with the heavy disguised unemployment in the countryside. In fact at a later stage official policies rested on the assumption that Polish farming suffered from a substantial over-all labour deficit. Over the decade that followed a more sober approach prevailed. It is undoubtedly the fact that the perennial pressure of population on the land has been considerably relieved; at least as compared with pre-war, when it was estimated that up to a half of the country's agricultural population could be moved to other occupations without any loss to agricultural output. However, the proportion of the Polish population engaged in producing food is still higher than in any well-developed European economy; and farming is still the domain characterised in Poland by a very low productivity. Its output per man is a mere fraction of that in industry. Though hidden unemployment is another very relative magnitude (whose size very much depends on the assumptions one makes in assessing it), it is safe to assume that in Poland it is still substantial: various estimates made have arrived at a net surplus ranging between one-and-a-half and two-and-a-half million.

One further element should be kept in mind in this context. Policies pursued in the early post-war period consciously promoted the rapid absorption of ' green ', unskilled labour—mainly labour from farms — into factories, well beyond current actual needs. Apart from the social reasons for this, there was much to be said for tactics which tended to create an outsize human basis, a framework within which adjustment could be made, and a training ground for the labour force of a rapidly growing industry. But while there was some justification for the policy fifteen years ago, most of it was lost as time passed. One might perhaps say — admittedly giving the terms a specific sense — that in the long run the policies amounted to the Keynesian multiplier-effect sought in a wrong, non-Keynesian economic milieu.

The actual effect by the end of the fifties was industrial *over*-employment exerting a heavy pressure on efficiency: it is highly probable that the swollen numbers of industrial labour have a zero or even negative marginal productivity. According to a report by the Economic Commission of the Polish Council of Ministers, the redundant surplus amounted in the later fifties to about half a million people—half the net addition to industrial manpower during the whole of the first development phase. (Some Polish students of the problem have advanced the defensible thesis that while—other things being equal—a capitalist economy tends to open industrial unemployment, the socialist one gravitates, for economic, social and political reasons, towards disguised unemployment; it might perhaps also be suggested that, *ceteris paribus*, a socialist society tends to shift the locus of disguised unemployment from agriculture to industry.)

IT was only towards the start of the sixties that some retrenchment — inevitably painful — was carried out. The accompanying debates shed a good deal of light on the basic Polish malaise: the inability to provide jobs outside agriculture for the potentially available manpower. The Polish long-term plan leading up to 1975 (technically it is a masterly exercise in long-range programming carried out under Professor Kalecki) envisages a strikingly small shift in the occupational structure. In fact, it rests on the hypothesis that, in absolute figures, Polish farming manpower will in that year be more or less what it is at present, in other words, that all that can be done in the country with one of the fastest rates of population growth in Europe (for the post-war period as a whole 1.8 per cent a year) is to create employment outside agriculture only for the increment of employable labour in town and countryside. This is a measure of the limitation which Poland's capital demand-supply position imposes on her industrial growth. The reader can get some idea of the order of magnitude of the capital involved by multiplying the figure of estimated disguised unemployment, which we have mentioned, by, say, the sum of $4,000 (the investment outlay for providing one person with industrial work). In addition to the astronomic figures this would yield, he would have also to bear in mind the capital requirements for the

useful employment of the currently maturing age-groups of the population.

The Polish post-war supply of capital for growth has been based essentially on domestic accumulation. The intensity of capital formation may be illustrated by saying that since the conclusion of post-war rehabilitation (roughly since 1950) the yearly fixed investment outlay has on the average equalled that of six inter-war years. (From the growth point of view it is relevant that the bulk of pre-war capital formation was in housing; in the post-war in directly productive assets.) It is not easy to give a precise idea of what this has meant as a share of the national product, since — owing to the peculiarity of their price-weighting— official valuations are not really meaningful. Broadly readjusted data would suggest — according to my own recomputations, for what they are worth — that at the peak of the investment pressure the share dropped to one-half. The very broad direction of policy was — if I may be permitted to borrow a very expressive phrase which Dr Francis Seton used in the Soviet context — to 'convert peasants into capital'. It is only right to say, however, that the brunt of forced saving has been carried by industrial workers, partly at least because the preservation in Poland of individual farming stiffened the peasants' resistance to the pressure for centralised capital accumulation, while a large proportion of the industrial workers — as we have seen — were newly urbanised peasants. Logically, the shift of the pressure has been a corollary of the policy of industrial over-employment of peasants. About the time of the heaviest pressure, according to my calculations, the real earnings of industrial workers fell to about seven-tenths of their pre-war level.

Growth policies combined with such a 'squeeze' called for increasingly rigid controls and for ever-larger doses of compulsion which were bound in time to yield decreasing returns.

Imbalances in the economy became acute, and the psychological and social ill-effects threatened the social as well as the economic fabric of the system which Professor Oskar Lange rightly likened, in a celebrated essay, to a later-stage war economy. There is every reason to believe that they materially contributed to the climate which brought about the outbreak in October 1956.

THE several years that followed were a period of readjustment. They saw a distinct shift towards greater pragmatism in the approach to problems of both economic strategy and mechanism. (I shall not deal with the second, which is treated elsewhere in these pages, but would point out that between the two there is a closer inter-relationship than is generally realised. May I also remark that the Polish search for a less rigid model of a centrally planned but operationally decentralised system has revealed practical difficulties in the running of it, which tend to increase as the solutions adopted become more 'mixed' and therefore more complicated.)

The strategy adopted after 1956 required in the first place greater attention to be paid to the morale of the population; hence more consideration to the needs of the consumer. Roughly by 1960 industrial workers' real wages had climbed up to a level half as high again as their low point in the early fifties. Consideration for the morale of the population as producers has forced the authorities to put up with the spontaneous collapse, after October 1956, of the collectivist system in farming. The country still awaits the construction of a new frame in which efficiency will be reconciled with the psychology of the farmer — in so far as the two may be in conflict. There can be little doubt that the postulates of institutional conformity in the communist bloc — closely verging, as they do, on ideological attitudes — severely circumscribe the Polish government's flexibility of action in this domain.

A more empirical approach has resulted in an effort to tailor the economy to its specific Polish environment. For reasons which should now be clear, this would amount to favouring labour-intensive, capital-saving branches and processes of production. This tendency, however, is in practice rather severely qualified. The point is that modern technology is as a rule inextricably tied up with a high capital intensity. Hence, under the penalty of a self-perpetuating technological backwardness, Poland has to stud the economy with very highly capitalised equipment and plant, however inconsistent this may be with her prime-factor conditions. This is a dilemma which she shares with many other developing economies; at certain points it may

indeed give the impression of a vicious circle, since industrial advancement may restrict the volume of employable labour, whose increase has been its prime purpose.

It is in this context that we may mention, at least in passing, that the marked preference for heavy, or producer-goods—especially capital-goods—industries has come under question. Sensible concessions in allocational priorities have been made to agriculture and certain industrial restructuring has been carried out. The vastly expanded ferrous metallurgy — the main target of criticism — has been readjusted to take better account of Poland's difficult raw material position. Modern chemicals have been given greater attention. But no dramatic re-direction of the general lines of industrial development has taken place. The question as a whole cannot be divorced from the peculiarities of Polish factor demand/supply conditions; but this writer for one is prepared to admit that a high preference for heavy manufacturing industry does agree with the trend of progress which has prevailed — certainly in the last and present century — in the economically developed world. In some Western writing on the growth of Eastern economies, the issue of light versus heavy, or consumer versus non-consumer goods industries, has been regrettably — and at times hopelessly — confused with the quite different question of consumer's welfare. (Are not living standards at their highest precisely in those Western countries in whose industrial structure the non-consumer goods branches take the greatest and, in an historical perspective, a growing proportion?) Underlying the misunderstanding there is the unformulated assumption of a nearly 'closed' economy of the Soviet type. It is the 'closedness' of the centrally-planned economies we know that seems to have obscured the real problem. At least as far as its economics go, the argument largely applies also to the issue of agriculture versus industry, in so far as farming is the sector with the relatively lowest productivity. Admittedly, however, in the specific Polish conditions, where the speedy transfer of manpower from farming to sectors of higher efficiency is not feasible, economic as well as social considerations demand that the half of the nation occupied with production of food and agricultural raw materials should be given adequate equipment to make their work as productive as possible.

WE have touched here upon a matter of paramount importance. The adoption of the economic system originally evolved in a vast and very richly endowed country, which also tended for political reasons — at least in the formative years of the system — towards autarky, has strongly influenced thinking on foreign trade in Poland, as it has in fact in other countries of Central Europe which must also live by trade. It is also arguable (and in fact there is evidence) that because foreign trade is *the* least predictable, plannable element, central planners are inclined to reduce it to a bare minimum — an obvious source of waste connected with the system. This motive — quite apart from any politically inspired inclination to a high degree of economic inter-weaving of the bloc economies — is also responsible for the heavy concentration of the members of the bloc in their foreign trade on intra-bloc trade: bilateral long-term arrangements and trade monopolies are expected to bring into national plans a somewhat greater degree of certainty, if not necessarily a more rational division of labour. The rigidities and loss of opportunities entailed have been discussed in Poland since 1956 with far greater frankness than elsewhere; and it seems correct to suggest that she has tried to escape them by expanding non-bloc trade beyond the proportions observed by other member countries. The forces which favour intra-bloc exchanges have tended to reassert themselves, however; but with two-fifths of trade done outside the bloc Poland still holds the record in this centrifugal orientation of commerce. (Programmes for the first half of the sixties do however envisage a rate of growth in Polish trade within the bloc higher than the over-all rate.)

As things stand, and are likely to remain in the foreseeable future, the balance of trade — or, to be more precise, the balance of payment —remains *the* focal point of Polish growth difficulties. Traditionally coal, timber, and food have been the principal pillars of Poland's foreign trade. In the initial period of post-war industrialisation coal exports — making up half of total exports — bore the main burden of

financing the supply of the economy with foreign machinery and other equipment. Several factors combined, by the late fifties, to reduce this 'coal monoculture'. First, the country's own fuel requirements have grown; although nearly three times as much coal is being mined as before the war (within pre-war boundaries), only small surpluses remain for export. In fact with a fast growing consumption of Soviet oil, Poland is likely to become a net importer of energy in the not too distant future. The secular deterioration of world coal markets has been another factor in damping down Polish exports, except for high-grade coking coals and coke with which the country herself is not too well provided. Food, the second most important item in Polish exports to the West, is also in decline as an export: the food-stuff trade balance has to carry the rising burden of the heavy and expensive grain imports which, since about the mid-fifties, have become a permanent feature. In one sense, though, this is a mark of advancement: imported fodder supports a greater output of the animal products which go into exports or help to improve nutritional standards at home. The gap caused by the shrinking sales abroad of fuel and farm produce has to be, and is being made up by the fast growing exports of engineering products — ships, rolling stock, machine tools, and other machinery.

While it is natural, and indeed desirable, that as the engineering and manufacturing industries in general expand and mature, they should take over the role of the country's principal currency earners, the quite spectacular change in the pattern of Polish exports has also more than one drawback. (How spectacular it is can be judged from engineering's share in Polish exports: it was a mere couple of per cent in the late thirties; about one-tenth in the late forties; a quarter in the late fifties; and is expected to average around two-fifths by the mid-sixties.) First, since the new industries are not able to meet the competition of well-established industries on their own ground, virtually the whole of such exports is directed towards the easier bloc outlets. Because of the more or less rigid principle of bilateral balancing of trade in these markets (and non-convertibility of foreign exchange), this forges yet another and increasingly powerful link between Polish imports as well as exports and the Eastern markets. Secondly, in contrast to Poland's traditional export commodities, the selling of capital goods entails granting substantial credits. (This is true in particular of investment exports to developing countries outside the bloc.) Can Poland, acutely affected as she is by lack of capital reserves and foreign currency, afford it?

TO put this in more general terms: in more than one sense the two stumbling blocks on the road of Polish economic growth — the shortage of capital and the tightness of foreign payments — are most intimately inter-connected. They are indeed two facets of the same problem. Poland's handicaps were enlarged when the massive Western aid of the early post-war years, mainly in the shape of UNRRA help (amounting to almost half a milliard dollars), came to a sudden stop, while the severely under-priced deliveries of Polish coal to the USSR (to which Poland was committed by a 1945 arrangement) undercut her chances at a time when coal was as good as gold. By the mid-fifties Poland was released from this obligation, and her losses on this count were partly made good by a 1957 agreement which, in compensation, cancelled the debts to the USSR incurred in buying on credit Soviet metallurgical and other equipment. But subsequent developments made it abundantly clear that within the Soviet bloc there are no sources of exportable capital-surpluses which could be relied upon to provide a support commensurate with the needs of the Polish economy. Towards the end of the fifties Soviet credits were petering out, and trade pacts for the first half of the 1960s stipulate a very substantial surplus of Polish deliveries to the USSR, the explicit aim being to provide means for the net repayment of Soviet credits. The other most developed bloc countries, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, have been able to grant only marginal financial help, connected with the development of the Polish hard and brown coal and sulphur mining in which they are interested.

It is not really surprising, then, that the Polish long-range plan, extending to 1975, assumes *no* net influx of foreign capital. It is true, however, that towards the end of the fifties Poland — the only country in the bloc to do

so — regained access to substantial Western aid. By 1960 the United States committed credits, on extremely favourable terms — which indeed may eventually convert a substantial part of the loans into more or less disguised gifts — approached almost half a milliard dollars. To see this in right proportions it may perhaps be useful to recall that it is between three and four times the equivalent — in purchasing power — of the American stabilisation loan obtained by Poland in the inter-war period! (A substantial proportion of that loan had in any case to be sterilised in gold holdings; and one of its conditions was the appointment of an American economic adviser.) Whether a Poland politically tied to the Soviet bloc can reasonably stake hopes for her growth on the continuation of financial support on this scale from the United States is a subject on which it would be idle to speculate here.

Yet it must be restated, for the sake of emphasis, that the supplementing of Poland's own capital accumulation from foreign sources is crucial for a tolerable tempo of industrial progress — tolerable, that is, from the social as well as economic angle. The choice of the right pace is generally, and in Poland's conditions especially, a difficult thing. The middle-of-the road school, which — to judge from the Kalecki variant of the long-range programme — seems to have gained the upper hand, has mapped out an even and not unduly ambitious advance; one which may appear quite near to an optimum. Yet even at this pace the lack of foreign-payment reserves has threatened time and again during the last year or two to slow down the wheels of Polish factories, increasingly dependent on foreign raw materials, and to empty the shelves of the shops.

If another and still more general moral can be drawn from this analysis, it is perhaps this: the first decade of the Polish experiment in a collectivist economy was characterised by the belief among those responsible for policy that central planning and controls do in themselves provide possibilities to which only the sky is the limit. Experience has in fact shown how very circumscribed and almost always disappointing, from one angle if not from another, are the economic choices — the area of manoeuvre — open to the practitioners of that difficult art of economic programming; certainly so in a country of Poland's size and type and structure. It is only fair to say that this lesson in humility has not been missed in contemporary Polish economic thinking.

STALIN AND THE POLISH COMMUNISTS

M. K. Dziewanowski

THE dissolution of the Communist Party of Poland (CPP) on the orders of the Communist International in 1938 is one of the most mysterious events of the Stalin era. Its official rehabilitation in February 1956, at the twentieth congress of the CPSU, threw little new light on the subject. On the contrary, it made the whole affair still more mysterious: neither the names of the alleged provocateurs, nor the evidence, on the basis of which the dissolution had been decreed, were revealed. We are still in the dark, and since neither the Soviet nor the official Polish history is of much help, the case is still open.[1]

What are the established facts? Since the early thirties the CPP had been subjected to a series of witch hunts. At first, ideological factors were emphasised, and then followed the purges of the suspected 'Trotskyites'. Then the line shifted from ideology to subversion and spying; the astonished world was treated to a string of Soviet accusations against 'provocateurs, spies, and diversionists' allegedly planted in the CPP by the 'agents of Pilsudski', or the 'Wallenrods' as they were then called. By 1935–36, ideological matters no longer counted; it was obvious that Stalin was bent on liquidating everybody who seemed not quite reliable, and was not particularly choosy as to pretexts. The assumption that anybody who did not prove his innocence was a spy or a provocateur was widely accepted. Even the Polish police were charged with propagating Trotskyism 'among the arrested anti-Fascists by promising them freedom in exchange for a pledge of joining the Trotskyite groups', and with 'printing Trotsky's propaganda at the Government publishing houses'. There were three well-known *causes célèbres* of Polish communist leaders, liquidated in Moscow for being 'Wallenrods', and working to destroy the CPP from inside. They were Jerzy Czeszejko-Sochacki, Sylwester Wojewodzki, and Tadeusz Zarski.[2]

The liquidation of Sochacki, Zarski, and Wojewodzki was intended to stress the contrast between a group of 'traitors' and the 'solid, healthy mass' of loyal party members. If such was its purpose, it was defeated during the Great Purge, which affected the CPP more than any other section of the Comintern. Several thousand Polish communists who were then living in the Soviet Union were either physically liquidated or sent to concentration camps. Those who happened to be abroad were lured back on one pretext or another and then liquidated.

'One of the most unsavoury jobs assigned to this department [the Foreign Section of the NKVD] is the luring to Moscow of foreign communists suspected of disloyalty to Stalin', wrote a former high-ranking Soviet agent. 'A communist who believes himself in good standing with the Comintern would receive word from the Executive Committee that he is needed in Moscow. Flattered at this recognition of his importance, he hastens to the Comintern capital. Upon his arrival he is turned over to the OGPU and disappears. Many such catches are credited to the Cadres Section, which through its network of spies frequently receives "information" not only false, but malicious, tending to show that the individual in question has not been toeing the Stalinist line.'[3] As a result of this elaborate action the CPP had by the middle of 1938 ceased to exist as an organised political movement.

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[1] For a recent disappointing treatment of the party's history see J. Kowalski, *Zarys Historii Polskiego Ruchu Robotniczego w Latach* 1918–1939 (Outline History of the Polish Workers' Movement 1918–1939), Warsaw, 1959.

[2] For the official presentation of these cases see *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, 1937, 1 and 3; 1938, 1. From these we learn that '. . . The leading figures of both factions, the "Majority" and the "Minority", following the instructions of the [Polish] counter-intelligence, widely applied the policy of deceiving the Comintern"; see also *World News and Views* (formerly *International Press Correspondence*), 6 April 1939, p. 382. For an attempt at a systematic treatment of the whole case of the liquidation of the CPP see my book, *The Communist Party of Poland* (Harvard, 1959). For a brilliant but unconvincing explanation of the dissolution of the party see I. Deutscher's article, 'La tragédie du Communisme Polonais entre les deux guerres' in *Les Temps Modernes*, March 1958.

[3] W. G. Krivitsky, *I Was Stalin's Agent* (London, 1940), p. 82. See also the memoirs of the former Finnish communist leader A. Tuominen, *Kremlin Kellot* (The Kremlin Bells) (Helsinki, 1956), pp. 250–253; for substantiation by a former member of

Then rumours began to circulate that the party had been officially dissolved by the Comintern because it had been penetrated by 'agents of Polish intelligence' and 'contaminated by Trotskyite elements'. No official announcement was ever made. Paradoxically enough, most survivors of the liquidation, other than those who were either too insignificant to be purged or who served the apparatus, owed their salvation to the fact that they were in Polish prisons, such as Bierut or Gomulka. One CPP member, who happened to be behind bars in his native country, said: 'In 1938 we were repeatedly transferred from one prison to another. Of seventeen prisoners, eleven escaped; others, among them myself, quietly remained. . . . Where could we have gone? In Czechoslovakia, we would have fallen into the hands of the Gestapo; in the Soviet Union—we knew all about it although we were in prison—we would have been arrested as "Polish spies". By remaining on the spot, we saved our lives.'

THUS the CPP was quietly dissolved some time in 1938, at the end of the Great Purge which had already destroyed the party. It may be asked: who dissolved the party? Of course, under the conditions then prevailing in Russia, whoever issued the formal decree of dissolution the *decision* must certainly have been taken by Stalin himself. The official historian of the communist movement in Poland, Tadeusz Daniszewski, discussing the question ten years after, at the peak of the Stalinist period, wrote: 'In 1938 the situation became still more complicated. The CPP, infiltrated by the provocateurs sent over by Pilsudski, was dissolved by the Executive Committee of the Comintern. . . . The purpose of the dissolution was to eliminate the provocateurs; to separate them from the healthy basic mass of the party. On this foundation, a new party was to be created, Marxist-Leninist in outlook, purged of Pilsudski's agents, able to perform the enormous tasks arising from the international situation of the moment.'[4]

Significantly enough, Daniszewski gave neither the date nor the place of this most important decree. It is not to be found either in the *International Press Correspondence* or in the *Communist International*. Nor is it included in the selection of CPP documents published after the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, i.e. after the rehabilitation of the CPP. The exact date of the dissolution can only be guessed: it probably took place some time after 1 May 1938, since on that day the party still put out its customary May Day appeal and also issued another document on 8 June 1938.[5]

Thus, while the fact of the party's disappearance is beyond doubt, the timing and the circumstances still remain uncertain. This is, however, one more reason for re-examining every bit of evidence, flimsy and fragmentary as it may appear. For instance, at the Eighteenth CPSU Congress in March 1939, greetings were sent by the 'fraternal parties' of the following countries: Bulgaria, China, England, France, Spain, United States, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Sweden, Austria, Rumania, Denmark, and Norway. There was no word about the CPP. A 'Report on the International Labour Movement' for 1938 devoted the following passage to Poland: 'It is characteristic of the increased influence of labour organisations in Poland that the class trade-unions and the legal political parties, as for instance the PPS and the Bund, scored considerable successes in the local government elections.'[6] Here again the conspiracy of silence is maintained. From the end of 1938 Comintern publications ceased to mention the CPP, as though it had never existed, and underground CPP publications became increasingly rare and communist activity in Poland more and more sporadic and chaotic. Finally it fades away almost completely.

The only official Soviet pronouncement on the subject of the CPP dissolution is a report by Dimitri Manuilsky at the Eighteenth CPSU

the Comintern apparatus see 'Interview with an Ex-Insider: The Party that Vanished', *Soviet Survey*, July–September 1960, and A. Burmeister, 'Tragedia polskich komunistow' (The Tragedy of Polish Communists), *Kultura*, January 1952. According to the estimates of Burmeister, several hundred Polish communists were liquidated and no more than seventy or eighty of those who survived the war were released and returned to Poland after 1946. 'Ex-Insider's' estimates are much higher: about 10,000 people liquidated while about 800 survived.

[4] Tadeusz Daniszewski, 'Droga Walki KPP' (The Way of Struggle of the CPP), *Nowe Drogi*, November–December 1948.

[5] *KPP uchwały i rezolucje* (CPP Statements and Resolutions), 3 Vols., Warsaw, 1954–56.

[6] *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, 1939, 4, p. 119.

Congress. There we find the following revealing passage:

> In order to split the communist movement, the Fascist and the Trotskyite spies attempted to form artificial 'factions' and 'groups' in some of the communist parties and stir up a factional struggle. . . . [The party that was] most contaminated by hostile elements was the Communist Party of Poland where agents of Polish Fascism managed to gain positions of leadership. These scoundrels tried to get the party to support Pilsudski's Fascist coup in May 1926. When this failed they feigned repentance for their 'May error', made a show of self-criticism and deceived the Comintern just as Lovestone and the police 'factionalists' of the Hungarian and Yugoslav parties had once done. And it was the fault of the Comintern workers that they allowed themselves to be deceived by the class enemy, failed to detect these manoeuvres in time, and were late in taking measures against the contamination of the communist parties by enemy elements. . . . The communist parties . . . have investigated their leading workers and removed those whose political honesty was questionable. They have dissolved illegal organisations which were particularly contaminated, and have begun to form new ones in their place.[7]

THUS, according to Manuilsky, the CPP was penetrated to the core by hostile, subversive elements. The brave old party, however, by a truly superhuman effort, managed to overcome its paralysis; pulling itself up by its own bootstraps it dissolved itself. Then it began to form a new and sounder organisation, thus putting to shame 'the Comintern workers' who 'failed to detect' the plague, and 'were late in taking measures against the contamination'. This is so absurd that it hardly needs refutation. It just doesn't stand up; it is a house of cards that falls by itself. How could the very party which had been most infiltrated by hostile elements reach such decisions? Nor is there one scrap of evidence, direct or indirect, to support the allegation that the CPP dissolved itself. Can it be seriously maintained that such a step could have been taken, remembering the centralised structure of the Comintern, in which each national party was merely one section of the hierarchy?

The reasons for dissolution enumerated by Manuilsky and automatically repeated by other writers, communist and non-communist, are threefold in nature: first, disintegration of the party; second, infiltration of the party by provocateurs and spies; third, contamination of the party by Trotskyite influences. The charge of disintegration is contradicted by all available data, which indicate that on the eve of dissolution the party was expanding numerically, and extending its influence not only in the cities but also in the countryside because of growing rural unemployment, and of the unexpected, unorthodox, essentially petty-bourgeois advocacy by the party of agrarian reform, previously decried as a reactionary measure. The growth in membership was reinforced by communist infiltration of non-communist and 'fellow-travelling' organisations. It may be said that after 1935, because of its sponsoring of unyielding struggle against Nazi Germany, because it exploited patriotic slogans, the CPP, for the first time in its history, was being transformed into something resembling a mass movement.

As for the second reason—penetration by provocateurs and spies—all the existing evidence suggests that the Polish police had never penetrated the inner core of CPP leadership and had never influenced party policy. According to the testimony of the former Chief of Polish Intelligence, Colonel Boguslaw Miedzinski, and of the former prosecuting judge in important communist cases, Jerzy Luxemburg, neither of whom could have reason to minimise the efficacy of his work, there were countless cases of minor agents having been planted, but only at lower levels. Such penetration as there was decreased after the early 1930s because the party went deeper underground, and spread into essentially non-communist organisations by agents quietly working to achieve the party's objectives.

The validity of the third reason given by Manuilsky for the dissolution—contamination with Trotskyism—is rather vague. For one thing, 'Trotskyism' was made to cover a multitude of sins, and by 1930 had ceased to have any precise meaning, at least in the Soviet Union. Moreover, the disintegration of the

[7] *World News and Views*, 6 April 1939, p. 382; compare this statement with the statement of the five parties and the official commentary published in *Trybuna ludu* of 19 February 1956.

avowed Trotskyite opposition after 1935–36 in the Soviet Union, the lack of any marked signs of activity by members of this faction in Poland, and the paucity of Trotskyite publications, all indicate that this particular heresy was not an actual danger to the party's unity or policy at the time.[8]

IT would therefore be safe to say that all three reasons given by Manuilsky for the dissolution of the CPP contradict the available evidence and do not explain the massacre and then the dissolution of the party of Dierzynski and Marchlewski. Even now, after the rehabilitation of the CPP, after the official withdrawal of the charges against it, we are still puzzled by the sudden and bloody suppression of an entire section of the Comintern, and the physical liquidation of its leadership. The statement that 'The evidence [for the dissolution of the CPP] had been faked by a gang of saboteurs and provocateurs whose real role was only brought to light after Beria was unmasked'[9] does not explain *why* the party was actually dissolved. Neither are we told who were those 'saboteurs and provocateurs'.

During my visit to Poland in 1958 I had a chance of discussing the problem with two leading party historians; both admitted that they had no opportunity of seeing the pertinent documents, that the communiqué of the five parties rehabilitating the CPP was issued without examination of the 'evidence faked by a gang of saboteurs and provocateurs'.

What then were the real reasons?

By 1937–38 the possibility of revolution in Poland seemed fainter than ever; the Great Depression was over, without having been sufficiently exploited by the CPP. Stalin was probably convinced that in the event of another 'revolutionary situation' arising in Poland, the Red Army would do a better job than the CPP. It should be borne in mind that the CPP had never been a factor of great importance in Comintern calculations, except as a 'transmission belt' to Germany. With Hitler's triumph any remaining Soviet hopes for a German upheaval evaporated. Consequently, there was no longer any obvious reason for maintaining an ineffective instrument.

This brings us to the real reason. By the time of the dissolution, by 1938, Stalin had apparently decided to reshape his strategy completely and to build his own diplomatic and military bridge to the Third Reich. Stalin always believed in coming to terms with a strong enemy, and from the close of the Civil War in Spain his determination to strike a bargain with Hitler seems to be beyond doubt.[10]

Stalin knew that any deal with Hitler would almost certainly provoke opposition within the CPP, since that party, with its large Jewish membership on the one hand, and its strong undercurrent of Polish nationalism on the other, could hardly accept such a step, which spelled the party's total destruction, without protest. Consequently, the purge of the CPP's entire top strata and, finally, the complete dissolution of the party, achieved three things: first, discarding an ineffective and unreliable instrument of policy; second, waging preventive war against a potential opposition; third, getting rid of the remnants of the domestic opposition. This opinion is shared by an informed observer of the Soviet scene during the Stalinist period, who writes that he:

> heard the declaration, made as far back as 1933, a few months after Hitler came to power, that the only possibility for Russia to survive as a Power was to make sure that the conflagration in the West should break out before the fire in the East. I had authoritative information to rely upon, that in 1937 the question of making a possible compromise with Hitler at the expense of Poland was already becoming more concrete and Stalin wanted no internal opposition in case of a compromise with the Germans; not only was bourgeois Poland to cease to exist, but also the Polish Communist Party.[11]

Thus it may be said that the CPP, one of the last major victims of the Great Purge, was, at the same time, one of the first victims of the Stalin-Hitler agreement.

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[8] The Trotsky Archives (at Harvard) show how weak and precarious the Trotskyite forces were in Poland after 1935.

[9] *Trybuna ludu*, 19 February 1956; also KPP *Uchwaly i rezolucje*, III, pp. 462 and 598–99.

[10] Cf. Krivitsky, op. cit., pp. 17–41.

[11] 'Interview with an Ex-Insider', *Soviet Survey*, July–September 1960.

SOVIET ASTRONOMY

Zdenek Kopal

IN a preceding issue of this journal, Professor Turkevich sketched an outline of the general achievements and current problems of Russian science. The aim of the present essay will be to document some of his observations and make a few new ones in regard to one particular branch of the exact sciences—namely, astronomy. The science of astronomy seems particularly well suited for such a demonstration, for not only has its development in Russia been largely self-contained, but it also makes an impact on wider philosophical issues which transcend the boundaries of the exact sciences and merge with political ideologies. Moreover, in the quite recent past, the role of astronomy as a guide and inspiration in efforts to explore the space around us has endowed our ancient science with a mission much more important than might be deduced from the number of its students in the contemporary world.

Astronomers are, in fact, a rare breed of night owls of peculiar spell and power. The total number of men actively pursuing these studies does not, even now, exceed a few hundred all over the world, and was no doubt much smaller in the past; yet the influence which the work and discoveries of this small band of dedicated men has exerted over both the intellectual and the material life of all mankind can scarcely be overestimated. Perhaps more than any other type of scientist, astronomers have been the traditional trouble-makers in the intellectual environment of their time. In bygone days, a few of them actually paid with their lives for their temerity. More recently, to be sure, their descendants have taken a handsome revenge; and the fruits of their work, transposed into space, now dominate the direction of our national budgets.

The birth of organised astronomy in Russia can be dated with relative precision, for it goes back to the foundation of the famous Pulkovo Observatory in 1839; the Observatory overlooked a low hill of that name some ten miles from what was then St. Petersburg, and it attained almost immediately the position of preeminence in the world of science which it has, by and large, held ever since. The Observatory was founded, on the orders of Tsar Nicholas I, by F. W. Struve (1793–1864), a Danish refugee who sought shelter in Russia from forcible induction into Napoleon's army, and was publicly dedicated to its mission on 19 August 1839. Its main instrument—a 15-inch refractor by Merz and Mahler—shared with the first Harvard telescope, erected at about the same time, the prestige of the largest specimen of its kind in the entire world.

From its foundation up to the present, the Pulkovo Observatory (like those of Greenwich, Paris, or Washington) has remained a government establishment rather than an academic institution; its principal task for many decades was to determine the exact co-ordinates of the stars and other celestial bodies, for the compilation of accurate star catalogues and the determination of the fundamental astronomical constants. To this end, Struve designed special instruments for the separate measurement of the two celestial co-ordinates (i.e., the right ascension and declination) independently of each other; and by a skilful use of first-class equipment, as well as constant improvement of the methods of observation, he and his collaborators (among whom his son and successor Otto Struve and C. A. F. Peters deserve special mention) pioneered new paths in observational astronomy and, by the middle of the nineteenth century, made Pulkovo what the visiting American astronomer B. A. Gould then termed ' the astronomical capital of the world '.

For the first half-century of its existence, Pulkovo remained an almost alien institution planted in Russian soil; its first three directors (F. W. and Otto Struve, and O. A. Backlund) being Scandinavians in the service of the Russian Emperor, and the common language of the staff being German. The turn of the century witnessed, however, the gradual emergence of native talent; T. A. Bredichin and A. A. Belopolsky—astrophysicists of international fame—

took over the management of Pulkovo and their staff likewise became almost solidly Russian.

THE revolution of 1917 and the Civil War which followed hit the Observatory hard but did not cripple it; for ten years or so it was directed by administrators (Ivanov, Drozd) whose names are otherwise virtually unknown in the world of astronomy, but in the 1930s the Observatory had again an outstanding astronomer in charge, in the person of B. P. Gerasimovich. But the heaviest blows to befall the Observatory in its century-long existence were soon to descend. In 1937, in the deepening shadows of the gathering storm, Gerasimovich and some of his distinguished colleagues (Numerov, Dneprovsky) were caught in the spreading terror of the great purge and disappeared without trace; and although Gerasimovich's immediate successor—Beliavsky—was a scientist of international repute, the days of the old Observatory were really numbered. Four years later the Germans had reached the Bothnian gulf. The hill of Pulkovo became an important point in the defence of Leningrad, and in the course of the heavy fighting which lasted more than two years, the Observatory was almost totally destroyed by artillery fire. As, moreover, many of the older members of its staff perished from privation during the long siege of Leningrad, the break with the past seemed almost complete. But the vitality and energy of the Russian people reasserted themselves, and less than ten years later Pulkovo Observatory rose once more like a phoenix from its ashes, and under the vigorous leadership of Academician A. A. Mikhailov (director of the Observatory since 1947) it rapidly resumed its former position in Russian and international scientific life.

What does Pulkovo Observatory look like today? Rebuilt on its old site in much the same architectural style as before (and re-dedicated in May 1954), it is the centre for the work of some 400 scientists and technicians (i.e., more than the total employed in all the observatories and astronomy institutions in Great Britain). It is headed by a director, elected every three years by the Mathematical-Physical Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He presides over the Observatory's scientific council, which acts as an advisory body planning scientific work, appoints the heads of departments or other senior astronomers, and confers advanced academic degrees. Neither the director nor the senior astronomers, therefore, have security of tenure in the western sense of the word; but stability and reasonable continuity seem to be provided by repeated re-election to office (thus, the present director of Pulkovo has been re-elected to his post no less than four times in succession; and the same is true of other distinguished heads of departments as well).

The historic Pulkovo Observatory—officially known as the Central Astronomical Observatory of the Soviet Union—is the most important single institution in Russian astronomy studies, but is itself a part of the Mathematical-Physical Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and its work is co-ordinated with that of allied institutions by the Astronomical Council of the Academy.

It is this Astronomical Council which plans and supervises all long-range activities in the field of astronomy in the USSR. It is presided over by Professor Mikhailov, and its members are all astronomers, among them academicians as well as directors of some regional observatories and professors at the more important universities. This group of scientists—not very large in number—advises the government (through the Presidium of the Academy) on the long-range deployment of human as well as material resources in different fields of astronomical research, and the directors of the individual observatories are subordinate to it.

THE efficiency of any governing body of this nature can best be assessed from the results of its administration; and in this respect it appears to the outsider that, over the past few decades, the Astronomical Council of the USSR Academy of Sciences has been managing the affairs of Russian astronomy with impressive ability and success. According to its master plan, the Pulkovo Observatory with its out-stations (at Nikolaev in the Ukraine, and Kislovodsk in the Caucasus) continues to be entrusted with furthering fundamental classical

astronomy, as well as radio-astronomy and solar work; in addition, it maintains the time service for the entire Soviet Union; and its optical shops, under the great optician D. D. Maksutov, provide many other centres with optical instruments. The Lomonosov University in Moscow (with its Sternberg Institute under D. Y. Martynov) concentrates largely on educating and training young astronomers to meet the anticipated needs of the entire Soviet Union; while stellar astronomy and astrophysics seem to have been allocated for the most part to the new Crimean Astrophysical Observatory near the shores of the Black Sea (at Simeis before the war), and to the newly founded Caucasian high-altitude observatories at Abastumani (1937) and Burakan (1946).

The instrumental equipment of most of these observatories still consists largely of moderate-size instruments, provided, however (especially at Moscow), on a quite lavish scale. The educational headquarters of Russian astronomy at Sternberg State Astronomical Institute (adjacent to the new Moscow University building), with its marble staircases, etc., is the envy of visiting western astronomers, accustomed to work in much more modest surroundings; and the size of its graduate-student body (approximately one hundred) makes it the largest graduate centre of astronomical training in the world. Russian astronomers are also being well equipped with instruments of the heaviest calibre. Thus a Russian-made 103-inch reflector—at present the third largest in the world—was placed in service at the Crimean Astrophysical Observatory in 1960, and a project initiated recently at Pulkovo under Maksutov will, if successful, provide Russian astronomers in a few years with a gigantic mirror telescope of 7 metres free aperture (i.e., 280 inches)—by far the largest in the world.

With these technical facilities available or on the way, what are the current achievements of Russian astronomers and what is their standing in the contemporary scientific world? Before attempting to answer this question, we should make it clear that it would be quite unfair to compare Russian astronomy as a whole with that of any other European country, for the simple reason that the total number of Russians engaged in astronomical research already equals (if it does not exceed) the total for all European countries combined. This is naturally reflected in the volume of output of Russian astronomical publications (their *Astronomy Journal* is regularly translated into English by the American Institute of Physics). There seems to be no limit (as there is, for financial reasons, in the West), on the amount they are allowed to publish; their scientific planners find it hard to understand our constant preoccupation with budgets; for them it is the material priorities and allocations of manpower which limit and control their progress.

Bibliographical references in Russian astronomical papers indicate a remarkably full coverage of the current scientific production in our part of the world; the Russians certainly appear to be better acquainted with our scientific progress than we usually are with theirs. This is, we understand, largely due to an efficient multi-lingual abstracting service maintained by their Academy for all branches of science—including astronomy—and readily available to all interested Soviet institutions.

Is this material ' freedom from want ' for the scientist an unmitigated blessing? In surveying the present output of Russian scientific publications—in astronomy as elsewhere—one cannot fail to notice that the ease of publication sometimes leads to a lowering of standards; there is a good deal of chaff mixed up with the wheat and the occasional diamond. It is also true—as Professor Turkevitch pointed out earlier—that planned avoidance of overlap in Russian scientific work may be partly responsible for many near-misses in astronomical discoveries as well. Thus—to give a specific example—the outstanding discovery of polarisation of the continuous light of Crab Nebula was made in Russia by Dombrovsky in 1954, but its implications were followed up not there but by the Dutch and the Americans.

By and large, however, taking a broad view of the pitfalls as well as the accomplishments of Russian astronomy in the past twenty or thirty years, it is clear that the concentration of leadership in the Astronomical Council of the USSR Academy of Sciences has been a major cause of the impressive developments in this

subject in the Soviet Union; its use of methods so different from those prevailing in the Western world seems to be justified by results. It should be added that, even when xenophobia was at its worst in the USSR, the Council maintained its policy of cooperation with astronomers in all countries, as did other scientific institutions. The Soviet authorities had too much to gain from scientific interchange. The tenth General Assembly of the International Astronomical Union, held in Moscow in August 1958, brought together the largest number of astronomers ever assembled anywhere.

The future advances of astronomy in Russia —as elsewhere—are dependent on the amount of native genius or talent; and as genius does not favour any country or race, this will depend, in turn, upon the size of the trained population on which the country can draw. Viewed from this angle it is to be expected that the Russian contribution to our science, already considerable, is likely to continue on an even more massive scale in the future.

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Dynamic Conformity

THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF THE CPSU

H. T. Willetts

THE tremendous events of the last few years—the curbing of the police, de-Stalinisation and the unrest it provoked, the struggle within the Presidium, Khrushchev's drastic administrative and social reforms, the vertiginous growth of Soviet power and influence abroad—have profoundly affected the mood and morale of the Soviet people at large. It would be strange if they had not also affected the outlook of the Communist Party, and the behaviour of its officials amongst themselves and towards the public. Unfortunately, nothing has changed less than the sections of the press from which we seek information on this subject, and particularly the journal *Party Life* (*Partiinaya Zhizn*). Dimly chronicled in those great grey blocks of officialese, the most exciting event is likely to seem at once boring and improbable. Contributors are too often central party officials insisting that their earlier decisions were just what was needed, or local party officials showing that they are carrying out instructions to the letter, and with the expected results. Inevitably, their articles echo the stereotyped, hollowly enthusiastic party enactments to which they are related.

Coming back to the journal after a breather of, say, ten years, a casual reader might note that levels are still being raised in most but not all things and places, that decisions, as of old, are usually but not always operatively verified, that life luckily continues to introduce corrections . . . and leave it at that. There are concrete details in plenty, but usually of excruciating triviality: a musical-instrument factory improves the class complexion of its party organisation by drawing in more bellows-makers and reed-tuners, an indignant little official complains about peremptory calls to meetings on the tiresome agenda 'you'll find out when you get here', a factory party organisation wonders whether it should trust the job of checking on modernisation to that member of its bureau who happens to be the engineer in charge of modernisation, several teams of workmates are reported to have acquired the collective ethos to the extent of making up little theatre parties after work. . . . The practical activities described are no closer to the full-blooded revolutionary life mentioned in interludes of editorial rhetoric than your parish magazine is to *Pilgrim's Progress*.

The drafting habits of party legislators, and the standard form for reporting progress, create other difficulties. In particular, enactments which may now be highly effective, and reports on their results in practice, are often scarcely distinguishable from earlier enactments and reports which are now known to have had no practical significance. There is, too, the irritating phenomenon of the constant angle of deviation from perfection: at any given moment things are much less wrong than they were, but just as far short of what is now required.

In short, we should look in vain for a precise, thorough, and convincing account of conditions in the party, and especially within the narrow circle of the supreme leadership, which remains outside the purview of the press. What however we can obtain from the party press, by studying the shifting degrees of importance it attaches to particular topics, analysing its treatment of currently awkward subjects, and especially by noting the specific changes which it mentions in the life of the party, is a clear party image. We may not know what the party is really like, but we can discover how it wants the people to think of it, and in what respects it claims to have improved on its earlier self. The party image of the Khrushchevian period, projected in the pages of *Party Life*, is what I shall try to describe here.

FIRST, though, I should like to mention a change in the public image of the party in the most material sense of the term: in the picture of its leading officials which appears on

the retina of the ordinary citizen. If, on some red-letter day in the spring or summer of 1956, you were trudging with the demonstrating thousands through the streets of a provincial industrial town, and had looked up at the saluting base, what would you see? A row of bosses with not a party tunic, not a subfusc suit, not a martyred and ferocious glare between them. Instead—panamas or fedoras, back-slappers' grins, American-style ties, light-coloured raincoats, the beginnings of elephant-leg trousers in pleasing sandy shades. In a country where visual symbols are very important, the transformation must have made its effect. Perhaps it was rather as though the Salvation Army were to turn out in happy-shirts and jeans. There are of course old photographs of Stalin and assorted Politburo members, strolling duck-footed with self-importance, along some deck or esplanade, or reviewing a summer parade, in what a careless man might call white ducks. A closer look shows that these were rather special garments. Stalin, for instance, always managed to look like the commodore of a yacht club which happens to mount 16-inch guns, Malenkov simply wears party uniform daringly executed in white flannel. . . . Well then, in 1956 if not earlier, bright summer clothes became more plentiful and the leaders wanted to show that life at long last really had become gayer—is there any more to be said about it? A little more. We have looked up at the tribuna—now let us look down from it. We see a stream of people dressed for the most part in drab, dark, well-worn suits, mufflers and cloth caps, looking, except for the bottles sticking out from some pockets, like a crowd of Welsh miners thirty years back. The double contrast is undeniably piquant: between the bosses as they once were and as they have become, and between the bosses as they have become and the unchanged workers. Once, on the tribuna, you had seen austere soldier-priests (I speak of course only of superficial appearances), a reminder of a grim heroic past and a portent of grim heroic times to come. Now you see a preview of a relaxed and prosperous future. We need not imagine that Agitprop had called in some local Dr Dichter and deliberately worked out a new look. The people on the tribuna were probably just following a fashion set by Khrushchev, because it was fun; whereas previously they had copied, not indeed Stalin, but his favourite henchmen, because it was politic. Consciously or not, these Khrushchev-like figures exemplified two important features of the new party image. On the one hand, its leaders have substituted a human, even a jolly public presence for their previous hieratic and forbidding guise. On the other, they have given up the humbugging pretence that they do not enjoy social privileges, that leadership is all sacrifice and no fun. What of course made it possible to reconcile Khrushchevian populism—small p—with the frank admission, almost the flaunting, of social discrepancies was a third feature of the new party image: its determination, expressed far more concretely and with much more detailed reference to actual conditions than ever before, to raise living standards. It would surprise me to find now anything like the conspicuous contrast between the bosses and the crowd which I have described above.

AMONGST the changes of which *Party Life* is particularly proud, the 'restoration of Leninist norms' in the conduct of party affairs comes first. They have, let us note, been restored before, to little effect. The safeguarding of democratic-centralist procedures in party elections, and the regular convocation of elected bodies, were the subject of enactments after the great purge. But it is possible that, in a very different political climate, even a slight improvement in procedures may have a real significance. It is therefore worth asking just how democratic the party now wants to appear.

It is an important principle of democratic centralism that all party offices are freely elective, from the bottom to the very top. What happens at the top we can, lacking information, freely surmise, but *Party Life* pays great attention to lower level elections, trying to ensure both that they shall be democratically conducted and that this adverb shall be interpreted correctly. Readers have asked whether the list of candidates for election must always be exactly co-extensive with the number of vacancies: or putting it, as they did not, simply,

whether contested elections are permissible. *Party Life* does not say that they are not, and indeed reports without comment elections at which, say, eleven candidates have sought election to nine posts. I have not seen a higher ratio of candidates to offices. Perhaps these figures represent the tolerable margin of uncertainty when all the candidates are acceptable to the higher party organ, and perhaps inclusion in the list as a predestined also-ran is sometimes an earnest of favours to come. However this may be, *Party Life* regards contested elections, not as an essential feature of democratic procedures, but rather as an indication that the preliminary democratic processes have not been thoroughly performed. The argument is that if the party organisation exhaustively discusses the merits of every possible candidate, it should always be possible to draw up a short list just big enough to fill the gap. Quaint reasons for putting up just enough candidates are sometimes given—for instance, that it needlessly hurts good servants of the party to put them up for elections in which they are defeated.

Representatives of higher party organs of course take part in the selection of candidates, and at one time their recommendations were automatically followed. Most probably they still usually get their own way, but *Party Life* sternly condemns the official who tries to foist on selection meetings a ready-made list or a very unpopular individual. Cases are reported in which a higher party organ has insisted on the inclusion of a candidate repeatedly rejected, and has in the end withdrawn him under pressure from a still higher instance. The impression created is that local party officials are indeed expected to influence elections in lower party organisations decisively, but to do it tactfully, to rely on patient persuasion, and on occasions to compromise.

One great difficulty in the way of much freer elections to the controlling nuclei of lower party organisations is that certain people traditionally find a place in them *ex officio*, and indeed there are good practical reasons why they should. If, for instance, a works director were excluded from the party bureau of his enterprise for any other reason than that he was in any case due for dismissal, he would, if he enjoyed a successful manager's normal influence with the local *raikom* and *obkom* officials, simply ride roughshod over the works party organisation, whose secretary might easily be doing a job part-time for an extra 500 or so rubles a month, keeping his files in a corner of the director's safe, and doing his paper work in a corner of someone else's office.

Now *Party Life* strongly opposes *ex officio* election to Party bureaux and committees; with the typical rider that industrial directors, leading trade union officials, chairmen of local soviets and so on are normally amongst the most suitable candidates for elective party office by virtue of the personal qualities which have taken them so far in their careers.

The party seeks to show that it has reverted to earlier democratic ways in decision-making as well as in electoral procedure. Since the summer of 1957 we have heard less and less about collective leadership at the top, but down below, according to *Party Life*, it is still *de rigueur*. Every member of the party bureau or committee must be fully informed on the agenda of its meetings, and allowed to have his say. What is more, local party business should as often as possible be discussed in enlarged meetings, with interested non-party people as well as rank-and-file party members present. The limits of discussion, it is claimed, are set wider than before. *Party Life* speaks frankly of limitations on party democracy which were necessary ' in times of crisis ', and are no longer so. But it qualifies such encouraging remarks with reminders that democratic centralism does not permit discussion down below of the general party line, or of majority decisions (i.e., those of higher party organs). It sums up the rights of participants in discussions in a phrase which should be enshrined in the Constitution: ' shades of opinion are not excluded '. When we come across such revealing formulas we may be tempted to dismiss the large, open party meeting (at one such 128 people were reported to have spoken, and that in a Russian *raion*) as at best a monstrous ritual of assent, and most probably a farcical waste of time. But it would probably be unfair to do so. For one thing, speeches at such meetings are often

highly practical, replete with concrete information and sensible suggestions. For another, speakers undoubtedly criticise senior local officials, though not of course high policy, much more boldly than they would once have dared. *Party Life* can publish the stories of awkward customers, shop-floor lawyers who righteously lambaste the bosses and suffer for it, sometimes are still suffering at the time of writing, but sometimes have already received their reward in the shape of a party post. Such stories are presumably meant as an invitation to other party members to be bold—in a ' business-like ' way, of course, and at their own risk. It seems likely that wider and franker discussion of practical matters gives ordinary party members a chance to show their mettle, local officials a clearer view of conditions in their areas, and higher party officials an additional check on the performance of their subordinates at the local level.

The elimination of bureaucratic methods in party work, and the re-activation of the mass membership, are constant themes in *Party Life*. They are old themes of course, but some of the practical steps recently taken are interesting. The number of territorial party organs has been reduced by the amalgamation of *oblasts* and *raions* in several places (this process is to continue), and the elimination of *raions* within medium-sized towns (for instance Tula). Non-elective party organs, in transport for instance, have been abolished. At the same time, the permanent apparatus of local party organs has been streamlined, and the number of paid officials considerably reduced. This reorganisation coincided with a great increase in the responsibilities of party organs, especially as a result of the decentralisation of economic administration. The party has tried to reinforce the local apparatus by making more intensive use of the enthusiastic amateur. It has recruited large numbers of volunteer ' instructors '—there were recently 17,000 of them in the RSFSR alone—who act as representatives of *raions* with far-reaching powers of inspection, and in emergencies of arbitrary decision. Again, the party has tried to supplement its signal system by setting up elected bodies with the cumbersome title of ' Commissions of Primary Party Organisations for the Exercise of the Right of Party Control over Production '—control of course in the Russian sense of verification. It is as yet unclear how effective these innovations have been. Some industrial managers, it is reported, refuse to take the volunteer instructor as seriously as the paid *apparatchik* who drives down from his own office; while the commissions in some places are effortlessly controlled, in the English sense, by the managers, and in other places embarrass *raikoms* by going over the heads of their parent works party organisations. *Party Life*, however, enthuses over the extension of voluntary party work and control from below, and can even quote in this connection Lenin's dictum that ' our aim is the unpaid performance of state duties by the toiler after his normal work '.

THE party claims not only to have remodelled itself on strictly democratic Leninist principles, but to have established a much closer relationship with the people at large. Communist pundits, of course, have always stressed the importance of learning from the masses and earning their confidence. Stalin himself, who as Tvardovsky recently put it, lived ' protected from life by the Kremlin walls ', liked to quote the Antaeus myth as an awful warning: not that part of the story in which the insolent giant sets out to erect a temple from the skulls of his enemies, but his destruction at the hands of Hercules who lifted him clear of his mother earth, the source of all his strength. It would be just as dangerous, said Stalin, for the party to lose touch with the masses. His successors have relaxed the crushing embrace which he thought necessary, and have tried to obtain a more satisfactory purchase on the masses by developing genuine mental and emotional contacts. It is not so much that the party has drawn closer to the people as that it has tried to draw the people closer to itself, without encouraging illusions about who in fact is gripping whom. *Party Life* provides many illustrations of this preoccupation.

A matter of considerable concern has been the class complexion of the party. On various occasions in the past the regime has found it necessary to expand its worker and peasant

membership, but in the last few years it seems to have treated social imbalance as an urgent problem. By the early fifties the party was too conspicuously dominated by the white-collared groups. In the Ukraine, as late as 1958, only 380,000 out of nearly 1,100,000 party members were workers or peasants. These occupational categories accounted for less than 50 per cent of the RSFSR new intake in 1955. The position was particularly serious in less prosperous industrial towns like Perm, and certain rural areas like Ryazan, where there was actually a decline in total membership. A recruiting drive which has gained momentum since the 20th Congress has brought the worker and peasant groups up to between 60 and 65 per cent of current annual intake for the USSR as a whole.

The imbalance was partly the result of Stalin's reluctance to allow a further rapid growth in membership after the great war-time expansion. The party, of course, did not modify its practice of co-opting bureaucrats and technicians *en masse* and *ex officio*, so that restrictions on the rate of growth affected mainly the workers and peasants, for whom in any case the cost of party membership, measured in spare-time chores and the dislike of their workmates, often outweighed any possible advantage. Recently, the party has encouraged large-scale recruitment, and has taken in more than a million new members in the last three years or so. As usual, some of those engaged in the campaign have 'sacrificed quality to quantity': in this case, as long as they could find enough recruits who formally counted as workers, they have not enquired closely whether they held key-posts in their enterprises, nor yet whether they were particularly good at their jobs. It is noteworthy that the party has had difficulty in attracting coal-face workers in some pits, and has drawn rather heavily on unskilled manual workers. The difficulty of persuading skilled and comparatively well-paid workers to devote part of their leisure to social or political work is of course not peculiar to the Soviet Union.

Party Life is anxious, too, that workers and peasants should more easily find places in the elected organs of the party, and be given greater prominence in its counsels. Khrushchev sets an example by, for instance, making the miner Mamaev a national figure, and Pigman Chizh the hero of a Central Committee plenary session. It is to be expected that they and their kind will become an increasingly important element in the public presence of the party. What, however, are the worker's or peasant's chances of taking up a full-time party career, and finding his way into the centres of power? We are told, on the one hand, that his way is to be smoothed. Local party bosses are urged to be particularly patient and helpful to farm and factory zealots with little 'political' experience who obtain minor party appointments. On the other hand, we find the party raising its educational requirements, and, in its overhaul of the *apparat* since the 20th Congress, installing wherever possible people with higher technical education. *Party Life* accuses Stalin and his epigones of wanting to restrict the *apparat* to 'pure party work'—presumably propaganda and political education—and to prevent it from supervising the economy. As a result, it is said, many party officials were too ignorant of industry and agriculture to oversee them efficiently. After the re-establishment of party supremacy, inadequate provincial officials were replaced in very large numbers, and wherever possible people with higher education, preferably higher technical education, were chosen to succeed them. The case of Tambov —not, one would think, a particularly go-ahead area—gives some idea how big the turn-over has been in the lower levels of the *apparat*: one-third of the *raikom* secretaries there, it was recently reported, had been in office less than one year, and another third less than three years. Officials with higher technical education recently occupied 46 per cent of all senior party posts at *oblast* level and above, and 32 per cent at town and *raion* level. If we look at the figures for officials with higher education, technical or otherwise, we find that even at the humble rural *raion* level 90 per cent of leading personnel now come into this category. The drive to raise the educational level of professional party officials will no doubt increase their efficiency and reinforce their authority in

their dealings with economic managers. (Possibly the regime also hopes, by making party and managerial personnel more readily interchangeable, to close a gap which Western commentators have exaggerated but not imagined.) But just as surely, it will become even more difficult for worker and peasant members to attain high party office.

Closeness to the people makes great demands on the time and breath of leading party officials from Khrushchev downwards; but it is only at the lowest levels that the party opens its doors and allows the public to look over its shoulder. Lenin's saying quoted by *Party Life*, that the work of communists must be checked by non-party people, is not entirely meaningless in application to the lower party organs; for they are continually urged to submit their activities at all stages to the scrutiny of the general public. *Party Life*, reassuring a dubious correspondent, has approved the mass admission of non-communists to low-level party courses—even if they outnumber party members. The journal has even given its blessing to the practice of submitting candidatures for party membership to the judgment of the non-party collective in an enterprise. The ordinary party member's sense of belonging to an élite might be impaired by such measures to make the ordinary citizen think of the party as ' his own '.

COURSES in political subjects are nowadays easier, more attractive, and much more obviously relevant to everyday experience than they were under Stalin. Gone are the days when weary worker-communists reported weekly after hours for years on end to battle with the *Short Course on the History of the CPSU*. Private study, checked by periodic participation in seminars, is now the recommended form of political education. Only semi-literates, professional party workers, and propagandists need join (separate) intensive study groups. The emphasis is on current policy, particularly its application in local circumstances, and on the performance of local industry and agriculture. For the ordinary party member, political education need mean no more than practice in expounding current policy in the proper jargon, with the proper patriotic fervour and with telling local references. Die-hards have apparently described this form of political education as ' revisionist and materialistic '. *Party Life*, typically, lays down that political and professional education must be kept separate, but that their mutual relevance must always be brought out. (Perhaps indicating one quarter from which accusations of ' materialism ', etc., might be expected, *Party Life* supports its ruling with a comic Chinese abuse of Marxist terminology: ' political work and productive work are a unity of opposites '.) In specialised enterprises and educational establishments the separation is not always convincingly made. Tomsk medical students, for instance, as part of their political education, hear lectures on such subjects as ' The nature of (dialectical) leaps on the basis of the data of microbiology ', and ' The significance of the philosophical doctrine of necessity and chance in neuropathology '.

As well as trying to make party membership easier and more attractive, and to encourage amongst non-members an interest in the doings of their local party groups, the regime seeks to diffuse the communist ethos amongst the population at large through a number of institutions which formally remain outside the party framework. Perhaps the most interesting of these are the ' brigades of communist labour '. The members of work-teams competing for this title must not only set themselves high production norms but must undertake a programme of collective self-improvement, and watch over each other's everyday behaviour, outside as well as within working hours. It is conceivable that this movement has some effect, particularly on young workers, in encouraging further education and preventing drunkenness and hooliganism. The cultural undertakings reported are at times ludicrously reminiscent of some nineteenth-century organisation for the improvement by self-help of the working class. Party organisers enthuse over a trip to the theatre ' when some took wives, some sweethearts, all were satisfied ', or even a brigade mushrooming expedition *en famille*, or the salvation of workers who, since joining the brigade of communist labour competition, have given up the

practice of 'christening the pay-packet'. Though the movement is supposed to fit workers for life in a communist society, they are not encouraged to anticipate too eagerly their future way of life. Some Lvov bicycle workers who began sharing out their wages equally amongst themselves were quickly told to stop it.

THERE is hardly any pretence nowadays that the Soviet Communist Party, in any meaningful sense, is either proletarian or revolutionary. Mayakovsky's vision of it as the crater through which the boiling lava of the proletariat erupts upon the bourgeois world would look absurd, even suspect, on the pages of *Party Life*. Nor, as a rule, does it pretend to be a party of heroic individual endeavour and fanatical consciences: the cult of the communist saint and martyr is found in fiction, but the author usually seems to be saying that the communist spirit has fled from the party and resides in an invisible church of true believers. The party shows itself to the public as an association of supremely able, hard-working, practical men, impatient of high-falutin' ideology or pretentious sentiment; willing to allow a measure of democracy at lower levels, but as jealously as ever withholding the inner life of its co-optative leading nuclei from public scrutiny; anxious for broad and free business-like discussion of practical matters by men of good will, and utterly intolerant of any challenge to high policy and its makers; eager to broaden its social basis, and busy reinforcing the predominance of the highly educated administrator and technician in its centres of power; ready to slur over much of what people find abhorrent or meaningless in its creed, but not to enquire whether the people have ideas of their own outside the sphere of handy production hints; easing the burden of political indoctrination, and speeding up the preparation of men's minds for communism-with-temperance propaganda.

Yet though the party may seem to have changed only slightly since Stalin's day, it functions in such a very different political climate that even slight changes may have a great significance. Perhaps that significance may best be summarised by contrasting Stalin's view of the party's function with what I take to be Khrushchev's view. Stalin pretended to regard society as a vast mechanism, with the party as the central motor and signal system, regulating all the other parts. This of course was never an adequate description, if only because Stalin so tangled the works with additional and independent signal systems, cross-switches and booster devices—as well as throwing spanners in angry moments—that no simple diagram either of the workings of the system as a whole or of the place of the party in it was ever possible. Nonetheless, it can be taken to represent Stalin's ideal, if only he could have trusted anyone long enough to allow a regular distribution of power. Khrushchev's ideal would have to be described, I think, not in mechanical but in organic terms; he perhaps is wise enough to think of society in terms of growth processes rather than engineering operations. It seems likely that he wants to stabilise the present, not excessively rigid and not excessively fluid, state of Soviet society. This he can do most easily within the party, where he seems to be successfully inculcating his ideal, which I could not describe better than in a phrase from *The Organisation Man*: 'dynamic conformity'. Beyond that, the party must involve wider and wider sections of the population by attraction, assimilate them by persuasion. If my interpretation is correct, then those who call Khrushchev a neo-Leninist are no less correct than the critics of his 'materialist revisionism': for Khrushchev perhaps genuinely cherishes Utopian hopes of re-integrating the atomised society into an organic whole of which the party is the heart.

If this speculation on Khrushchev's intentions seems precariously balanced on the slender facts I have mentioned, please forget it, and reflect instead on the significance of those facts in the light of Mikoyan's statement that the inner life of the party is the model for the future life of communist society.

REVISIONISM: THE GREAT DEBATE

George Lichtheim

TO understand what was involved in the great debate over Marxism which shook the European socialist movement around 1900, it must be borne in mind that the challenge came from inside the fold. Its chief protagonist had been a close collaborator of Engels, and those who shared his views were in different degrees influenced by Marx; many indeed continued to think of themselves as 'critical Marxists'. Intermingled with this group, and sometimes difficult to distinguish from it, there were socialists stemming so to speak from an earlier geological stratum; of whom it would be true to say that they were less concerned with revising Marx than with adhering to their pre-Marxian view of things, which had suddenly become more respectable owing to the outbreak of dissension within the Marxist school. In the strict sense, 'revisionism' was confined to areas where Marxism had become the official doctrine of the social-democratic movement: principally Germany, Austria and Russia. One cannot seriously speak of Marxism being dominant around 1900 beyond this region, though there were influential Marxists in the West European, British and American socialist parties and sects of the period; and in consequence it is not really very helpful to contrast for example the 'Marxist' Guesde with the 'revisionist' Jaurès. The latter—aside from being the dominant figure in the socialist movement of his country—was quite plainly the protagonist of an indigenous French socialism largely untouched by Germanic importations (and, if influenced by them, almost as deeply indebted to Kant as to Marx). To class him among the revisionists is in a sense unfair to both. As a public figure he towered above them, while as a theorist he could not well compare with the more learned and ingenious representatives of the school. On the whole his contribution to the theoretical side of the debate was limited to the subject of socialist ethics, and here the Germans—having studied both Kant and Marx at the source—possessed an advantage which foreigners could not hope to match.[1]

If the greatest representative of French socialism was, from the theoretical viewpoint, on the fringe of the discussion, the majority of West European socialists hardly figured in it at all. Never having been Marxists in the full sense, there was no particular reason why they should adopt the revised version of the doctrine. For all his rigidity in doctrinal matters Kautsky saw this quite clearly, as witness his comment on the Belgian socialist leaders who in 1902 had incurred his displeasure by mismanaging a general strike movement to obtain universal suffrage:

> I maintain an entirely unprejudiced attitude towards them; the talk about their revisionism leaves me cold. They have nothing to revise, for they have no theory. The eclectic vulgar socialism to which the revisionists would like to reduce Marxism is something beyond which they (sc. the Belgians) have not even begun to advance. Proudhon, Schaeffle, Marx—it is all one to them; it was always like that; they have not retrogressed in theory, and I have nothing to reproach them with.[2]

A similar degree of tolerance was not, however, extended to the Fabians. Here was an influential group of socialists who represented a rival approach—for the most part derived from Ricardo, Mill, and Henry George, plus the new 'subjectivist' school of economics—

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[1] For Jaurès' philosophical views cf. Vorlaender, *Kant und Marx* (Tuebingen, 1926), p. 104 ff. This is the authoritative study of the revisionist movement on its philosophical side, with special reference to the derivation of its doctrines from Kantian ethics.

[2] Kautsky to Victor Adler, 23 May 1902, *Briefwechsel*, pp. 400–01. For Kautsky's critical view of the political strategy pursued by the French and Belgian socialists, cf. also his letters of 19 May 1902, and 28 January 1903. The former is noteworthy among others for his insistence that universal suffrage in Belgium would mean 'the beginning of the end not only for the clerical regime, but also for the monarchy, and even the bourgeois regime'.

and whose activities had already stirred the disapproval of Engels, years before Bernstein gave signs of being influenced by their views.[3] In later years it even became possible for the historian of the Society to claim, with some degree of satisfaction, that revisionism was cradled in Britain.[4] This is true in the biographical sense, at least in so far as Bernstein is concerned, for there can be no doubt that his outlook was deeply influenced by his prolonged residence in Britain.[5] But revisionism in theory was already latent before Bernstein had come upon the stage; in a sense it had been in the air since the appearance in 1894 of the third and concluding volume of *Capital*, with its forced and unconvincing solution of the price-value problem. To anyone concerned with Marxist theory this was a serious matter, but it was not a matter in which the Fabians took much interest; nor indeed were they competent to do so. The attack on Marxian economics was led by Böhm-Bawerk, and continued by Pareto, with some assistance from Benedetto Croce; in other words, it was centred on Austria, Switzerland, and Italy. There were excellent geographical reasons for this, just as there were good reasons for the Central European provenance of the leading Marxists of the period, but in practice it meant that the debate was confined to one particular area. No controversy worth mentioning took place either in Britain or in France. In the former country Marxism was as yet unrepresented in the theoretical field, and in France its defenders were more interested in the philosophy of history than in the dull subject of economics. Lastly, it took time for the whole of *Capital* to be translated, and in the interval all the really important debates had already taken place.[6]

Italy, however, requires special mention in this context. Not only did it produce in the person of Antonio Labriola (1842–1904) a Marxist theoretician of some eminence who was also a full-fledged professor of philosophy.[7] It also brought forth two critics of Marxism who raised the debate to a new level: Vilfredo Pareto and Benedetto Croce; the latter a former pupil of Labriola and for some years at least a quasi-Marxist. If one cares one may attribute this surprisingly strong Italian contingent to the circumstance that Italy was more fully exposed than either France or England to German-Austrian influences. A more accurate statement probably would be to say that Italy was a borderland exposed to both Central European and Western European intellectual currents, the former including Marxism as well as neo-Hegelianism. At any rate it is a fact that Italian thinking figured prominently in the debate over Marxian theory which raged from about 1895 to 1905, just as it was an Italian, Enrico Barone, who in 1908 made the crucial contribution to the theory of socialist economic planning.[8] This, incidentally, underlines the complexity of the situation, for Barone, so far from being a Marxist, was a follower of Pareto, whose criticism of Marx (cf. *Les Systèmes Socialistes*, Paris, 1902–03) set the tone for much of the French and Italian literature of the period. Yet it was Barone who for the first time developed a coherent blueprint of a planned economy—and he did so on the basis of modern, post-classical equilibrium

[3] Engels to Kautsky, 4 September 1892; cf. *Aus der Fruehzeit des Marxismus*, p. 338 ff.; Marx-Engels, *Selected Correspondence* (London, 1956), pp. 529–31. For Kautsky's belief that Bernstein's development was leading him 'away from German social-democracy, if not from socialism', and his advice to him to become 'a representative of English socialism', cf. his letter to Bernstein of 23 October 1898, reproduced in Victor Adler, *Briefwechsel*, p. 272 ff.

[4] E. R. Pease, *The History of the Fabian Society*, p. 239.

[5] The best account of this subject is to be found in Peter Gay, *The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism* (New York, 1952), pp. 54 ff., 93 ff.

[6] For a brief account of the post-1894 discussion cf. Meek, *Studies in the Labour Theory of Value*, p. 201 ff.; Sweezy, *The Theory of Capitalist Development*, p. 190 ff. Wicksteed's critique of Marx, which played some part in the genesis of Fabianism, belongs to an earlier phase. There was no revisionist debate in France, for the excellent reason that there were no Marxist economists in that country. Those socialists who took an interest in Marxist theory—their number was not large before 1918—relied upon what information they obtained from the librarian at the *Ecole Normale Supérieure*, Lucien Herr, who was not only a clandestine socialist, but possessed the then almost unique distinction, for a Frenchman, of being able to read German. His article on Hegel in the *Encyclopédie* remained for many years the only reference to that philosopher in France.

[7] And who should not be confused with his namesake Arturo Labriola, the founder of Italian Syndicalism, who is important in socialist history for other reasons.

[8] In a paper entitled 'Il Ministro della Produzione nello Stato Collectivista', now available in an English translation in *Collectivist Economic Planning* (ed. Hayek, London, 1935), p. 245 ff.

economics as taught at Lausanne by Walras and Pareto. Here was further proof, if the revisionists required it, that socialist theory was not dependent on Marx. To conclude this brief note on the Italian contribution, Croce during the same period produced a critique of Marxian economics which laid due stress on the weaknesses of its value theory[9]; while his countryman Alfredo Poggi, another pupil of Labriola, intervened with some effect in the debate on Kantian and Marxian ethics.[10]

WITH this last-mentioned theme we have crossed the threshold into the central area of discussion, both geographically and ideologically. For obvious reasons the controversy over Marxism as an all-inclusive system was bound to pivot on Germany, though Austria-Hungary and Russia made important contributions. This does not mean that the level of debate was uniformly higher in Germany than in the neighbouring areas: such was not the case. But Germany was the principal battlefield, both because it was the most important country in Europe, and because of the commanding position held by German socialism within the Second International. If this massive labour movement were to be disrupted or to shift its ground, the long-term consequences would be far-reaching. From our present vantage-point this is evident enough. In 1900 the full implications of a split were still obscure, but the cleavage was already sharp and angry. There was an even more violent conflict in the emerging Russian social-democratic movement, but it turned on different issues and must be considered separately. There were likewise interesting theoretical developments in Austria, but they did not quite fit the German pattern. The difference between Germany and Austria in this respect has its significance, and must be mentioned briefly before we take the plunge into our theme.

In the strict sense there was no revisionist debate in Austria. This is the more remarkable since Vienna was one of the three great centres of the 'new economics'—Lausanne and Cambridge being the other two—and consequently an ideal arena for ideological tournaments. The Austrian school of economics, as represented by Böhm-Bawerk, had in fact taken the field as early as 1896 with an assault on the the third volume of *Capital*.[11] This became the starting-point of a theoretical controversy which gave the fledgling Marxist school in Vienna a chance to display its talents in a series of lively encounters with the academic economists, who in addition to Böhm-Bawerk's other pupils included the youthful Joseph Schumpeter; but it did not give rise to a revisionist movement. In Vienna one was either a Marxist or an anti-Marxist, and in the latter case an adherent of liberal economics. Some of the Austro-Marxists diluted their general philosophy a little, so as to allow for all kinds of personal ingredients, from Kantian ethics to Freudian psychology; but they never relinquished their claim to be in the central tradition, and they never joined the German revisionists in their attempt to substitute an altogether different theoretical brew. It may be said that they merely wore their revisionism with a difference, but the difference was an important one. Vienna became a centre of Marxian socialism and remained one even after 1918, when the majority of Central European Marxists went over to the Leninist faith.

A somewhat different situation prevailed in Russia, or to be exact, in Petersburg and among the Russian emigrants in Western Europe. Here there were theorists of some eminence who joined the critics after going through a Marxist phase. Tugan-Baranovsky, Peter Struve, S. N. Bulgakov, and Nicolai Berdyaev cannot be ignored. But their example also shows how different the Russian situation was from the German. Of the four, only Tugan-Baranovsky was a genuine revisionist in the sense of trying to bring Marxist theory up to

[9] *Historical Materialism and the Economics of Karl Marx* (London, 1914). (The title of the original *Materialismo storico ed economia marxistica*, 1899.)

[10] A. Poggi, *Kant e il Socialismo* (Palermo, 1904). For an account of his views cf. Vorlaender, op. cit., p. 225 ff.

[11] Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, *Zum Abschluss des Marxschen Systems*, translated as *Karl Marx and the Close of his System* (London and New York, 1898); reprinted (ed. Sweezy, New York, 1949), together with Hilferding's rejoinder and an appendix containing L. von Bortkiewicz's important paper, first published in 1907, on Marx's solution of the price-value transformation problem.

date.[12] For the others the critique of Marxism was merely a stage towards a fundamentally conservative position. Marxism to them was simply the extreme form of Western radicalism-cum-materialism, and their break with it signified a return to traditional, i.e., in the last resort Russian-Orthodox, values. In consequence they contributed little to the revisionist controversy, whatever their significance in the history of Russian political thought.[13] Revisionism presupposed agreement on the fundamentals of the socialist faith as understood in the West, and this faith was radically humanist; whether it was also necessarily 'materialist', in the sense given to the term by Engels and Kautsky, was a different question, and indeed one of the principal topics over which the disputants fell out.

AFTER these preliminaries it is time to indicate more plainly what the great debate was about. Briefly, it concerned the adaptation of Marxism to the modern world of industrialism and democracy, as it presented itself in Western Europe and North America around 1900. This alone should serve to make it clear why Russia was on the fringe of the discussion, and why nearly all Russian socialists remained true to Marxist orthodoxy, however much they might disagree over tactics. It also supplies a pointer to the phenomenon of Austro-Marxism: The modern world was certainly a tangible influence in pre-1914 Austria, but its impact was not such as to encourage the notion that a peaceful transition to modernity could be made which would leave the Habsburg Empire intact. In Germany, by contrast, the break with the past promised to be less violent—or at least so it seemed to the more hopeful spirits in the socialist movement before the first world war. This situation formed the background of revisionism. It does not 'explain' it. The explanation, if there is one, lies in the tension which Marxism set up in the minds of people who had to adjust to a new situation, but did not wish to let go of certain fundamentals they had come to accept. None of the revisionists renounced socialism as a goal, though some came to adopt Bernstein's sceptical position, summed up in his rather unfortunate phrase 'the movement is everything, the goal nothing'. This curious formulation hardly reflected its author's real attitude, since he remained active in promoting the 'goal' to the day of his death; but it made a useful slogan and in particular gave satisfaction to all those—notably in the growing trade union movement—who did not seriously expect to see socialism realised 'in our time', but had all the more need for some assurance that their day-to-day activities were meaningful and important.[14]

THE name of the protagonist has now been invoked so often that it is necessary to fix some attention upon his views. This is not altogether easy, for Eduard Bernstein (1850–1932) was almost as prolific a writer as Kautsky, and the issues he stirred up were sufficiently numerous and complex to keep a generation of controversialists almost ceaselessly employed. Moreover, the debate gradually broadened to include such recondite subjects as the relation of Marxism to Darwinism, the possibility of constructing a socialist ethic on the basis of Kantian idealism, the relevance of Hegel's logic to the Marxian system, and similar topics. Although Bernstein became involved in all these issues, his contributions to the more strictly philosophical disputations were not rated very highly even by his friends, and in the end he withdrew from this part of the arena to concentrate on more immediate

[12] Cf. his *Theoretical Foundations of Marxism* (1905) and his short history of Socialism, in *Der moderne Sozialismus in seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung* (Leipzig, 1908); cf. also Kautsky's lengthy review of the latter work in *Neue Zeit*, 1907–08, II, pp. 540–51, 607–12.

[13] Cf. Vorlaender, op. cit., p. 190 ff.

[14] On this subject and the whole question of Bernstein's role in the German Social-Democratic movement cf. Gay, op. cit., passim. Bernstein's main contribution to the debate, originally published under the rather long-winded title *Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie* (hereafter cited as *Voraussetzungen*) appeared in an English translation as *Evolutionary Socialism* in 1909, published by the Independent Labour Party. For a contemporary critique of Bernstein's position from the orthodox standpoint cf. Louis Boudin, *The Theoretical System of Karl Marx in the Light of Recent Criticism* (Chicago, 1907). The literature is endless, most of it in German, but readers interested in a Marxist-Leninist comment can find one in P. Sweezy, op. cit., p. 192 ff.

matters.[15] It is probably no injustice to the memory of this remarkable man to say that his autodidactic training showed up more disadvantageously in his philosophical excursions than in his political and economic writings. As a political thinker he was at least the equal of his opponents, though his cast of mind was not really attuned to the German situation; while his economic and historical writings maintained a creditable standard.[16] He can also claim the merit of having maintained an unimpeachable stand in 1914–18, when he broke with the majority of his adherents to rejoin his old enemy Kautsky in a principled opposition to his party's collaboration with the Imperial government. Nonetheless in the long run his reputation must rest upon his attempted revision of Marxism, and here a considered judgment is much more difficult to formulate.

In part this is due to the extreme complexity of the issues involved in the revisionist debate. The topics Bernstein tried to tackle in his *Voraussetzungen* (1899), as well as in his later writings, ranged from the most abstract and recondite to the simplest and most pressing, besides which his adherents raised a large number of side issues, not all of them theoretical. As time went on, the controversy over Marxist theory turned into a pragmatic dispute over tactics, and eventually it merged with a factional struggle for power. By 1910, when the theoretical debate was as good as over, Bernstein and his friends had gained the support of men—notably among the trade union leaders and senior party officials—who neither knew nor cared what the original disagreement had been about, but were quite clear that the quasi-Marxist orthodoxy of the party leadership was a brake on their instinctive reformism. Subsequent developments were to show that Bernstein was badly mistaken about the outlook of these supporters; most of them were distinctly to the right of him, a circumstance which affected both their and his orientation during the war years. Some went so far as to subscribe to the entire programme of German imperialism in 1914–18, thus offering a parallel to the Fabians, though in the German setting such tendencies necessarily had a more aggressively nationalist ring. The liberal-minded theorist who had originally started the revisionist movement was made to feel distinctly uncomfortable in this environment.[17]

These confusions ultimately stemmed from a single circumstance of which Bernstein's critics never failed to remind him: that Germany differed from England. Although he frequently protested his awareness of this fact,[18] Bernstein did give the impression of believing that a 'British' form of development was not merely desirable, but possible—indeed quite probable—so far as Germany was concerned, and that the social-democrats could do much to promote it. His criteria of judgment in any case were derived from the West European situation, compared with which Imperial Germany was indisputably lagging.[19] Prior to 1918 the question was whether this gap could be bridged without revolution; since today we know the answer it is unnecessary to remark that on the political issue Bernstein proved mistaken. As against this it is arguable that in the long perspective the type of democratic socialism he envisaged has stood the test, not merely in Western Europe but also in those parts of Germany which after 1945 were more or less willingly incorporated in Western Europe. This, however, is not exactly what the revisionists of 1900, or the reformists of 1910, had in mind when they looked forward to a Germany modelled on the Western pattern. At best their victory has been a partial and belated one.

Two further points connected with the political side of the controversy must be got out of the way before we can turn to Bernstein's strictly theoretical contribution: the imperialist issue and militarism.

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[15] Vorlaender, op. cit., p. 176 ff; Gay, op. cit., p. 131 ff.

[16] His historical study on radical trends in the English Revolution of 1640–60 was pioneer work and won him recognition in British academic quarters; cf. Gay, op. cit., p. 51 ff.

[17] Gay, op. cit., p. 251 ff.

[18] Cf. Bernstein to Bebel, 20 October 1898, in Victor Adler, *Briefwechsel*, pp. 260–61.

[19] Ibid., p. 263: 'Look across the German frontiers to the politically advanced countries: Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Switzerland, Norway, even France. . . . In Germany, owing to the peculiar state of affairs, the party has obtained a political power which is out of tune with the general political development. It has thereby been placed in a difficult position. This situation is not alleviated by the constant banging of the revolutionary drum. . . .'

For a variety of reasons, the tariff was the central issue in the politics of Imperial Germany before 1914. On this matter the 'agrarian' majority stood together under the leadership of its politically and economically strongest section: the East Elbian landowners, who were also the effective rulers of the Prussian state and the Prussian army. If the social-democratic programme had consisted of nothing but a drastic free-trade platform, it would already have spelled revolution so far as Prussia was concerned; and the Reich as a whole pivoted on Prussia. The fact that heavy industry had entered the protectionist 'solidarity bloc' made it an ideal target for social-democratic assaults, and this propaganda had no need to be socialist in order to be regarded as truly radical. Inasmuch as it menaced the economic foundations of the bloc of great landowners and great industrialists who ruled Germany, it was subversive by its very nature. When around 1900 the protectionist bloc turned imperialist as well, the conflict assumed an even sharper form, for social-democratic resistance to the Reich government's policy of naval expansion and hostility to Britain now merged with its attack on the political foundations of Bismarck's Empire.

All this had very little to do with socialism, but a great deal with democracy. What is important for our theme is that the revisionist debate cut across this issue, since Bernstein's faith in liberalism was not shared by all his supporters. Many came in the end to make their peace with protectionism and imperialism, until the catastrophe of 1918 sobered them. However, for the period immediately under review it is true to say that democratic socialism—as Bernstein and his immediate supporters understood it—implied a policy of free trade, European peace, and above all good relations with England. On this issue there was no conflict between the party leadership and the revisionists, save insofar as some of the latter were a little wobbly in their attachment to free trade. The real trouble was that a programme of peace, democracy, and economic liberalism had no chance of being adopted by a majority of the Reichstag. This made it impossible for German social-democracy to develop along the lines of the British Labour Party. It was not Marx (let alone Hegel), but the tariff, which stood in the way of revisionism.[20]

Closely linked with this issue was that of militarism—to employ the cant term in use before 1914 to describe the internal situation in Prussia-Germany. For practical purposes the Reich was governed by an uncontrollable bureaucracy centred on the Emperor and the General Staff. In this respect the situation was similar to that in pre-1945 Japan; indeed the Japanese constitution had been modelled on the German. Here again social-democratic policy was dictated by circumstances, and here too it required a considerable act of faith to suppose that Germany would evolve without a catastrophe in the direction Britain and Western Europe had already taken. In promoting such beliefs the revisionists certainly did not display superior insight. This became evident when on the eve of 1914 some of them began to despair of peaceful progress and to toy with the idea of a general strike to bring about constitutional reform.[21] It was becoming plain that, in Prussia anyhow, Bernstein's prescriptions would not work, and that stronger measures were needed to dislodge the autocracy. This realisation in turn promoted the fortunes of the radical wing, which aimed beyond democracy at a full-blown proletarian revolution, while Bernstein exhausted his ingenuity in elaborate paper schemes for obtaining the support of dissident liberals in the Prussian pseudo-parliament.[22] These tactics were

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[20] Cf. Gerschenkron, *Bread and Democracy in Germany* (Berkeley, 1943), p. 67: 'In both countries free trade policies were oriented toward the interest of consumers. In England as in Germany, the labour struggle against protectionism was a struggle against imperialist policies, with the important difference that Joseph Chamberlain lost and Bülow won. But while in England the free trade policy was related to the problem of democracy only in the sense that the absence of protectionism spared the English democracy a profound internal conflict, protectionism in Germany perpetuated the economic and political existence of a class whose economic interests and general philosophy were bitterly opposed to all democracy stood and stands for.'

[21] Schorske, *German Social Democracy* (Harvard, 1957), p. 274 ff.

[22] Gay, op. cit., p. 231 ff; Schorske, op. cit., p. 171 ff. On the general subject of German imperialism in the Wilhelminian period cf. Eckart Kehr, *Schlachtflottenbau und Parteipolitik, 1894–1901* (Berlin, 1930);

doomed to failure: there was in fact no way of solving the constitutional problem peacefully, and consequently no genuine choice of tactics. It is humanly understandable that this realisation was unpalatable to men who saw that war was coming and were driven frantic by the thought that in the race between militarism and democracy they were losing ground. But from our present vantage-point it is plain enough that Bernstein and his friends were conducting a fight against hopeless odds. The ruling caste was determined not to permit a significant extension of democracy in Prussia and the Reich; indeed the mere threat of such a development was enough to help precipitate the crisis of 1914 which otherwise might have been postponed for another few years. Germany, in the eyes of the governing caste, depended for its safety on Prussia, and Prussia must stand and fall with its undemocratic constitution which guaranteed the hegemony of the military aristocracy. Before Germany's rulers perforce relinquished this position to the rising democratic tide, they would hasten the inevitable European war while they still held control. All this was becoming plain even before 1914; so was the fact that what Germany needed was not a socialist but a democratic revolution. It was Bernstein's achievement to have perceived this before anyone else did, but to carry his party along with him, German socialism would have had to operate in a different environment.

AFTER this lengthy digression it is time to consider the substance of Bernstein's theoretical position. Briefly, it amounted to a repudiation of the analysis enshrined in the *Erfurt Programme*. Where Kautsky in 1891 had envisaged a bleak future of mounting class tensions, increasing centralisation of wealth, and 'for the proletariat and the submerging middle class', the certainty of 'growing insecurity, misery, oppression, enslavement, debasement, exploitation',[23] Bernstein in 1899 saw evidence of increasing order, security, tranquillity, prosperity, and more equitable distribution of wealth.[24] Where the *Programme* held that Marx's pessimistic analysis of social development had been fully borne out by the facts, Bernstein found statistical evidence—warmly contested by his critics—that the middle classes were holding their own, while wage-earners' incomes were rising. Capitalist concentration, in his view, was proceeding rather slowly, and small-scale enterprise continued to flourish alongside the industrial giants. Meanwhile business cycles were tending to flatten out; social tensions were lessening; and ownership of property was becoming more widespread. Since it was impossible to suppose that the actual situation had changed fundamentally between 1891 and 1899, it was apparent that Bernstein and his opponents were looking at the same set of facts through differently coloured glasses. As in the dispute between Kautsky and David over the stability of small-scale peasant farming, neither side managed to persuade the other that its reading of the situation was mistaken, though it is significant that after 1918 they moved much closer together.[25]

Had Bernstein contented himself with disputing the more unrealistic assertions of the *Erfurt Programme*—notably its tendency to dwell on the 'increasing misery' of the proletariat in a manner more reminiscent of the *Communist Manifesto* than of Marx's and Engels's mature writings—it is probable that his proposed revisions would have been largely accepted. Unfortunately for the cause he was trying to promote, he linked these criticisms to a wholesale onslaught upon every aspect of the Marxian system, from its philosophy of history to its economic doctrine. Here he was clearly out of his depth and no match for the arguments of his opponents. Not that these counter-attacks were uniformly successful; but they proceeded from a firmly held belief in the importance of theoretical coherence, while Bernstein gave the

G. W. F. Hallgarten, *Imperialismus vor 1914* (Munich, 1951), passim. What those liberals who, with some misgivings, backed the imperialist course, thought of the matter may be inferred from Max Weber's writings collected in *Gesammelte Politische Schriften* (Tuebingen, 1959), p. 109 ff.

[23] *Das Erfurter Programm*, p. 2.

[24] *Voraussetzungen*, p. 82 ff.

[25] Gay, op. cit., pp. 157–65. In some respects the debate came perilously close to hairsplitting, e.g., over Bernstein's inclusion of minor shareholders among the class of property-owners. To the orthodox, for whom control rather than ownership was the decisive criterion, this of course was simply further proof of Bernstein's tendency to backslide into liberalism.

impression of being content with a good deal less. Thus in criticising Marx's value theory—whose shortcomings were indeed obvious—he made the artless suggestion that the truth might lie somewhere midway between the labour-cost approach and the 'marginalist' stress on utility.[26] This kind of eclecticism had other effects besides driving Kautsky to despair: it showed that Bernstein did not really have much of a head for theory, or at any rate that he did not greatly care for theoretical consistency. There were other blunders of the same kind, e.g., his unfortunate attempt to correct the 'one-sidedness' of the materialist conception of history, or his well-meant but singularly naive remarks on the nefarious influence of Hegel. In all these respects he was aiming at something important—a doctrine more inclusive and less rigid than the system constructed by Engels and Kautsky—but the inadequacy of his thinking was painfully evident, not least to the abler among his supporters. These included men professionally versed in philosophy who were understandably alarmed by Bernstein's amateurish incursions into their field. A brief account of these 'revisionists in philosophy' may help to set the subject in perspective.

The first thing to be noted is that almost all the writers in question were Germans, and that most of them had been influenced by the neo-Kantian revival which got under way in the 1870s.[27] This was partly a reaction to the 'vulgar' materialism of the natural scientists; in part it represented an attempt to restore unity and cohesion to the liberal world-view, as originally formulated before the great eruption of positivism and scientism in the 1850s and 1860s. Being a German movement, neo-Kantianism was naturally dominated by university professors, and at its peak it more or less monopolised the official teaching of philosophy in Germany. Its leading figures (Friedrich Albert Lange, Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, Ernst Cassirer), and those who followed in their wake (K. Lasswitz, R. Stammler, F. Staudinger, K. Vorlaender, and others), had in common a belief that the urgently necessary integration of philosophy and science could be effected by reviving those elements of 'critical' (i.e., Kantian) thinking which were independent of Kant's purely personal—and thus historically outmoded—notions on metaphysical and ethical subjects: e.g., his half-hearted concessions to the theological world-picture, his modified authoritarianism in politics, and so on. The school, in short, was neo-liberal as well as neo-Kantian and, in so far as it was neo-liberal, critical of the existing state of affairs. It was in particular hostile to every form of authoritarianism in politics or morals. Politically, its influence found expression after 1900 in the increasingly violent attacks which Max Weber—an influential adherent, though not strictly speaking a member of the school—directed against the institutions and the government of Imperial Germany. Mention of Weber, however, also indicates the limits beyond which this privileged and as it were licensed opposition could not be expected to pass (save for those who broke with 'society' and became social-democrats). For Weber—though critical of the regime—was unrepentantly national-liberal and 'imperialist'. In so far as it had political implications, the school ranged from moderate liberalism to moderate socialism. The 'extremes' were excluded.

At first sight there seems to be no obvious reason why an academic revival of Kant's philosophy—or rather of his methodology, for the neo-Kantians (like the neo-Marxians) rated method above system—should have stirred political echoes. The key to the riddle lies in Germany's incomplete and indeed precarious evolution as a national organism. The Reich had been put together by Bismarck in a manner which left a good many important problems unsolved. In particular, the Conservative-Liberal compromise of 1866–78 had failed to settle the question whether Germany was to evolve along Western lines or retain its famous 'uniqueness', the source of so much nationalist

[26] Gay, op. cit., p. 171 ff; Meek, op. cit., p. 211 ff. For a more recent study of the revisionist debate cf. Christian Gneuss, 'Um den Einklang von Theorie und Praxis. Eduard Bernstein und der Revisionismus', in *Marxismusstudien*, II, p. 198 ff.

[27] The authoritative account of this subject is to be found in Vorlaender, op. cit., p. 112 ff. One needs to remember, though, that the author was himself a distinguished representative of the neo-Kantian school, as well as being a prominent figure in the revisionist movement. For a Hegelian-Marxist (but not Leninist) treatment of the subject, cf. Korsch, *Marxismus und Philosophie*, passim.

fervour. Corresponding to this political uncertainty there was a spiritual vacuum which attracted socialist criticism on the left and Nietzschean tendencies on the right, while liberalism was increasingly reduced to the status of an academic creed. Although this situation had parallels elsewhere in Europe, there were in Germany's case special aggravating features which were to become more marked in 1914, and disastrously evident in 1933–39. In the perspective of history the neo-Kantian movement can be seen as an unavailing attempt to stiffen the backbone of German liberalism by making it less dependent on the uncertain market values of ' science ', ' modernity ', ' progress ', and other fashionable deities. Not that the neo-Kantians were indifferent to empiricism and the natural sciences; they merely felt that something tougher and more inclusive was needed to hold the cultural fabric together. It was this conviction, together with growing scepticism as to the permanence of the bourgeois world, which caused some of them as early as the 1860s to take a sympathetic interest in socialism.[28]

BY the 1890s the process was sufficiently advanced to make it possible for leading neo-Kantians—who were also full-fledged university professors—to draw radical conclusions from Kant's ethics, and even to suggest a thorough-going synthesis of socialism and philosophical idealism.[29] This was about as far as any holder of a university chair in Imperial Germany could venture, Marxism being officially taboo and anyhow incompatible with Kantian idealism, to judge from Engels's pronouncements on the subject. The final and decisive step was taken when a fusion of Kantian ethics and Marxian politics was proposed by writers who were active social-democrats and thus outside the official fold. With the appearance of this group—principally L. Woltmann, F. Staudinger, K. Vorlaender, C. Schmidt and K. Eisner—the issue ceased to be academic and became political. The question now was not whether a university teacher might profess socialist ideas in his off-hours, but whether active social-democrats could adhere simultaneously to Marx and to Kant. Needless to say, Kautsky and Bernstein held different views on this subject. But the matter was not simple, for neo-Kantian tendencies cropped up in the most unexpected places. So prominent a representative of Marxism as the veteran leader of Austrian social-democracy, Victor Adler, had suggested as early as 1895—in an obituary article on Engels, of all places—that Kant's philosophy was compatible with Marx's sociology and might even be substituted for the materialist world-view without doing damage to the substance of Marxism! [30]

Against this murky backcloth the debate at first unrolled in a manner suggestive of a fair degree of tolerance on both sides. There was also much genuine uncertainty. Not all the neo-Kantians were supporters of Bernstein, and vice versa. Some prominent revisionists managed to remain both Kantians and Marxians. Others, such as C. Schmidt, repudiated Kant's ethics while subscribing to his general philosophy.[31] Still others, notably Woltmann, were orthodox followers of Kant as well as active adherents of Bernstein's political views. Bernstein himself contributed a stream of essays and reviews, starting in the early nineties and culminating in 1901, in which he gradually shed his reservations and explicitly affirmed a Kantian standpoint, though his critics (who included the revisionist socialist and orthodox Kantian K. Eisner) threw doubt on his understanding of

[28] Cf. Vorlaender's remarks on F. A. Lange, op. cit., p. 115 ff. Since Lange was in a sense the founder of the whole movement it is not without significance that he also counts among the pioneers of social reform. From the Marxian viewpoint he was of course no more than a democrat with vaguely socialist leanings; but in the Germany of his time this was a good deal.

[29] Vorlaender, op. cit., p. 117 ff. The dominant figure of the school, Hermann Cohen (1842–1918), went furthest in this direction, and his pupils came to figure prominently among the revisionist wing of Social-Democracy. But even so outstanding a radical as Karl Liebknecht—later to become the proto-martyr of German communism—was philosophically an adherent of the neo-Kantian school: a circumstance deplored by his political friends.

[30] A suggestion energetically disputed by the ' father of Russian Marxism ', G. V. Plekhanov; cf. his *Grundprobleme des Marxismus* (Stuttgart, 1910), p. 97. (The German translation of a work originally published in 1908 under the title *Osnovyne Problemy Marksizma*; English ed., *Fundamental Problems of Marxism* (London, 1929.))

[31] Cf. Vorlaender, op. cit., pp. 155–85, for a detailed account of the discussion; Bernstein's share in it has more recently been critically analysed by Gneuss, loc. cit., p. 214 ff.

Kant's method. The opposing camp likewise was at first far from united. Its principal representatives—Kautsky, F. Mehring, H. Cunow—shared an invincible distaste for philosophical idealism in general, and Kantian moralism in particular, but beyond that they had little in common. How confused the situation was can be seen from the fact that at one stage Kautsky deputed the well-known neo-Kantian F. Staudinger (writing under a pseudonym) to refute Bernstein's philosophical heresies.[32]

Notwithstanding these initial uncertainties, the debate did in the end give rise to something like a philosophical line-up corresponding more or less to the political cleavage. At any rate down to 1914 (when the war produced a major upheaval and even turned old enemies into friends) orthodox Marxism tended to go hand in hand with political intransigence, or 'radicalism' as the term was then understood; while the reformist wing, by and large, came to shelter those who toyed with idealism in philosophy. Individual exceptions apart, most of those who tried to 'revise' Marxist philosophy were also revisionists in politics, which in the circumstances of the day meant some degree of accommodation to the *status quo*; while 'materialism' came to be regarded as synonymous with radicalism. This was particularly true of the left wing which emerged after 1905—the date of the first Russian Revolution—as a separate trend; but it also applied to the 'Marxist centre', as represented by Kautsky and his closest adherents. To Kautsky—as to Plekhanov in Russia, Labriola in Italy, and (so far as they understood the issue) Guesde and Lafargue in France—Marxism meant what it had signified to Engels: a 'materialist' world-view which by its nature excluded every species of philosophical idealism, including the Kantian variant. In so far as it required buttressing by the conclusions of science, the proper support was to be found in Darwinism. Kautsky indeed went so far as to put forward what he himself regarded as a satisfactory synthesis of the Darwinian and the Marxian standpoint.[33]

If one takes a severely practical view of historical developments it is tempting to dismiss these longwinded philosophical disputations as mere by-products of the 'real' political and factional struggle within German social-democracy. This would be a misconception. The 'real' struggle, as time went on, became divorced from the clash of ideas, but the ideological cleavage helped to cement the political alignments. The famous five-day debate on Bernstein's book at the 1899 party congress had indeed no precise sequel in later years—partly because it became clear that revisionism could not be stoned to death with cream-puffs.[34] Either there must be a split—which in fact came in 1914–18, though not on the issues raised by Bernstein—or the existence of two different schools had to be accepted. Once the latter course had been adopted, it became impossible to dissociate political from ideological considerations. Thus the expulsion of K. Eisner and his colleagues from the editorship of the party's principal daily paper in 1905 was as much connected with Eisner's attachment to Kantian ethics as with his lack of enthusiasm for the idea of political strikes on the Russian model.[35] Of course if one happens to believe that 'practical' politics should be strictly separated from mere ideas, all this must seem very odd, not to say absurd. But then German social-democracy around the turn of the century was more than a political movement. Or perhaps one ought to say that its political faith involved ethics as well as economics. At any rate the question whether or not socialism implied a new approach to morals did not seem to the participants to be wholly divorced from more practical and urgent matters.

With these facts in mind we may turn to a brief and necessarily inadequate résumé of the

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[32] Vorlaender, op. cit., p. 213 ff.

[33] Cf. his *Ethik und Materialistische Geschichtsauffassung* (Stuttgart, 1906). Notwithstanding its brevity, this is a more significant work than the bulky treatise of 1927 which disclosed a painful falling-off in mental powers, as well as a marked failure to keep up with the changing situation in philosophy after the first world war.

[34] Cf. *Protokoll ueber die Verhandlungen des Parteitags der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands* (Berlin, 1899), p. 94 ff. No one could say that the annual congress of Germany's greatest party did not take the matter seriously. Bebel's speech attacking the revisionists lasted over 3 hours, and David replied at similar length, with Woltmann bringing up the rear and Rosa Luxemburg appearing for the extreme left. The result was a massive condemnation of Bernstein's views, which however had no practical consequences.

[35] Schorske, op. cit., p. 70 ff; Vorlaender, op. cit., p. 210 ff.

philosophical issue, as it presented itself to most German, Austrian and Russian socialists down to 1914; Germany being the principal arena, if only because revisionism had its chief strength there.

THE first point to be noted is that Bernstein's 'revision', and Kautsky's seemingly orthodox 'interpretation' of Marxism had at least one thing in common: both were equally far removed from the Hegelian origins of Marx's own thought, with the difference that Kautsky was nonetheless at pains to acknowledge the importance of Hegel's philosophy, while Bernstein frankly avowed his distaste for it.[36] Like the great majority of contemporary democrats, both men held an evolutionary view of historical progress; again, in common with the dominant outlook of the age, their understanding of historical method was coloured by their somewhat uncritical acceptance of the theoretical model employed by the natural sciences. But whereas Kautsky—in conformity with Engels, and under the impulsion of his own life-long preoccupation with Darwin—conceived history as subject to immutable laws, and socialism as the determined goal of this process, Bernstein increasingly shifted the emphasis from causal determination to freedom. Historical necessity, in his view, was gradually giving way to conscious control: men were even now increasingly able to determine their circumstances in accordance with their desires. Indeed the existence of socialist strivings was proof of this. Paradoxically, Bernstein maintained that the goal was desirable just because it was not inevitable. Socialism represented 'something that ought to be, or a movement towards something that ought to be'. In this sense it could even be described as 'utopian'. And since it was the realisation of an ideal, its aims could not be deduced from either science or history. They were autonomous and carried their own justification.[37]

This attempted solution satisfied no one. The orthodox were frankly outraged or contemptuous; as they saw it, Bernstein had simply reverted to the pre-Marxian standpoint. Nor were his supporters altogether pleased with his intervention. In particular, his alarmingly vague definition of 'science' caused the stricter neo-Kantians to regard him as a well-intentioned amateur. Nonetheless there was no denying that he had made a breach in the orthodox position. For the first time a prominent social-democrat had renounced the entire corpus of doctrine bequeathed by Marx and Engels. If socialism was not the essential pre-condition of conscious control, if freedom was already operative, in the sense that men were called upon to determine *now* what sort of social organisation they wanted, then the Marxian distinction between 'human pre-history' and 'genuinely human history' went by the board. Bernstein's critique of Marx amounted to saying that the freedom available to men under present-day conditions was already sufficient to enable them to decide their future. If he was right, the gradual establishment of socialism signified no more than a broadening of the area of freedom already established under liberal democracy. This of course was precisely what Mill had believed to be true; and it was precisely what Marx had regarded as nonsense. On this issue no compromise was possible.

The obverse of this coin was the revisionist assault on what the radicals called 'historical necessity'. To Engels—as to Kautsky, Plekhanov, Labriola, Mehring, Luxemburg, and the orthodox school in general—historical determinism was both the guarantor of the eventual 'leap from necessity to freedom', and the foundation of the view that bourgeois society was altogether subject to the rule of necessity. The 'iron laws' of development were laws precisely because class society had no control over the economic mechanism. If their operation did not literally spell 'increasing misery'—on this point Kautsky at least was prepared to make concessions—it certainly excluded the notion of introducing fresh determinants of the kind envisaged by Bernstein and his friends. Hence it was unrealistic to advocate a piecemeal substitution of socialist for capitalist

[36] Bernstein, *Voraussetzungen*, p. 71.

[37] Bernstein, *Wie ist wissenschaftlicher Sozialismus moeglich?* (Berlin, 1901), passim. Cf. also Vorlaender's comment, op. cit., p. 180 ff; Gay, op. cit., p. 146 ff.

dynamics. Irrespective of political circumstances—obviously different in Germany from the situation in other countries—it was false in principle to assert that the transition to socialism involved no more than an extension of reformist trends already in evidence, e.g., labour legislation, trade unionism, co-operation, collective bargaining, governmental regulation of the economy, etc. Such tendencies towards a more highly regulated form of society did not alter the basic laws of development described by Marx; they might have the effect of easing the transition, but the break would nonetheless be drastic and fundamental. 'Gradual change' was a fantasy. Socialism, whether or not introduced peacefully by legislation, represented both a new class interest—an aspect neglected by the revisionists—and an altogether new mode of social organisation. It was not, as Bernstein had suggested, the continuation of liberalism's incomplete work of human emancipation, but rather a new stage in history, and consequently—among other things—the precondition of a new ethic and a new manner of viewing the world.

These conclusions were tentatively set out by Kautsky in his polemic against the neo-Kantians, *Ethik und Materialistische Geschichtsauffassung* (1906), itself a sequel to his earlier dispute with the 'ethical socialists' which had resulted in the editorial changes already referred to. The link between political revisionism and ethical philisophy had by now become so close that a blow against Kant and the neo-Kantians was automatically viewed as a move in the ideological struggle between the Marxist majority and the opposition. If Bernstein or Eisner saw no incompatibility between socialism and ethical idealism, the orthodox school placed all the greater emphasis upon the class character of the movement as the source of those moral energies whose importance the Marxists too were not disposed to deny.[38] At bottom the quarrel turned on the question whether the class struggle should be viewed as the exclusive motor of progress, political and moral. If socialist morality was essentially the expression of proletarian class interest, it was evidently impossible to subordinate its aims to an allegedly supra-historical ethic binding upon the whole of mankind. Such an ethic could be expected to evolve—if at all—only after the existing society had been left behind. For the revisionists to seek spiritual nourishment in the writings of Kant or some other idealist philosopher, simply showed that they had not really emancipated themselves from utopian socialism, or worse still, liberalism. Yet the Marxists did not deny that moral impulses were present in the attempt to transform society. Was the source of these impulses then to be found only in the circumstances of the political struggle? The revisionists did not think so. As they saw it, socialism was making an appeal to what was fundamental in human nature, as it existed here and now. Moreover, those among them who had grasped the Kantian distinction between empirical and normative science were well aware of the flaw in the orthodox position: 'science', in the positivist meaning of the term, could show socialism to be inevitable, but could not make it seem morally superior, or explain why anyone should trouble to hasten the process. If Marxism was 'scientific' in this descriptive sense, then it fairly cried out for a normative philosophy to complement its analysis of 'the facts'.

In trying to meet these objections the orthodox school was handicapped by what it regarded as its trump card: the determinist conception of history. For if Marxism was taken to imply that the logic of history was that of a causal process, there was no room for the notion that history might be propelled by human volition directed to the attainment of some final goal. It made little difference whether finality was denied altogether (Plekhanov), or given a biological foundation (Kautsky). In either case 'objective' science could provide no grounds for moral imperatives. Kautsky as good as admitted this when he drew a watertight distinction between 'the moral ideal, the ethical indignation against exploitation and class oppression' inherent in the socialist movement, and 'the scientific study of the laws of development of the social organism characteristic of Marxism'.[39] 'It is true', he

[38] Kautsky, op. cit., passim; cf. also his article 'Klasseninteresse-Sonderinteresse-Gemeininteresse', in *Neue Zeit*, XXI, 2, p. 265 ff.

[39] *Ethik und Materialistische Geschichtsauffassung*, p. 141.

added rather helplessly, 'that in the case of a socialist the thinker is also a fighter, and no one can be artificially cut in two halves having nothing to do with each other; hence there appears occasionally even in Marx's scientific work the impact of a moral ideal. But he always and rightly attempted to eliminate it so far as possible. For in science the moral ideal becomes a source of error if it is allowed to prescribe the goal.' With this neat dissection of Marxism into a 'scientific' and a 'moral' half, Kautsky had practically demolished his own case and surrendered the disputed ground to Vorlaender and the neo-Kantians. For if Marxist theory was the study of objective 'facts'—including such alleged facts as the grounding of history in biological evolution, which Kautsky (in common with Engels) regarded as proved—then it clearly required a normative philosophy of 'values' to complement it: which was precisely what the neo-Kantians were trying to explain to their bewildered and slightly resentful opponents. The intellectual superiority of the revisionist school in this controversy was indeed so marked as to drive the opposing side back upon a somewhat philistine hostility to philosophy as such. So typical a representative of orthodoxy as F. Mehring characteristically mentioned indifference to 'philosophical brain-weaving' among the preconditions of Marx's and Engels's 'immortal achievements'.[40]

It is thus apparent that the revisionist controversy cannot be understood without reference to philosophical issues of the most general kind. For a debate which had originally begun with a pragmatic dispute over political tactics this may seem a queer ending, attributable in part perhaps to the intellectual climate of pre-1914 Germany. There is something in this explanation, but not much. It would be truer to say that the nature of the confrontation was inherent in the character of social-democracy as a movement which—in however diluted a fashion—represented the Marxian 'union of theory and practice'. The political attitude of the leading revisionists had general implications because Marxism implied a new world-view. As such it necessarily collided not merely with official religion and the established churches, but with liberalism as well. At the same time its ideology was itself in part derived from the classical philosophy which was also the basic inspiration of the liberal creed. When the revisionists cast around for a new theoretical foundation, they were in fact promoting that political alliance of organised labour with liberalism which the Fabians actually helped to achieve in contemporary England, and which Germany was destined to miss. Material circumstances proved decisive, but the ideological conflict was not meaningless; so far from being a mere epiphenomenon of the 'real' struggle, it was a vital part of it. The consequent failure of German social-democracy to win over a sizeable part of the educated middle class, and in particular its failure to conquer the universities, was to prove fatal to the Weimar Republic. These issues were already involved in the controversy of 1895–1905, though the participants could hardly be expected to realise it.

At the theoretical level, the long-drawn dispute between orthodoxy and revisionism resulted in a stalemate. This situation was especially marked in the philosophical field, where the contestants in the end came to identify their respective positions with the materialist evolutionism expounded by Kautsky, as an alternative to the neo-Kantian ethical idealism of the revisionist school. Here the deadlock was complete. In this sense the revisionist controversy was part of a larger movement of ideas which, starting in the 1870s, brought about a confrontation of 'scientific materialism' and 'philosophical idealism' all over the Western world. That the split ran right through European socialism is a tribute to the profound involvement of that movement with the basic issues of its time. Orthodox Marxism, as interpreted by Kautsky or Plekhanov, was in tune with the scientific determinism of the age. Even the philosophical helplessness of the school was after all no greater than that displayed by the founder of psychoanalysis. Its critics had indeed almost a monopoly of genuine philosophical insight. Their concern with normative values reflected the fundamental situation in

[40] Korsch, *Marxismus und Philosophie*, p. 51.

philosophy; in a wider sense they were giving expression to the main problem confronting the liberal culture of their time. It was of course just this involvement with the problems of liberalism which rendered their efforts unsympathetic and suspect to the Marxists. The latter had meanwhile travelled sufficiently far away from the Hegelian origins of their creed to hold the altogether unwarranted belief that philosophy had been left behind for good. This turned out to be an illusion. The era of war and revolution was to bring about, among others, a revival of Hegelianism at the heart of the Marxian system.[41]

(*This essay is a chapter from a book entitled* Marxism: A Historical and Critical Study, *to be published shortly by Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, and Praeger, New York.*)

[41] For a detailed critical account of the subject in the light of subsequent developments cf. I. Fetscher, 'Das Verhaeltnis des Marxismus zu Hegel', in *Marxismusstudien*, III, pp. 66–169; the transformation of Marxist philosophy, down to the situation in the Soviet orbit after the second world war, is here traced to the Hegelian heritage itself; cf. Korsch, op. cit., passim; Georg Lukacs, *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* (Berlin-Vienna, 1923), p. 13 ff.

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ISLAM IN THE SOVIET UNION 1917-1960, II.

Walter Kolarz

A NEW era in the relations between Soviet power and Islam started with the outbreak of the Nazi-Soviet war. It cannot be said without qualification that this new era was better; in some ways it was more depressing than the preceding one. Up to the war the regime was clearly out to destroy official institutionalised Islam; from 1941, when the Kremlin initiated a new policy, Islam was allowed to vegetate and, by becoming an instrument of government policy, forced to discredit itself in the eyes of the believers.

From the Islam which was resurrected in 1941 appeared statements and appeals in favour of the communist regime. It might be argued the same could be said of the Russian Orthodox Church, the main beneficiary of the new religious policy, but to draw such a parallel would be incorrect. In the first place, the Russian Church is naturally inclined to take up a patriotic attitude towards any Russian state, even if it is communist and atheist; it may go too far in its loyalty statements and take an uncharitable view of states more worthy of Christian sympathy than the Soviet Union; but some sincerity there is in the verbal support which the Patriarchal Church gives to the Soviet government. The same cannot be said of the Moslem community, to which only minority races belong. Moreover, as far as the war was concerned, the Russian Orthodox Church leaders had much more reason than the Moslem dignitaries to support the government. In a certain sense the Church shared in the victory and was able to extend her jurisdiction as a result of Russia's military triumph. Soviet Islam, on the other hand, was defeated in the war; evidence of this is the wholesale deportation of five Moslem peoples, small numerically but passionately devoted to the Islamic faith. Finally, the Russian Orthodox Church obtained in return for its loyalty a number of genuine concessions. It even became a power in the state, exercising effective spiritual jurisdiction over millions of believers. The concessions made to official Soviet Islam for similar services were minute. It never became a power, only a facade. The leaders of the Orthodox Church, though carrying out a policy of collaboration and receiving a good deal of official publicity, were nevertheless personalities in their own right. Their Moslem opposite numbers, the 'Red Muftis', as one might call them, were for the most part created by the Soviet propaganda services. They were generals without soldiers.

THE first of the 'Red Muftis' to achieve prominence was Abdul Rahman Rasulayev of Ufa. At the beginning of the war he was described as 'Chief of the Central Council of Islamic Religious Centres in the USSR', but popularly he was called the 'Soviet Mufti'. Especially in the early part of the war, the regime was in need of a man to issue pro-Soviet and anti-Nazi statements on behalf of all the Moslems of the USSR. Rasulayev discharged this task most satisfactorily, but it is doubtful whether he exercised real jurisdiction outside Bashkiria and Tataria. His patriotic activity began soon after the Nazi invasion; on 18 July 1941 he addressed his first appeal to the Moslems of the Soviet Union, calling on them to 'Rise up in defence of their native land, to pray in the mosques for the victory of the Red Army, and to give their blessing to their sons, fighting in a just cause'. This was followed six weeks later by a second appeal, in which Mufti Rasulayev urged the Moslems of the Soviet Union to defend the country 'in the name of religion'.[1]

In 1943, Mufti Rasulayev and Ufa, his headquarters, were to lose their leading positions. In October of that year the Moslem clergy and believers of the five Central Asian Soviet Republics held a congress in Tashkent at which was founded the Ecclesiastical Administration of Moslems of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. This represented the majority of the Moslems

[1] Stanley Evans, *The Churches of the USSR* (London, 1944), p. 158.

of the Soviet Union and became the most important Islamic body of the USSR. Thereafter the Central Asian Moslem administration was the main medium for issuing statements in support of Soviet policy. Rasulayev lost his position as principal spokesman and two other 'Red Muftis' came to the fore, namely, the chairman of the Central Asian Moslem organisation, Mufti Ishan Babakhan Ibn Abd al-Majd Khan, and the vice-chairman, his son and successor, Zia al-Din Babakhanov.

In May 1944 the Transcaucasian Moslems likewise made themselves independent. They held a congress (Kurultai) in Baku, which was attended by 60 delegates from Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. The congress adopted a particularly servile message of allegiance to Stalin, who was described as the 'God-sent and wise head of the Soviet government'.[2] The founding of a Moslem Council for Transcaucasia led to the emergence of another 'Red Mufti', namely the Sheikh ul Islam Ahund Aga Ali Zade, whom the Soviet government used chiefly to propagate its point of view among the Shiite Moslems of Persia and Iraq.[3]

Yet a further Moslem Council was founded at the end of the war for the Moslems of the North Caucasus and Daghestan. It began its activities under particularly unfavourable auspices, since the Soviet authorities had just deported a large proportion of its potential flock, namely the members of the Balkar, Karachai, Chechen, and Ingush peoples. These nationalities had incurred the displeasure of the Soviet authorities for alleged co-operation with the Germans, but had always been highly suspect to the communists because of their unswerving adherence to Islam. With the establishment of the three Moslem Councils in Tashkent, Baku, and Buinaksk (Daghestan), the jurisdiction of the Ufa Mufti was limited to the Moslems of the Volga-Ural region, Siberia, and the Moslem diaspora in the big Russian cities. This restored the situation which had prevailed in Tsarist times, when the Mufti of Ufa was the supreme ecclesiastical authority for all Russian Moslems outside Russian Central Asia, Transcaucasia, the North Caucasus region, and the Crimea. The institution of the Mufti of Ufa or Mufti of Orenburg, his original title, goes back to 1784, when Catherine II was Empress of Russia.

THE official recognition extended to various Moslem bodies during the war, though born of the necessities of a wartime situation, also had long-term objectives. The war saw the expansion of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and a number of Moslem countries, such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, as well as a revival of relations with Saudi Arabia. A loyal Moslem hierarchy could do useful work in strengthening Russia's influence in the Moslem world. The reports about the Moslem congress held in the Soviet Union provided valuable propaganda material for the Soviet diplomatic missions, particularly in Cairo and Teheran, and the favourable response showed the Kremlin that Soviet Islam might prove in future a valuable export article. This in fact is what it became after the war.

The Soviet Moslem leaders, although enjoying little prestige in the Soviet Union itself, were used by the regime to put across to the peoples of the East the Soviet propaganda line on every important topic. The statements issued by the Moslem bodies of the USSR and the leading Muftis and Imams on various international issues are very numerous, and all one can do is to indicate their tone. They usually contained the characteristic communist polemical phrases: 'the American and British warmongers', 'the monstrous crimes of the American soldiery', and 'American barbarians committing ever new crimes against humanity' —this referred to the Korean War. They accused the Western powers of 'flagrantly violating international treaties under the pressure of American aggressors' and concluding a 'shameful deal' to revive German militarism. Soviet Moslem statements protested against NATO, SEATO, the Baghdad Pact and the San Francisco peace treaty with Japan. They supported every initiative of the World Peace Council, all its appeals and all its congresses. In 1956 they condemned the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Suez as a 'shameless crime committed against the behest of the Most

[2] *Soviet War News*, 31 May 1944.
[3] See Interview with Sheikh ul Islam of Transcaucasia, *Soviet War News*, 11 October 1944.

High.' In 1957 they protested against 'Turkish armed aggression in Syria' (which existed only in the imagination of Soviet propagandists). In 1958 they demanded for Algerians the very independence which Moscow denies to the Moslem peoples of the USSR.[4]

Some of these statements were sent out by the Soviet propaganda services, but others were read by the 'Red Muftis' themselves in Arabic and Persian, to enhance their publicity value. The purely political diatribes contained in the statements were usually interspersed with quotations from the Koran, with the appeal to Allah to punish the enemies of the Soviet Union, to drive the 'dark powers' (Britain and the United States) from the territories of the Arab Nation, or even culminated in the wish that Allah would submit them (Britain, France, and Israel) to 'tortures'.

For a long time only verbal contributions were expected from the Moslem leaders of the Soviet Union, but as the Soviet and communist activities in the Moslem states expanded, more services were exacted from them. They had to play their part in welcoming foreign guests from Moslem countries, they were sent on propaganda tours abroad, usually in the guise of pilgrimages, and the Imam of the Moscow mosque was invited to certain diplomatic functions which Moslem delegations attended. They were allowed to send monetary gifts to Moslems in foreign countries if this was likely to create a favourable impression (the victims of the 'Suez aggression' and the casualties of the floods in Pakistan). A meeting with the Chief Mufti of Central Asia and Kazakhstan became almost a matter of routine for every Moslem statesman going to Tashkent, including President Soekarno of Indonesia, who was there in 1956, and President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who visited the city in May 1958.

The chief Mufti whom Nasser saw was Zia al-Din Babakhanov, whom we have already mentioned, and who might be called the 'Moslem Metropolitan Nikolai', for he has proved to be as versatile and as active a collaborator with the Soviet regime as his Orthodox Christian opposite number. There are few religious figures in the Soviet Union who have been as useful to the Soviet government as he—first as the real power behind his father, who died in 1957 at the age of 98, and later as the elected head of the largest Moslem body of the USSR. As Babakhanov is *persona grata* with the Kremlin, he has been able to play a part in semi-official Soviet organisations such as the 'Soviet Society for Friendship with Arab Countries', which was founded in 1958, and to travel abroad on official and semi-official business. He went to Damascus to award the Soviet Peace Prize to a left-wing Syrian sheikh, to Stockholm for a communist-sponsored conference on disarmament, and to Delhi for a World Congress of Religions. He also went to Mecca and Medina on the *hajj*; permission was granted by the Soviet government not only to Babakhanov but to a number of other important Soviet Moslem functionaries as well.

THE resumption of the *hajj* after many years was one of the most interesting features of the new Moslem policy. The first group of Mecca pilgrims was allowed to leave the USSR in November 1944, and there were annual pilgrimages until 1947, when a cholera epidemic made the *hajj* impossible. In the last years of Stalin's lifetime the pilgrimages were again stopped, but under Stalin's successors they have been not merely permitted, but encouraged and widely publicised. The Soviet pilgrimages to Mecca never assumed a mass character, but were usually confined to better-known Moslem figures who were collaborating with the Soviet regime and could be trusted to use their trip to the Holy Places for spreading Soviet propaganda. From the official information available it would appear that the government never granted more than two or three dozen exit permits to would-be pilgrims at a time, and those who obtained them were, in all likelihood, carefully chosen.

The propaganda which Soviet pilgrims carry into the Arab world is of a triple nature. In the first place they proclaim to their co-religionists of other countries that there is full freedom of religion in the Soviet Union, an

[4] Tass report, 20 June 1951, 11 November 1956; *Izvestiya*, 5 January 1955; Moscow Radio in Arabic, 25 October 1957, 7 October 1958.

assertion which not infrequently meets with scepticism among the non-Soviet Moslems. Their second task is to tell the Moslems of other countries that their brethren in the USSR are wealthy and provided with cultural amenities of every kind.[5] Thirdly, and finally, the pilgrimages are used to boost the Soviet Union as a bulwark of peace and to induce the Moslems of other countries to join the Soviet-sponsored peace campaign. On their way back from the Holy Places the pilgrims have often stopped at Cairo, visiting Al Azhar University and giving press conferences and receptions—all with the obvious intention of creating goodwill for the Soviet Union as a power showing respect to the Moslem religion.

OFFICIAL institutionalised Islam in the Soviet Union eked out a very precarious existence, but there has been a certain improvement since the Kremlin became more active in the Middle East. As an immediate result of this new religious policy which Stalin initiated during the war, a number of mosques were reopened. By the end of 1944 mosques existed again at Gorky, Omsk, Novosibirsk, and other Russian cities with a Moslem minority, mostly of Tatar nationality. Altogether, Mufti Rasulayev could boast of ten new mosques added to his jurisdiction; in the years which followed, more mosques were reopened or had their existence legalised. Mr Polyansky, the Soviet official in charge of the non-Orthodox religious groups, stated in 1947 that there were 3,000 mosques in the Soviet Union, which implied an increase of nearly 1,700 since the beginning of the war.[6] The Chief Mufti of Central Asia repeated this figure three years later to foreign visitors.[7] There was a further increase in the number of mosques after Stalin's death, and in 1957 Mufti Babakhanov was able to announce the 'recent' opening of 50 'new grand mosques' in Central Asia alone.[8] In the same year, it was officially stated that there were about 8,000 'Moslem communities' in the Soviet Union.[9] It does not seem that 'communities' can necessarily be identified with 'mosques' but only with groups of Moslem believers. Details about existing and reopened mosques are scanty, often unreliable, and contradictory, but if the existing data about Soviet Islam in the fifties is treated with caution and cross-checked, the following picture emerges:

In a considerable number of predominantly Russian cities the religious spirit of the Moslem minorities has been so strong that the Soviet authorities have had to reopen the mosques closed in the years of religious persecution. Of particular importance is the Mosque of Ufa, still the main religious centre of European Russia and Siberia, as well as those of Moscow and Leningrad. On important holidays prayers in the Ufa mosque are attended by 3,000 to 4,000 people. The Moscow mosque can accommodate about 2,500 people and foreign visitors have found it crowded even on ordinary Fridays. It would seem that this one mosque is insufficient for Moscow's Moslem population, which may be as large as 100,000. The Moscow mosque plays a major part in Soviet propaganda to the Moslem world. Its services are attended regularly by representatives from Moslem diplomatic missions accredited to the USSR and it is frequently visited by delegations from Moslem countries. The Moscow Imam is therefore an important personality within the general framework of Soviet Moslem policy. His sermons always have a strong political bias and he co-operates with the authorities even more closely than other Moslem dignitaries. The Leningrad mosque, which was built by the Emir of Bokhara in Tsarist times, was repaired and reopened in 1956 at the time when the Soviet regime began to pay more heed to public opinion in the Moslem countries. The regime was quite indifferent to the religious needs of the Leningrad Moslems, but it was not in its interests to ignore the susceptibilities of the foreign Moslem delegations, which often included Leningrad in their itinerary. Small wonder that the Leningrad Imam became a regime propagandist, almost as frequently quoted by the Soviet radio as his opposite number in Moscow.

Information about Moslem religious life in the Caucasus and Transcaucasia has rarely been

[5] Cf. 'Pilgrims to Mecca', *New Times*, 1953, 36.
[6] *Alger Républicain*, 7 October 1947.
[7] *Alger Républicain*, 20 December 1950.
[8] Tass report of 19 October 1957.
[9] *Moscow News*, 13 March 1957.

released by official Soviet sources, and the Shiite Moslems of Azerbaijan in particular have been allowed fewer contacts abroad than their Sunnite brethren. From this it need not be concluded that Islam in the Caucasian and Transcaucasian areas is a negligible quantity. The reports of foreign travellers are misleading, since they refer only to a few places open to visitors, such as Baku, where they have recorded an almost total disappearance of all signs of religion.[10] The Soviet authorities know better. They know that there are 'tenacious religious survivals' among a section of the Baku population and its hinterland, and that 'illegal' mullahs in Baku receive in their homes believers to whom they preach and with whom they pray. Surprisingly, some of the most resourceful illegal mullahs, who even use tape-recordings for their religious meetings, are women.[11]

Much more than in the proletarian and internationalised capital of Azerbaijan, Moslem religion has maintained itself in the remoter parts of the country never visited by a foreigner. In these 'black spots' on Azerbaijan's map the population is persistently denounced for its backwardness and its observance of religious customs. The communist authorities in Baku found, time and again, that they could not rely on local functionaries to set a good example to the 'backward population'. Some of these preach atheism in public, but in their own life uphold the religious heritage of their fathers. Whenever such cases of ideological dualism are disclosed, they cause consternation at communist headquarters; but they also give us real insight into the complexities of the communist struggle against Islam.

THESE North Caucasus Moslems may be divided into two groups, those who were deported in 1944 to Central Asia and resettled in their mountain homeland during and after 1956, and those who were spared this bitter experience, such as the Daghestani, Kabardinians, and Cherkess. In both groups of North Caucasus Moslems, Islam has survived, among the peoples whom Stalin earmarked for genocide, to an even greater extent than among those who remained completely unscathed. The Chechens and Ingush were treated for over a decade as pariah peoples; they were used as agricultural labourers on collective and state farms in Kazakhstan, but they were not considered worthy of political indoctrination and frequently their children did not go to school. When they returned to the Caucasus after twelve years of exile, their negative attitude towards Soviet power had not diminished, nor had their adherence to Islam grown weaker. The resurrected Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic had to cope once again with 'reactionary elements, especially supporters of old customs and the Shariat'.[12] A feature of Moslem religion peculiar to the Chechen-Ingush Republic is the existence of a strange sect called the Kunta Hadji people, founded by a Moslem sage called Kunta Hadji at the end of the nineteenth century. The Soviet authorities found it difficult to combat the sect, for its supporters were mostly poor people who joined the Red partisans during the Civil War. Far from declining under Soviet rule, the Kunta Hadji sect was able to extend its influence and also survived the deportation of the Chechens to Central Asia. After their repatriation to the Caucasus the sect remained a major problem for the local anti-religious propagandists.

As to the survival of Islam among the non-deported mountaineers, conditions in the comparatively small town of Derbent may be considered typical. The mosque of this town has room for 5,000 people and it is usually filled to capacity on Fridays.[13] From this, conclusions may be drawn as to the liveliness of Moslem religious feeling in the Daghestani mountain villages, where people are more insulated from anti-religious propaganda than they are in Derbent. The Soviet authorities seem to be aware of the fact that Islam will continue to have a strong grip on the Daghestani so long as they remain in their mountain abodes, and this may be one reason why in 1958 the government began the resettlement of certain groups of Daghestani hillmen in the plains.

[10] Cf. *New York Times*, 11 November 1955.
[11] *Bakinskii Rabochii*, 25 May 1956, 26 September 1959.
[12] *Groznenskii Rabochii*, 31 January 1958.
[13] Moscow Radio in Arabic, 23 November 1959.

In Central Asia, where the majority of the Moslem population of the Soviet Union lives, the picture shows considerable local variations. In Kazakhstan, with its strong European population, institutionalised Islam is weaker than in any other Central Asian Soviet Republic. The local ecclesiastical dignitaries themselves admit that there are only 26 official mosques in the Republic, most of them in towns such as Alma Ata, Semipalatinsk and Dzhambul. The mosque of Alma Ata, the only surviving one of 18, is a small wooden building recognisable as a mosque by the crescent on its highest point. Congregations in the few Kazakh mosques are small even on the big Moslem holidays, and confined to old people. This does not necessarily mean that the suppression of Islam in Kazakhstan was more drastic than elsewhere, and recovery, therefore, more difficult. The weakness of the Moslem religion in Kazakhstan is largely due to the fact that it never had as deep roots among the previously nomadic Kazakhs as among the settled population of Central Asia, especially that of Uzbekistan.

That country is still the very heart of Central Asian Islam and perhaps of Soviet Islam as a whole. It would even be true to speak of a timid revival of Uzbek Islam. The city of Tashkent contains once again 17 large and 50 small mosques, that is, one-third of the number of Moslem houses of worship which existed on the eve of the first world war. On important holidays, as many as 10,000 faithful attend prayer in the Central Mosque of Tashkent, the Tillah Sheikh Mosque, where the Chief Mufti of Central Asia officiates.[14] On ordinary Fridays up to 3,000 people may come to the same mosque.[15]

In Samarkand, that ancient holy city of Islam, only 7 out of 105 mosques have remained open to the public for worship. It is not so much the mosques which attract the religious fervour of the local Moslems as the Shah-i-Zind mausoleum. According to legend, the mausoleum contains the mortal remains of a cousin of Mohammed, Kusam-bin-Abbas, who brought the Islamic religion to Samarkand. For this reason, the Shah-i-Zind, or Living Shah mausoleum, has remained one of the most remarkable monuments of Islam in the Soviet Union, despite official attempts to transform it into something of interest only to scholars and tourists. It was officially stated that as many as 20,000 people assembled in 1954 in front of the Shah-i-Zind mausoleum to celebrate the end of the Ramadan fast.[16]

VERY little Moslem religious life is left in the other holy city of Uzbekistan, Bokhara. At the outbreak of the first world war it included within its walls 354 mosques and 138 religious schools. Of these, only 4 mosques are now open, and one medreseh, the Medreseh Mir-i-Arab, which for several years was the only Moslem teaching establishment in the whole of the Soviet Union. This is all that remains of officially recognised Islam in Holy Bokhara. Many, though by no means all, of the ancient Islamic buildings of Bokhara still exist, but they serve no religious purpose, and the streets in which they are situated are called after the Paris Commune, Lenin, Stalin, Karl Marx, Marat, Klara Zetkin, Thaelmann and other representatives of Western godlessness. There is even a street which is called outright ' Bezbozhnaya ', the ' Godless ' street.

Most of the other places in Central Asia which are occasionally mentioned as the scenes of important Moslem religious activities on holidays are also situated in Uzbekistan, such as Andizhan, Ferghana, Kokand, Khiva, and Chimbai in the Karo-Kalpak Autonomous Republic. All these towns have mosques attracting a considerable number of worshippers. Religious life also seems comparatively strong in Tajikistan. Between 6,000 and 10,000 devout Moslems have been reported as attending service on special occasions in the Shah Mansur mosque of Stalinabad.[17] Whilst these figures were triumphantly quoted to foreign audiences, an account for home consumption quoted with regret that the Stalinabad mosque was visited by ' not a few youths and girls ', and that even children of school age were brought there.[18]

[14] Statement by the Moslem Board of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, Tass report, 3 June 1954.
[15] Peter Scholl Latour, ' Sowjetzentralasien und der Islam ', *Aussenpolitik*, 1959, 6, p. 273.
[16] Tass report, 3 June 1954.
[17] Moscow Radio in Arabic, 13 May 1956.
[18] *Kommunist Tajikistana*, 27 July 1958.

The real home of religious life in Central Asia is not the towns but the countryside, over which the official Moslem administration with its headquarters in Tashkent has very little influence. Official Soviet reports show that the Moslem religion is firmly entrenched in the Central Asian village and the Central Asian collective farm. There is a large number of ' unregistered but active mosques ', the existence of which the authorities ignore, since administrative measures against them might stir up local trouble. ' Many dozens ' of such illegal mosques were discovered in one province of Kirghizia alone.[19] The situation is not very different in Tajikistan, where Western tourists were informed that there was a mosque in virtually every *kishlak* (village), and in Turkmenistan, where the Soviet press and radio warned the *kolkhozniks* against obeying the Moslem clergy when they called upon them to pray and carry out religious rites.[20]

The unregistered mosques are served by an illegal or semi-legal clergy and there are also many itinerant preachers and roving mullahs unattached to mosques and catering for collective farmers in their homes. Some of these mullahs also preach in the open and attract large audiences. The authorities take a serious view of such illegal religious meetings, and even during Khrushchev's liberal phase did not hesitate to put such popular preachers under lock and key. In Turkmenistan two of them were sentenced to 20 and 17 years in gaol respectively.[21] This is in striking contrast to the pliable and opportunist attitude of the officially recognised Muftis and Imams. Even some collective farm chairmen have realised what a power the Moslem clergy still represents in the Central Asian village. On some occasions, they have enlisted the mullah's support to improve labour discipline and to increase output. Whenever such instances of collaboration between kolkhoz management and Moslem rural clergy came to light, they were bitterly resented by the higher communist authorities. How could Islam be stamped out of the Central Asian village, if even the kolkhoz chairman recognised the Mullah's authority? [22]

FOR communists Islam is a many-headed monster. The official mullahs and their mosques are perhaps the least obnoxious head. The main foe is the piety of the simple Moslem, expressed in countless religious observances and taboos. A study of Soviet anti-religious literature pertaining to Islam shows that the practice which worries the authorities most is the cult of the Holy Places and of the *Mazars*, or sacred tombs. Soviet anthropologists have described the cult as pre-Islamic rather than Moslem. They assert that only the name and legend of the venerated Saint belong to Islam, while many of the actions carried out during the pilgrimages have more ancient roots in beliefs influenced by animistic concepts and magic elements connected with the cult of nature.[23] That the cult of the sacred tombs derives from a mixture of Islamic and pre-Islamic beliefs is no consolation for the authorities, who are faced with the existence of Holy Places all over Central Asia and Azerbaijan.

It is usually the Soviet press itself which draws attention to the popularity of certain pilgrimages by complaining about the crowds thronging certain *Mazars* and Holy Places, for instance, the *Mazar* of Hodja-Obi-Carm and the Gissar fortress, both in Tajikistan, Kunya-Urgench in Northern Turkmenistan, and, of course, Shah-i-Zind in Samarkand, which has already been mentioned. Almost in the same class as Shah-i-Zind as a pilgrimage centre is the mausoleum of Ahmed Yassaui in the town of Turkestan, in the Kazakh Soviet Republic. Yassaui, a Moslem saint and author of learned religious works, died in the second half of the twelfth century and Tamurlaine built a magnificent mosque in his honour. The Soviet authorities closed the mosque but they could not prevent Yassaui's fame continuing to attract many thousands of pilgrims every year to the smaller nearby mosque which the state has left to the believers.

[19] *Sovetskaya Kirghiziya*, 19 April 1959.
[20] Ashkhabad Radio: talk on ' Islam and its reactionary role ', 12 August 1954.
[21] *Turkmenskaya Iskra*, 25 July 1958.
[22] Cf. D. Kishbekov, *O feodalno-baiskikh perezhitkakh i ikh preodolenii* (on feudal-bei survivals and how to overcome them) (Alma-Ata, 1957), pp. 55–56.
[23] *Sovetskaya Etnografiya*, 1957, 2, pp. 61–67.

The mountain called Takht-i-Sulayman (Throne of Solomon), near the town of Osh in Kirghizia, enjoys great popularity with devout Moslems, who believe that King Solomon prayed and died there. It is thought to be a miraculous mountain where all sorts of ills can be cured. The Soviets have been unable to stamp out the cult of Takht-i-Sulayman, and even in the late fifties there were still about twenty sheikhs living there, guiding the steps of pilgrims and advising them on their visit to the mountain.[24]

The cult of the Holy Place, widespread in Central Asia, has remained an important feature also in the local religious life of Azerbaijan. Even the young Soviet generation, including members of the Young Communist League, took part in pilgrimages. The sacred tomb of a local Saint called Mohammed effendi, near the town of Nukha, continued to attract wedding processions long after the second world war, and many 'Soviet brides' have prayed there before setting out for the homes of their bridegrooms. This was not an isolated local occurrence, for in 1957 Mustafayev, the Azerbaijani party secretary, urged 'public organisations and party activists' to 'put an end to the worship of holy places'.[25]

The most awkward aspect of the Holy Places, from the communist point of view, is that they are not 'survivals of the past' doomed slowly but surely to extinction. In fact, new Holy Places have come into being during the Soviet era, such as the tomb of the Seyyid Ali Et-Aga in a village near Baku. Ali Et-Aga died in 1950 and the people now venerate him as a saint, even though the professional anti-religious propagandists have denounced him as a 'sorcerer' who had played for many years on ignorance and superstition.[26] In 1957, another Holy Place appeared near the town of Tashkent, on the road where a young man had been killed by lightning.[27]

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[24] *Sovetskaya Kirghiziya*, 19 April 1959.

[25] *Bakinskii Rabochii*, 27 August 1954, 20 June 1954, 6 April 1957.

[26] *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 11 July 1959.

[27] L. I. Klimovich, 'The Cult of Saints in Islam', *Nauka i Zhizn*, 1958, 9.

PILGRIMAGES to the Holy Places usually reach their climax on the birthdays of the saints whose tombs are visited by the faithful, and during the great Moslem fasts and holy days. The observance of these holy days has always worried the regime as much as the cult of the *Mazars*. The fight against the observance of the principal Moslem holiday, the Kurban Bayrami or Feast of the Sacrifice, which is also called Kurban Ait or Id al-Adha, has been as characteristic of the atheist campaign in Moslem territories as the fight against Christmas and Easter in the Christian parts of the Soviet Union. In addition to Kurban Bayrami, Soviet atheist propagandists have always denounced Ramadan, the month of fasting, when devout Moslems do not eat before sundown. Both Kurban Bayrami and Ramadan have been fought by the regime with every means communist propaganda has been able to devise: satirical poems, pungent cartoons, mass meetings, and plays performed on the stage. The great day of mourning of the Shiite Moslems, the tenth day of the Moslem month of Moharram, also comes in for bitter attack. On this day the Shiites commemorate the death of Hussein and Hassan, the sons of Calif Ali and the chief martyrs of the Shiah faith. The day used to be observed by mourning processions, called *Shakhsei-Vakhsei*, during which the participants indulged in self-mutilation, and there was good reason for the communist government to prohibit the processions; Persia, the Shiite country *par excellence*, did the same. However, the Soviet regime was not satisfied with putting an end to a savage centuries-old religious practice, but exploited the occasion to vilify the Shiite creed and to question the entire spiritual basis of Islam. Other Moslem holy days did not supply Soviet propaganda with such convenient anti-religious arguments as the Tenth of Moharram, nor could they be banned. They continued to be supported by hundreds of thousands and even millions of Soviet Moslems. Soviet propaganda consequently made a virtue of defeat by advertising the widespread celebration of Kurban Bayrami in the Soviet Union as evidence of religious freedom.

Opposition to the observance of Kurban Bayrami is motivated not only by atheist arguments

but also by the damage it is said to cause to the national economy, because the observers of Kurban Bayrami failed to turn up to work, and because of the mass-slaughter of livestock offered as a sacrifice to Allah. The month of Ramadan also comes in for criticism not only as a religious fast but also for having a deleterious effect on health and consequently on the ability to work.

The Moslem administration for Central Asia and Kazakhstan has shown skill in countering these arguments; a decree (*fatuah*) issued by the Tashkent Chief Muftiate in 1954 ruled that the slaughtering of livestock on the occasion of Kurban Bayrami was not obligatory, and that prayers in the mosque during religious holidays should take place early in the morning, before the beginning of agricultural work. As to the Ramadan fast, another decree of the Moslem leaders of Soviet Central Asia stipulated that it should not apply to sick people, travellers, nursing mothers, and persons engaged in heavy manual labour.[28]

As the old arguments against the Moslem feasts became outdated, the communists looked for other and more constructive methods. They introduced local secular, or rather agricultural holidays; in Bashkiria and Tataria the 'Feast of the Plough' (*Sabantui*), in Daghestan the Festivals of Spring, of Flowers, of the Cherry-tree, and the First Furrow, and in Uzbekistan the Feast of Cotton-growers (*Pakhta-Bayrami*), for which a great success was claimed.

The regime finds it equally difficult to wipe out other customs still stubbornly adhered to by many Moslems of the Soviet Union. Circumcision is one which dies hard. The party, always suspicious of religious survivals, has never condoned its widespread practice; it has stated most emphatically that there could be no 'red circumcision' and that it was reactionary even if none but Party members attended the family feast celebrating the occasion. The basic communist ideological objection to circumcision is that it produces a physical difference between Moslems and people of other faiths. However, communist writers themselves have admitted that this argument is untenable, since circumcision has been practised not only by Moslems and Jews but by many peoples who have nothing to do with Judaism or Islam.[29]

In line with Koranic teaching, Russian Moslems continue to regard the pig as an unclean beast. Moslem collective farmers can only with difficulty be persuaded to keep pigs, however much the government tells them that pig-breeding is the most profitable branch of animal husbandry. In one Kazakh district (Suzak), pig-breeding was not introduced until 1956. Even Moslem cattle-breeders who are prepared to supply pigs to the state will not consent to eat pork-meat themselves.[30]

SOVIET policy towards Islam after 1945 sought the destruction of the Moslem religion not by drastic action but by systematic anti-Islamic indoctrination of the people, using for this purpose an army of anti-Moslem agitators and floods of anti-religious pamphlets, books, and newspaper articles, to which the devout Moslems could oppose only a small handful of theologically-trained persons and practically no religious literature whatever. But it was inadvisable to suppress altogether Moslem theological training and Moslem literature. Both were part of the pretence that there was equality in religious matters for Moslems and Christians. Both served Soviet propaganda abroad. The only two Medresehs of the Soviet Union, the Mir-i-Arab Medreseh of Bokhara and the Barak Khan Medreseh of Tashkent, became important show places. Although a large number of foreigners have inspected the two establishments, information about them is vague and contradictory. The Bokhara Medreseh was the first to be opened; the Tashkent Medreseh, though planned since 1948, was not inaugurated until 1956. Since then, Moslem theological students have spent the first five years of their training in Bokhara, making their final studies in Tashkent. The curriculum of Bokhara includes interpretation of the Koran; study of the prophets; history of Islamic Law; Soviet constitution; Russian; Uzbek, which is the mother-tongue of about half the students.

[28] Kishbekov, op. cit., pp. 60–61.

[29] *Nauka i Religiya*, February 1960, p. 43.
[30] Kishbekov, op. cit., p. 57.

(Other nationalities are represented among the students in the following order: Tajiks, Tatars, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and Turkmenians.)

One of the most striking features of the curriculum at the Bokhara Medreseh is the great attention paid to the study of Arabic. Over one-third of the time (4,392 out of 12,081 hours) throughout the five-year course is devoted to this language. It is taught in three separate sections—morphology, syntax, and practical conversation. This suggests that at least a certain number of the graduates are to be used by the regime for the conduct of Soviet propaganda in the Arab world. It is also interesting that the curriculum devotes 384 hours to Persian, which was not taught in the higher Moslem schools in pre-Soviet times,[31] which again indicates that the Medreseh Mir-i-Arab may serve objectives which have nothing to do with the official purpose of the school.

Probably the student body of the two Medresehs contains both regime agents and religious young people with a genuine vocation. That the latter category should exist at all displeases the authorities; the Turkmenian Communist Party chief once stated regretfully that 'some young people, educated in our Soviet schools, go on to study in Moslem ecclesiastical training establishments'.[32] But the Soviet leaders have little reason to worry about the two Medresehs, for the number of their students is small. The Mir-i-Arab Medreseh has never had more than 100, and the Barak Khan Medreseh even fewer.

The situation is even more precarious for Moslem religious literature than it is for Moslem religious training. After the war it was announced that the Central Asian Moslem administration would publish a journal of its own, but only two issues seem to have appeared. Apart from this short-lived venture, Soviet sources have reported from time to time the publication in Tashkent of Moslem calendars in editions ranging from 2,500 to 10,000 copies, and a book *Islam and Worship* of 68 pages in the Tatar language, written by the Mufti of Ufa.[33] In addition, two editions of the Koran were printed, one in Ufa and one in Tashkent. The Tashkent edition came out in fewer than 5,000 copies. Although Moslems in the USSR itself have difficulty in obtaining the 'Soviet Koran', copies are presented to foreign Moslem visitors or sent to Moslem religious leaders in foreign countries.

Anti-religious propaganda in the Moslem territories of the Soviet Union has been concentrated since 1947 in the hands of the All-Union Society for the Dissemination of Scientific and Political Knowledge. The propaganda has had its ups and downs and there has been periodic criticism that not enough was done to spread atheism. The anti-religious work of the Society in the Moslem areas is not very different from what it is in other parts of the Soviet Union. Apart from publishing anti-religious pamphlets in the languages of the Moslem peoples, it trains anti-religious lecturers who are expected to impart their newly-acquired knowledge to a wider public. The training of anti-Islam experts was expanded following two big anti-religious conferences in 1956, one in Baku for the Caucasian and Transcaucasian territories, and the other in Tashkent for the Central Asian Republics; it was decided that more permanent atheist propaganda institutions were required. In Alma Ata a so-called 'House of the Atheist' was established; in Baku an 'Atheist's Study' (*Kabinet ateista*); in Ashkhabad a 'University of Scientific Atheism'. All these institutions aimed at making Soviet anti-Moslem propaganda more varied, more detailed, more hard-hitting.

THIS does not mean that Islam in the Soviet Union could even regain all the ground it has lost since 1917 if the Moslem Republics of the USSR were suddenly to find themselves under non-communist rule. The advance of secularism in Russia's Moslem territories is not exclusively the product of communist education, propaganda, and terror. It might well have taken place under a regime of secularised Moslem nationalists, but then the decline of Moslem religion would not have been accompanied by all the unpleasant features of Soviet Moslem policy, of which the constant abuse of believers has been one, but not the most drastic characteristic.

[31] *Oriente Moderno*, August-September 1954, p. 403.
[32] *Turkmenskaya Iskra*, 27 February 1957.
[33] *Soviet News*, 23 March 1957. See also *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique*, May 1959, p. 187.

HEALTH SERVICES IN THE USSR

*Mark G. Field**

FASCINATED, frightened, almost mesmerised by Soviet achievements in science, engineering and space technology, the West has tended to ignore equally significant (though not so spectacular) developments in other areas of Soviet life. It has smugly assumed, for example, that a totalitarian regime was incompatible with a welfare state, or that measures increasing the well-being, satisfaction, and health of the population were less important than coal reserves, steel production, and ICBMs. Such an approach, unfortunately, yields an astigmatic panorama of Soviet reality. Welfare measures and medical care in particular are not only important in mobilising popular support in the Soviet Union and sympathy abroad (particularly in the underdeveloped areas); they are also 'strategic'. And, in a world situation where military conflict might lead to mutual suicide, the struggle for people's minds and allegiances takes more and more the form of showing evidence of concern for their welfare. The aim of this brief essay is to call attention to the achievements of Soviet socialised medicine; it must be made clear at the outset that equally or even more impressive achievements have been reached in Western countries. But in Russia progress in this field is attributed to the regime which, moreover, started at a level not greatly above that in many underdeveloped countries today.

The Bolsheviks in 1917 inherited, among other things, a heavy legacy of health problems, particularly epidemics that could not be effectively checked because of the lack of soap and disinfectants and the run-down condition of the population. Lenin harboured no illusions about the nature of the enemy on *this* front when he declared war on epidemics and particularly on louse-borne typhus in the words: 'Either the lice will defeat socialism or socialism will defeat the lice'.[1] It was an almost foregone conclusion that the nature of the health problems faced and the political philosophy of the regime would converge into the philosophy of a heavily centralised and government controlled medical and public health system. Measures were taken almost immediately after the seizure of power to organise medical care around a core of party physicians. A Medical Sanitary Section (*Otdel*) of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee was set up on 26 October 1917 (o.s.) to organise the medical services for 'the workers and soldiers'. This had no ties with the previous medical organisations in the capital. Indeed, one of the first acts of the regime was to dissolve the pre-revolutionary medical associations (particularly the Pirogov Society) on the now familiar ground that they were, in essence, counter-revolutionary, and that their liberal-bourgeois views and their evolutionary doctrines made a radical reorganisation of medical care for the people impossible.[2] In July 1918, Lenin signed a decree establishing a Commissariat (now Ministry) of Health (literally: Health Protection) and appointed as its first commissar Dr N. S. Semashko, a companion from the days of exile. From its very inception, Soviet medicine has been state sponsored and financed, governmentally administered, bureaucratically run, and party controlled.

THE overall management of Soviet socialised medicine is the responsibility of the Health Ministry of the USSR. The Ministry administers the medical system through the republican health ministries, and their subordinate provincial, regional, municipal, and district health departments. These departments are component parts of the corresponding executive committees of the Soviets, and therefore subject both to their Soviet and to the next higher health department or ministry. The

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[1] Cited in N. A. Vinogradov and I. D. Strashun, *Health Protection of the Workers in the Soviet Union* [in Russian] (Moscow, 1947), p. 6.

[2] For more detail see the author's *Doctor and Patient in Soviet Russia* (Harvard, 1957), and 'Russian Medicine: Medical Organisation and the Medical Profession Since 1861', in *The Transformation of Soviet Society Since 1861*, ed. Cyril E. Black (Harvard, 1960), pp. 541–552.

Ministry is a large medical administrative bureaucracy that directly or indirectly organises, supervises, and controls practically all aspects of medicine and public health and the activities of more than three and a quarter million persons (1959), or slightly over 6 per cent of all workers and employees in the USSR (exclusive, of course, of the collective farmers).[3] Altogether, 6·2 per cent of the total national budget, representing more than 37 milliard rubles, was allocated to the protection of health in 1957, or close to 190 rubles per capita.[4] There is still private medical practice, but its practitioners lead a precarious (though lucrative) existence, are heavily taxed, and often ideologically censured as relics of the bourgeois past.

The average Soviet citizen receives medical care either from the general or the closed medical network. In the general network, the individual is assigned to a neighbourhood or district clinic on the basis of his residence. In the closed network, occupation determines the medical centre to which the individual reports. Industrial establishments maintain closed facilities for their workers and employees, and, as might be expected, the larger the establishment the more comprehensive the facilities.

Whether it is the neighbourhood or the factory clinic, these establishments constitute the individual's initial gateway to the health services. Physicians working in these clinics either see the patient at the clinic, or at his home; if necessary they can hospitalise him either in a general or in a specialised hospital.

For purposes of medical administration, the residents of a neighbourhood or district are divided into groups of approximately 4,000. Each such group constitutes a medical sector (*uchastok*) which is the responsibility of several clinic physicians. There are variations, of course, from area to area, medical care becoming skimpier as one leaves the large cities and moves towards the rural districts and outlying areas. Ideally, the medical *uchastok* is staffed and equipped according to the following table of organisation:

MEDICAL SECTOR (UCHASTOK) FOR 4,000 PERSONS [5]

Specialty	No. of med. posts	Approx. no. of hospital beds
Internal medicine ...	2·00	10·0
Paediatrics	1·25	5·4
Surgery	0·90	7·6
Obstetrics and gynaecology ...	1·00	7·2
Ophthalmology ...	0·25	1·0
Otolaryngology ...	0·20	0·6
Neurology	0·25	0·8
Phthisiology	0·6	4·2
Dermatovenereology	0·4	1·6
Total	6·85	38·4

If we assume that each *uchastok* has about 2,800 to 3,000 adults, then each general practitioner has a panel of 1,400 to 1,500 patients, and the 1,000 to 1,200 children are served by one paediatrician working full-time and one working quarter-time. These do not appear to be excessive loads. The 100 pregnancies and live deliveries that might be expected at the present rate of births are attended by one obstetrician-gynaecologist who might also be expected to help the other departments with their gynaecological and related problems. Specialists are available for consultation and treatment, each specialist serving, of course, more than one *uchastok*. The neurologist (or psychiatrist) is expected to serve a population of about 16,000, or four *uchastoks*, since there is only one quarter-time position assigned to each.

This table of organisation, naturally, serves only as a blueprint, given the available medical manpower and hospital beds in the Soviet Union. The reality often departs widely from the design, because of, for example, increases in population of the *uchastok* without re-districting, maldistribution of professional personnel (concentration in the cities), shortages of specialists, bureaucratic red-tape, and so forth. The situation is least favourable in the countryside, where medical progress has not been as rapid as in the cities because of poor transportation and inadequate facilities, the

[3] *The USSR in Figures* [in Russian] (Moscow, 1960), pp. 197–98.

[4] *Expenditures for Social-Cultural Measures in the USSR State Budget* [in Russian] (Moscow, 1958), p. 7.

[5] K. V. Maistrakh, *The Organisation of Public Health in the USSR* (Bethesda, Maryland), mimeo, p. 64.

shortage of reasonable housing for physicians, and the general relative neglect of the peasant population compared to the urban dwellers. Physicians are said to be reluctant to practise outside the cities, and while administrative and mandatory assignments are often used to staff the countryside (particularly with young medical graduates), the rural districts are medically backward compared to the urban centres. Many medical positions are, as a result, either unfilled or filled by junior medical personnel, particularly *feldshers* or medical assistants, a category roughly corresponding to the non-commissioned medical aide in the army or to the public health nurse in the more isolated districts of the United States. Nonetheless very substantial progress has been made in the countryside since the revolution, particularly in public health and preventive medicine. This acquires added significance when it is remembered that more than half of the Soviet population still lives on the land.

In addition to these general facilities and services, there are restricted medical institutions and personnel reserved for the élite. The higher one's rank, the better one's medical care. Party officials, bureaucrats and their wives, are not ordinarily expected to occupy hospital beds alongside mere peasants and workers, as Dudintsev made quite clear in *Not by Bread Alone*.

THE increase in the size of the Soviet medical contingent has been nothing short of phenomenal. Concentrated as we have been on watching the growth curves of engineers and scientists, we did not look at the adjacent columns listing similar progression in the number of physicians. A few figures will tell the story: at the time of the Revolution there were about 23,000 physicians on what is now Soviet territory (20,000 if the boundaries before September 1939 are considered). The figure now exceeds 400,000. In these 43 years, the medical contingent has thus increased 18- to 20-fold; and it is still increasing, as Soviet medical schools graduate about 17,000 students a year, compared to about 7,000 physicians in the United States.[6]

[6] *Health Protection in the USSR* [in Russian] (Moscow, 1957), p. 155; *Izvestiya*, 18 October 1960.

It should be noted that this figure does not include military physicians. The armed services depend for their medical personnel on their own schools; as far as we know there is no peacetime conscription of doctors.

It is planned to increase the number of medical students still further, and to turn out 28,000 graduates annually over the next five years. This will give a medical contingent of about half a million doctors in 1965, the end of the current seven-year plan. At present the Soviets can boast of a ratio of 18 physicians per 10,000 of the population, the second highest in the world (after Israel). (The corresponding figure for the United States was 13·3 in 1955 and is going down as the population increases but the number of medical graduates remains stationary.) This gives the USSR more than one-fourth of all the world's physicians as against one-thirteenth of world population.[7] They are therefore in an extremely favourable position to export physicians abroad (and have already done so on a modest scale), whereas the United States has to import a substantial number of foreign physicians to serve as house officers in American hospitals.

These statistics say nothing, of course, of the quality of their training. We know, for example, that the number of Soviet medical schools is about the same as the number of American medical schools, but that with classes two to four times as large the quality of teaching and personal supervision must correspondingly suffer. This is probably the case, but from what we know of Soviet schooling and what we can infer from recent scientific successes, very little that is derogatory can be assumed *a priori* about the quality of Soviet education in general. As has been recently pointed out of scientific and engineering education, during the last ten years there has not been a single study to challenge the proposition that, in qualitative terms, Soviet education is not inferior to that in the West.[8] This statement may not apply wholly in the specific case of medical education; for the evidence shows that the need has been to train masses of

[7] *Report on the World Social Situation* (United Nations, 1957), p. 45.

[8] Nicholas DeWitt, 'Soviet Science Education and the School Reform', *School and Society*, Summer 1960, pp. 296–300.

physicians rapidly, and presumably at the sacrifice of some quality. Nonetheless from the general social viewpoint, and particularly from an examination of the movement of vital statistics, it is quite clear that the quality and the quantity of medical services have been equal, in most cases, to the tasks at hand, and have had a profound and positive impact on the health and longevity of the Soviet population.

It might well be asked where, with the scarcity of professional manpower and the competition from higher priority occupations such as engineering, did the Soviets recruit so large a number of medical students. The answer is simple enough: they enlisted women into medicine. The rise in the proportion of women in the Soviet medical profession is probably unique in the annals of medicine. From a modest 10 per cent before the Revolution, the figure climbed to 45 per cent in the first decade of Soviet rule, to 52 per cent in the second, to over 60 per cent in the third, and now stands at 75 per cent.[9] Medicine has become a woman's occupation in the USSR to about the same degree as elementary and secondary teaching has in the United States. The parallel might well extend to niggardly salaries, overwork, and dubious prestige. The mass of Soviet physicians are women whose wages are often below that of the manual workers they treat. The élite of the medical profession, on the other hand, consists overwhelmingly of men (professors, academicians, well-known specialists, chiefs of departments and large hospitals), who earn several times as much as the general practitioners and who can supplement their earnings from private practice. There is therefore a sharp break between the majority of poorly rewarded physicians and the élite of the profession, and this break tends to occur along sex lines.

One of the problems associated with the heavy preponderance of women is the attrition caused by married women doctors who leave the profession. Soviet statistics do not tell us, unfortunately, how many physicians are actively working, how many are working part-time, and how many are not working at all. We know, however, that the wastage is of some concern to the Health Ministry, and it can be expected that, as the manpower situation improves, we shall see the percentage of females in medicine recede from its high-water mark towards the half-way point.

THE education of the future Soviet physician begins at 18, after completion either of ten years elementary and secondary schooling, or of seven years of intermediate schooling plus three years at a medical technicum which trains subsidiary medical personnel (nurses, midwives, *feldshers*). The medical schools (called institutes) are the responsibility of the Health Ministry and are not (as they were before the revolution and until the early thirties) part of the universities. There were in 1956 77 medical institutes (68 in medicine, 2 in dentistry and 7 in pharmacology).[10] A medical institute may itself be divided into any of five faculties, the three mentioned above plus two others. In other words, higher medical training is given in five different branches of medicine from the beginning of a student's career. These are medicine and surgery (66 faculties); paediatrics (25); public health (22); dentistry (12); pharmacology (20, including four correspondence faculties); giving a total of 145.

Medical education lasts six years, except in dentistry and pharmacology where it is shorter. This means that at the age of 23 or 24 the young Soviet medical student becomes a physician or *vrach*, the term *doctor* (although used familiarly to denote the physician) is formally reserved to those professionals who acquire an advanced academic degree; they can first become a candidate of medical sciences, and then a doctor of medical sciences. A doctor of medical sciences is usually a mature scholar, who has made significant contributions to medicine, and very rarely does he receive this title before his mid-forties.

The medical curriculum is not very different from what it is in other countries, with the exception that 250 hours are devoted to Marxism-Leninism, or, as these courses are now called, 'Philosophical Discipline'.[11]

[9] *National Economy of the USSR in 1958* [in Russian] (Moscow, 1959), p. 880.

[10] *Health Protection*, p. 152.

[11] Arnold Starr, 'Medical Education in Soviet Russia', *Journal of Medical Education* (1958), 33.

When he completes his medical training, the young Soviet physician is obliged to take up a post in the rural areas or isolated settlements for a period of three to five years. This is considered by the regime and the health authorities as ' repayment to the state and to the people ' for the education received, and is, as well, a convenient device for staffing the countryside with medical personnel. (Repayment is not an empty phrase, since medical schooling is free and many students receive grants in addition.) Staffing the countryside with medical personnel is an important aspect of this programme, since as we have noted physicians are often unwilling to go to the countryside voluntarily. The Soviet medical press provides evidence that, although these assignments are mandatory for graduates and have the weight of the power of the state behind them, many physicians manage through pull and connections (*blat*) to elude them: these young doctors are said to be suffering from the ' ruralophobia ' that often afflicts young Soviet graduates of urban background and is severely condemned. It must also be borne in mind that, in addition to the rudimentary cultural amenities and absence of creature comforts in the countryside, the prospect of assuming medical responsibility in isolated rural settlements, away from friends, colleagues, and teachers, can be particularly frightening to the medical fledgling. Logically, such assignments should be handled by more mature and experienced physicians.

After the physician has repaid his debt to the state he has, in theory at least, more latitude to choose what he wants to do, and particularly where he wants to do it: he may enter a medical institute for advanced studies and obtain a higher academic degree; he may go to special courses leading to the acquisition of a specialty; or if he remains in general practice he has the opportunity to attend refresher courses to learn about the latest techniques.

The rise in the number of hospital beds has been as impressive, if not as rapid, as the increase in the medical ranks. Since 1917 the number of beds has increased about eight-fold, the number of beds per constant unit of the population about six-fold. There were in 1959 1,620,000 beds—about 76 beds per 10,000 of the population. More than half of these were in the countryside. While there are large general hospitals in the cities and population centres, many rural hospitals are small (25 beds or less) and are therefore not equipped to provide comprehensive and diversified services. There are indications that henceforth only larger hospitals will be built. In addition to these in-patient facilities, there were in 1956 33,854 installations or dispensaries providing out-patient care, 16,692 of them in urban centres and 17,162 in rural communities.[12]

WHILE there are no absolute criteria for evaluating the quality of a national medical system, it can be assumed that the quantitative progress described above must, at some point, imply qualitative improvement also. Availability of a physician, even if he is not the best-trained physician in the world, is still better than no physician at all, and 18 physicians per 10,000 of the population are better than 1 or even than 17. The recent publication, after many years of silence, of vital statistics rates, permits an indirect evaluation of the impact of medical progress and particularly of public health services on the health and the longevity of the population. Since 1913 the birth-rate has fallen from 47 per 1,000 to 25·3 in 1958, a decrease fairly characteristic of a population in the process of industrialisation and urbanisation. The death-rate, on the other hand, has tumbled from 30·2 to 7·2 over the same period, a seventy-five per cent drop. These rates give a natural population increase of 18·1 per 1,000, which is a bit higher than that of the United States (about 17) and also higher than that of the world population (about 15). At the present time the Soviet population is increasing about twice as fast as that of Western Europe. Equally, or perhaps even more impressive, is the increase in average life expectancy at birth resulting from the lower mortality rates, as the following figures show:

[12] *The USSR in Figures* (1960), p. 246; *Health Protection*, p. 80.

AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (1896–1958) [13]

	1896-97 (50 provinces of European Russia)	1926-27 (European part of USSR)	1957-58 (all of USSR)
Average life expectancy of males ...	31	42	64
Average life expectancy of females ...	33	47	71
Average life expectancy, total population	32	44	68

Over the last 60 years the life expectancy at birth has more than doubled; it has increased by more than fifty per cent since 1926–27. The average Soviet baby can now be expected to live 24 more years than he could some thirty years ago and 36 years longer than a Russian baby born in 1896–97. An important factor in the increase in life expectancy at birth has been the decrease in infant mortality (i.e., death before one year of age). In 1913 more than 27 children out of 100 would be dead before they reached their first birthday; now only four would suffer the same fate.[14]

Soviet medicine has thus been one of the more impressive and positive achievements of the regime. It may be noted, for example, that studies conducted in the West with former Soviet citizens who are presumably hostile to the regime indicate a high degree of support for the welfare aspects of the Soviet social system. This applies particularly to the principle of socialised medicine; in a study conducted in the New York area in 1951 seventy-five per cent of a sample of displaced persons preferred the Soviet to the American medical system because in the Soviet Union medical care was a right guaranteed by the constitution and was free.[15] They considered this superior to fee-for-service or the humiliation of medical treatment as a charity, and this belief was stronger than their complaints about the manner in which the principle of socialised medicine was implemented in the Soviet Union, particularly the controls imposed upon the medical profession, the shortages of equipment and facilities, and the impersonality of medical bureaucrats enjoying a monopoly of services.

Whether he likes the regime or not, the average Soviet citizen finds in the existence of a large medical organisation and in free medical services evidence of concern on the part of the regime for *his* health. Soviet socialised medicine, furthermore, provides a blueprint for under-developed countries that is far more relevant than the American model; for they are impatient to solve their health problems and will develop their medical institutions primarily through the agency of the state, and the Soviets stand ready to show them how. The medical missionary of today bids fair to replace his religious colleague of yesterday as a means of peaceful penetration.

High birth rates, high death rates, and low life expectancy are a devastating waste of social investment in child-raising, education, and training. Industrial society depends more and more on highly trained personnel who must be supported and kept out of the labour force for many years before they can become self-supporting and make their contribution; an early death thus represents a net loss, and conversely a long life expectancy permits society to capitalise not only on the individual's training but also on his maturity and experience. Until now the emphasis in Soviet medicine has been, and rightly, on quantity, with the aim of bringing some medical care to the masses of the population. It is likely that future developments will move in the direction of better quality in personal services and research. If the recent achievements in science and the medical progress of the last forty years are any indication of things to come in medical care and public health, there are scant grounds for Western complacency. It is in this respect, as well as in the propaganda context, that Soviet socialised medicine represents a challenge to the United States.

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[13] *The USSR in Figures* (1960), pp. 224–45.

[14] The infant mortality rate in the Soviet Union is, however, still considerably higher than in the United States (about 2·6 per 100), and there is reason to believe that actual infant mortality rates are higher than the ones given officially. See John F. Kantner, 'Recent Demographic Trends in the USSR', in *Population Trends in Eastern Europe, the USSR and Mainland China* (New York, 1960).

[15] Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen* (Harvard, 1959), pp. 236–42; and the author's 'Former Soviet Citizens' Attitudes toward the Soviet, the German and the American Medical Systems', *American Sociological Review*, December 1959, pp. 674–79.

MARX, MARXISM, AND ETHICS

Eugene Kamenka

IN the past decade, the Soviet Union has witnessed a cautious, but nevertheless startling, growth of ethical theory. In 1951, a conference of Soviet and Czech philosophers agreed that the teaching of ethics was confused, that it was not set out in logical terms, and that it neglected moral theory before Hobbes; a specialist course, such as M. I. Lifanov had outlined in *Voprosy Filosofii* (No. 2, 1951) was badly needed. In the same year, the philosopher P. A. Sharia published his *Concerning Some Questions of Communist Morality;* he even attempted, with some straining of texts by Lenin, to argue the case for a limited existence of freedom of the will. Four years later, A. F. Shishkin, now the doyen of Soviet ethical theorists, published his more orthodox *The Foundations of Communist Morality*. Last year, he added a reasonably serious work on the history of ethical theory, *From the History of Ethical Doctrines*. This expounds and discusses the ethical systems of Indian and Chinese ' materialists ', Epicurus, Spinoza, Helvetius, and Chernyshevski, and again raises the position of ethical questions in the Marxist-Leninist *Weltanschauung*. Soon after the book appeared, a conference of moral philosophers and party, industrial, educational, and Komsomol leaders met in Leningrad under the auspices of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of Higher and Specialised Secondary Education to discuss the role of ethics in Soviet life. It ended by formulating a draft syllabus for ethical teaching in higher educational institutions and publishing its deliberations. Not since the twenties had Soviet communists displayed so much interest in moral questions; not since the ' philosophical ' works of Engels and Kautsky's *Ethics and the Materialist Interpretation of History* had any dogmatic Marxist taken so seriously the problems and history of ethical theory.

Politically, the new emphasis on morality and its role under socialism in the Soviet Union is perfectly understandable. Morality, as Marx realised, is a method of social control; with the abandonment of the radicalism of the early twenties, and of the simple reliance on economic planning and secret police controls that characterised the late twenties and early thirties, Soviet communism has turned increasingly to traditional methods of producing social stability: patriotism, the development of Soviet law and the inculcation of respect for it, and, finally, an ' official ' public morality.

Intellectually, however, the development of Soviet ethical theory is startling and indeed hazardous. Normative morality functions best in the absence of moral theorists; to investigate moral problems is, sooner or later, to come across the central difficulties of normative morality. In Marxism, the danger is even greater. For Marx's views on ethics and morality are scant, contradictory, and confused; to investigate them thoroughly is both to destroy the illusion of a coherent Marxian system and to stumble across fundamental weaknesses in Marx's social theory. To the sensitive man, it is also to perceive the gulf between the spirit that animated Marx's struggle and the conditions his work has helped to produce. To understand these dangers and difficulties, we must look not only at ' Marxism ', but also at the work of Marx. Only then shall we fully understand the tight-rope which Soviet ethical theorists are treading and be able to look critically at the content of their teaching and its relation to Marx and to ' Marxism '.

TO preach morality is easy, to give it a foundation is difficult. The difficulty stems precisely from the contradiction that has lain at the heart of most traditional moral theories—their uncritical mingling of science and advocacy in the concept of a *normative* science, their attempt to give ethical judgments the objectivity of scientific descriptions and the imperative, exhortative force of recommendations, attitudes, or commands. The imperative side of moral theory is essential to those who see ethics as a prescriptive theory of conduct and morality as a theory of *absolute obligation*. For them, ' good '

cannot represent 'merely' a quality which some of us display (or seek) and others lack (and reject); it must be a relation as well, something *demanded, pursued, required,* which it is illogical (or 'wrong') to reject. So long as we think of good as simply those qualities which 'are demanded' or required, there is a superficial plausibility; it disappears the moment we ask the question that must be asked of an incomplete relation—'demanded or required by whom or by what?' The concept of an *absolute* obligation or demand is, as Schopenhauer noted in his *Grundprobleme der Ethik,* a contradiction in terms. To become intelligible, the statement of an obligation or a demand requires two terms: that which obliges or demands as well as that which is obligatory or demanded. 'Laying a foundation for morality' has all too often been seen as finding an 'authority' to which these demands may be brought back: God, conscience, reason, the nature of man, the nature of society, the 'law' of the universe. But apart from the inevitable vagueness of these 'authorities', there is nothing unconditional about them; it is always possible to ask why I ought to obey this or that authority and always impossible to give a satisfactory reply without invoking some further, questionable authority. To the man who rejects the Constitution, I cannot demonstrate why he should obey the law. In fact, men have exhorted or commanded obedience to moral and legal norms precisely because these norms are not part of the 'nature of things', because there are no universal ends or standards which we all *must* follow. What is made obligatory or demanded by one, may be rejected by another. The illusion of a single, binding morality thus vanishes; it has to be replaced by the recognition of competing interests, competing demands, and competing codes that cannot be brought before one tribunal. We can study how such interests, demands, and codes arise, what conditions are favourable to them and what conditions are not; but no such study will show that we *have to* obey them. The advocative moralist, of course, has an interest in preventing the recognition of the sources from which moral exhortation stems or on which it depends: the normative function of moralism has depended on the adoption of a moral language ('Stealing is wrong', 'Children must obey their elders', 'You ought not to cause suffering') particularly suited to obscuring the source of the demands it makes.

If 'good' is treated as that which is demanded or pursued, there can be no systematic or coherent ethical science. The nature of the things demanded or pursued will vary with the demands or interests concerned; what is 'good' in terms of one morality may be 'evil' in terms of another. There is, however, a second strain in traditional moral theory and moral conceptions which does seem to emphasise and portray a positive, intrinsic distinction between goods and evils which is independent of whether we pursue them or not. The distinction may be approached—though not defined—in terms of co-operation and conflict, assistance and resistance. Goods co-operate with one another, evoking and assisting other goods; evils conflict not only with goods, but with each other; they enforce and compel instead of evoking and assisting. Taking up distinctions suggested in Georges Sorel's contrast between the producer's and the consumer's morality, and worked out in the ethical writings of Professor John Anderson,[1] we may say that goods are those mental activities which are 'free' or enterprising, activities which are disinterested, possible under all conditions, communicating themselves with a spontaneity radically distinct from the enforced imitation enjoined by evils, co-operating with each other and displaying internal progress and development in a way that evils cannot co-operate or progress. (Compare the history of science with the history of religion or of tyranny.) Evils, though ineradicable, are parasitic upon goods; they conflict not only with goods, but also with each other; they are interested as opposed to disinterested, repressive as opposed to free, consumptive as opposed to productive. Goods carry with them a characteristic devotion to movements 'transcending the individual', to ways of living in which he is 'caught up'; evils elevate the particular and produce such egoistic attitudes as hope, guilt, and despair. The qualities characteristic of goods are displayed in love and courage, in the scientific, artistic, and productive spirit, in the

[1] Published in the *Australasian Journal of* [*Psychology and*] *Philosophy* from 1927 onwards. See especially his 'Determinism and Ethics', vol. VI (1927), p. 241 ff, and 'The Meaning of Good', vol. XX (1942), p. 111 ff, on which I have drawn heavily.

enquirer's and creator's honesty, detachment from self, and immersion in his work. Goods require no censorship, no punishments, no protection as part of their ways of working. Evils, on the other hand, display their characteristics in obscurantism, superstition, the demand for censorship, luxury, commercialism, tyranny and the 'sheltered hell of bourgeois existence' (Anderson). They require censorship, suppression, punishment, and protection; they seek prior guarantees of security; they display a fundamental instability and incoherence. Moralism itself, on this view, it will be noted, is the product of evil motives, and the necessary instability of moralistic theories is characteristic of evils in general. Goods require no protection or commendation; the question whether any person, movement, or code supports goods is irrelevant to their character, while the suggestion that their ethical character itself *requires* support is exposed as an illusion. In general, the extent to which men display goods and engage in good activities will depend not on exhortation, but on the goods they already have and their communication with other goods.

Marx was not a moral philosopher. He concerned himself with none of the traditional problems of moral philosophy; he never analysed critically the meaning of moral terms, he never considered carefully the concept of moral obligation or how one could distinguish moral demands from other demands. He rejected—quite soundly—the dualism of ought and is; in his conception of good as freedom and self-determination he came close to the recognition of positive ethical qualities. His theory of alienation suggests the subordination of activities to egoistic ends which is characteristic of evils; his emphasis on the 'complete man' and his *Gattungswesen* suggests the coherence, co-operation, and immersion in an activity characteristic of goods. His lifelong contempt for servility, his respect for the moral character of the proletariat, his own uncompromising refusal to serve or to seek security show how strong his perception of ethical qualities could be.

'The social principles of Christianity', he wrote in the *Deutsche-Brüsseler Zeitung* in 1847, 'preach cowardice, self-contempt, abasement, subjugation, humility, in short, all the properties of the *canaille*; and the proletariat, which does not want to be treated as *canaille*, needs its courage, its consciousness of self, its pride and its independence far more than its bread'. But Marx himself was not able to develop this into a coherent theory of positive ethical qualities, logically independent of men's interests or attitudes towards them. For all his suppression of the dualism of 'ought' and 'is', historical 'progress' remained for him a normative conception, 'rationality' something which one *ought* to support. Yet, at the same time, he professed to be a determinist and a 'pure scientist'. Since he was not able to purify ethics of its normative and advocative overtones, the result is a contradiction in his work.

This contradiction is muted in the work of Marx; it breaks out with braying asininity in the 'philosophical' works of Engels, where the relativism of all moral judgments and the 'fact' of moral progress are proclaimed in one unconsidered breath. From then on, dogmatic Marxists were required to believe at one and the same time that Marxism was a value-free science, rejecting as pointless mere moral exhortation, and that it was the most progressive, most humane and ethical of all world-views. Many of the more intelligent found the strain too great. Bernstein, Kautsky, and Hilferding came down heavily on the 'Marxist science' side. Hilferding puts it most clearly in the preface of his *Finanzkapital* (Vienna, 1910, p. 10): 'The theory of Marxism as well as its practice is free from judgments of value. It is therefore false to conceive, as is widely done, *intra et extra muros*, that Marxism and socialism are as such identical. For logically, regarded as a scientific system and apart from its historical effect, Marxism is only a theory of the laws of movement of society formulated in general terms by the Marxian conception of history; the Marxian economics applying in particular to the period of commodity-producing society. But insight into the validity of Marxism which includes insight into the necessity of socialism is by no means a matter of value judgments and just as little an indication to practical procedure. For it is one thing to recognise a necessity, and another thing to work for this necessity. It is quite possible for someone convinced of the final victory of socialism to fight

against it.' (Why anyone convinced of the inevitability of socialism should struggle *for* it, is never explained; the difficulty is met by the crude suggestion that inevitability can be hurried or delayed—which would make nonsense of the whole notion of causality.)

IN general, emphasis on the 'scientific detachment' of Marxism accorded well with the science-worship of the late nineteenth century and the positivism of early twentieth century intellectuals. In its anti-bourgeois intellectual struggle the Communist Party was thus able to mobilise much of the young intellectual's contempt for cant, hypocrisy, and moralism. Those concerned with the party's practical affairs, however, were always aware of the more vulgar popular appeal of underlying moral exhortation and of the tensions between moral scepticism and party discipline. These tensions became especially evident with the growth of the Soviet state, where the appeal to conventional moral slogans became more and more part of the machinery of government, exhortation, and control. It is no accident that since 1936 Soviet ideologists, more concerned with internal propaganda than external criticism, have emphasised even more sharply the 'moral nature' of communism and repudiated the Hilferding-Kautsky-Bernstein conception. 'The founders of Marxism,' writes the Soviet philosopher P. A. Sharia,[2] 'had no need to separate out a special science of ethics, since the scientific theory of social development they created already provided a scientific foundation for morality, too, as one of the forms of social consciousness.... One must not confuse two things: the *basing* of socialism on ethics, which the classics of Marxism-Leninism attacked bitterly, and the ethical nature of Marxism itself, as the most progressive, scientific world-view, striving towards incessant progress, towards the liberation of exploited and suffering humanity.'

While Marx was incapable of perpetrating the intellectual crudities of an Engels, a Sharia, or a Shishkin, there can be little doubt that he too would have wished to reject the dichotomy of fact and value underlying Hilferding's distinction between Marxist *Wissenschaft* and socialist *Weltanschauung*. The attempt to distinguish scientific judgments from moral judgments by claiming that they belong to a different *logical type* has come clearly to the forefront of ethical theory only in the twentieth century. Marx would have rejected it—soundly enough—as involving an insupportable dualism. The fact that this dualism of what *is* and what *ought to be* is merely suppressed, but not resolved, in the Hegelian conception of the rational goal which both *would and ought to be* Marx was never able to see. This is shown clearly enough not only by his continued use, in his fully materialist period, of the conception of progress, but by his continuing belief in the *rationality* of the ultimate historical end. While Marx was careful to eschew the language of personal advocacy, he never ceased to believe that history carried its own objective recommendations, showed the progressive solution of tasks, and thus united, at every step forward, what is and what ought to be. Precisely because Marx never freed himself from this advocative strain, because he never ceased to think of ethics as connected with the fulfilment of demands, he was quite unable, for all his materialism, to work out a coherent naturalistic theory of ethics as concerned with qualitative differences in *activities*, in the nature of those activities which, incidentally, do the demanding. Marx does say in a well-known passage of *The Holy Family*: 'It is not a question of what this or that proletarian, or even the proletariat as a whole, may imagine for the moment to be the aim. It is a question of what the proletariat actually is and what it will be compelled to do historically as a result of this being'; from time to time he also emphasises, as Sorel has pointed out, the *moral character* of the proletariat, its rugged honesty, independence, and striving for knowledge. But Marx was simply not able to stick to the sound materialist view that the character of a thing was prior to its aims; the influence of Hegel was too strong. The working out of a naturalistic, materialist theory of ethics was smothered by

[2] P. A. Sharia: *O Nekotorykh Voprosakh Kommunisticheskoi Morali* ('Concerning Some Questions of Communist Morality') (Moscow, 1951), pp. 30–32. Sharia is in some respects one of the abler men and took an unorthodox view on free will, but the passage cited, with all its confusions, represents a standard post-war view to be found in every Soviet book on ethics.

Marx's teleologism and cast on the dung-heap by his economic reductionism. The direct result was a failure to come to grips with ethical problems and moral qualities which not only reduced the Marxist critique of ethics to incoherence, but in its failure to grasp positive ethical distinctions and the conflict of activities seriously weakened Marx's social theory.

THE Marxist critique and rejection of 'ideologies', especially of ethics and moral judgments, was for long one of the best-known and, for some, one of the most attractive features of Marxist 'social science'. Yet the precise grounds and extent of the rejection have always been vague and internally inconsistent. Marxists, of course, have had an easy target in the moral exhortations of intuitionists and theological moralists; when a Marxist meets a patent dualism he knows what to do with it; when confronted with the supraterrestrial, the intuitive, or the faculty of conscience he can make the right moves. But this could be learnt as well from Bentham or Feuerbach. It is when he has to deal with a *naturalistic* ethic, from Epicurus to Helvetius, even to Bentham himself, that his difficulties become apparent. It is not their belief in a naturalistic ethic which is attacked, but their social individualism. Whether a *social* naturalistic ethic can be carved out of their views, whether the 'truly human morality', at least, is founded on the conception of happiness or the 'basic biological character' of men and their needs, is a problem that is always eschewed.[3] To see that this is not so, that an ethical science could not be erected on these conceptions, would of course require admissions fatal to the general premises of Marxism —it would require a critical appraisal of terms like 'happiness' and 'need', a recognition of conflicting demands, which would completely undermine the Marxist belief in rational social interest and the possibility of *deducing* social policies from economic facts.

In fact, the precise extent to which any moral judgment at all is held irrelevant or inadmissible in Marxist theory has always been unclear. Marx himself never tackled the question, Engels only obscured it. In his work and the work of Marx we find in fact a number of inconsistent criticisms of morality, which have had varying degrees of influence and importance. Two of these rest not on economic reductionism, but on a Hegelian teleology; the third is an economic reduction—but precisely how far it goes and to just what it reduces morality is never quite plain.

The first and most inept of the teleological rejections of ethical judgment is Engels' proclamation, in *Ludwig Feuerbach* and *Anti-Dühring*, that all truth, including moral truth, is *relative*. Since Hegel, he writes in his *Feuerbach*, 'one cannot be imposed upon any longer by the inflated insubstantial antitheses of the older metaphysics of true and false, good and evil, identical and differentiated, necessary and accidental; one knows that these antitheses have only a relative significance, that that which is recognised as true now, has its concealed and later-developing false side, just as that which is recognised as false, its true side, by virtue of which it can later on prevail as the truth . . .' The central weakness of all such relativism has been noted by Plato in the *Theaetetus*. The relativist does not treat his *own* pronouncements as relative; for them, at least, he claims *absolute* truth, so that his position is immediately destroyed. Marxism, in the eyes of Engels, does not have its 'concealed and later-developing false side'; it, at least, is simply and absolutely true. In *Anti-Dühring*, indeed, Engels has to admit that certain 'trivial' propositions—that twice two make four, that birds have beaks—are absolutely and not relatively true. Even in the historical sciences, where he thinks the existence of error most obvious, he

[3] This evasion comes out quite clearly even at the rare times when Soviet philosophers do tackle the history of ethical theory in any detail. Thus A. F. Shishkin's recent work, *Iz Istorii Eticheskikh Uchenii* (From the History of Ethical Doctrines, Moscow, 1959), treats Indian and Chinese materialists, Epicurus, Spinoza, Helvetius, and Chernyshevski as important forerunners, in their ethical teachings, of the positive, humanist ethic of Marxism, though mostly 'limited by their crude materialism and their failure to grasp dialectical development'. But the traditional problems of ethical philosophy are falsely distorted into a reflection of the struggle between materialism and idealism, determinism and free-will, in which Shishkin is obviously at home, and the equally important question of the nature and status of ethical propositions is never seriously considered.

admits the occurrence of absolutely true 'commonplaces' or 'platitudes'. It becomes quite clear that Engels' relativism is fraudulent; he is not denying the existence of facts, of absolutely true propositions at all, but simply asserting the growth of error as we move from 'simple facts' to 'complicated theories'. The relation between such 'facts' and 'theories', and how to distinguish between them, is not worked out at all. In fact, what Engels is really saying is that men are more prone to error in general statements than in particular ones, and in social and historical fields than in 'scientific' fields. This, far from implying the relativity of all truth, requires the recognition of absolute truth, of a positive and definite distinction between truth and error. Thus, when Engels writes in *Anti-Dühring* that 'the knowledge which has unconditional claim to truth is realised in a series of relative errors . . . through an endless eternity of human existence', it is clear that the word 'relative' has no meaning here and should simply be dropped. The movement described by Engels is not a movement from relative to absolute truth, but a quantitative movement from the knowledge of some facts to the knowledge of more facts. If all knowledge were in fact 'relative' there would be no movement at all, and true beliefs would be indistinguishable from error.

IT is in the field of moral judgments, of course, that the relativism proclaimed by Engels carries most initial plausibility. But this is not because truth is relative, but because there has been considerable disagreement about the precise content and meaning of moral terms. If moral terms had in fact no empirical content, then there would indeed be no moral truths; but Engels neither denies that moral judgments can have empirical content nor examines what that content might be. While Marxist writers have occasionally fallen back on Engels' relativism, and never challenged the sincerity of Marx's 'approval' of the manuscript of *Anti-Dühring*, no-one who has studied Marx's work seriously can for one moment imagine Marx himself capable of expressing, or of subscribing to, such crudities.

More influential, somewhat more intellectually respectable, and much more obviously in accord with one strain in Marx's own writing and thinking is the rejection of 'abstract' moral evaluation of actions, ways of life, and institutions 'in themselves'. The value of these, Marx often seems to be saying, lies not in themselves, but in the role they play in history; they are not good or bad, but progressive or reactionary, 'of the future' or 'of the past', doing the work of history or frustrating it. There is no point in judging in isolation, especially when the path of history is not one of slow steady improvement, but one of inevitable conflicts, necessary miseries, and later resolutions. 'Reason,' Hegel had said in one of the most famous passages in his *Encyclopedia*, is as cunning as it is powerful. Cunning may be said to lie in the inter-mediative action, which, while it permits the objects to follow their own bent and act upon one another till they waste away, and does not itself directly interfere in this process, is nevertheless only working out the execution of its aims. With this explanation, Divine Providence may be said to stand to the world and its process in the capacity of absolute cunning. God lets men direct their particular passions and interests as they please; but the result is the accomplishment of—not their plans, but His, and these differ decidedly from the ends primarily sought by those whom He employs' (Wallace transl., Section 209).

Marx, too, emphasised this disparity between the moral character of men's actions and intensions and the results that inevitably followed from them. The exploitation of slaves made inevitable the agricultural development of feudalism; the greed of the capitalist merchant built industrialism, opened up the world and toppled ancient despotisms; the increasing misery of the proletarian was the indispensable precondition of the rational society of the future. In the face of the ethical qualities of the end, the ethical qualities of the preceding stages, if they could be spoken of at all, were irrelevant. If history proceeds inevitably towards the truly rational, then indeed one can say with Hegel *Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht*.

For the Communist Party, as 'the party of history', the principle was of inestimable value in imposing iron discipline and unquestioning obedience in a period of militant struggle

accompanied by constantly shifting tactics. Reinforced by Marxist essentialism, by the conception that each stage of history requires the solution of a dominant 'task', the victory of the proletariat under the leadership of the Communist Party became the only relevant moral criterion in the period of struggle under capitalism. (Stealing from capitalist employers used to be denounced in party catechisms on the simple ground that it would discredit the party in the eyes of the public.) Lenin, claiming that there is no shred of ethics in Marxism from beginning to end, repeatedly emphasised the moral primacy of proletarian victory. Trotsky, in his *Their Morals and Ours*, took the same line. A gun in itself is neither good nor evil; it becomes good in the hands of a proletarian fighting for the classless society and evil in the hands of a capitalist fighting for oppression and exploitation. At the same time, within the party and within the Soviet Union the principle could always be used to justify those who actually gained and kept power. History was on their side. It is this which plants the first seeds of doubt in the mind of the anti-Stalinist Rubashov sitting in his prison cell in *Darkness at Noon*; within Marxism he can find no answer.

MARX'S rejection of 'abstract' moral evaluation, then, gains much of its force from his teleologism and his belief in the inevitable unfolding of a historical plan. But, if one takes him to be eschewing a thoroughgoing reductionism, he is able to reinforce this rejection by his economic interpretation of moral codes, and his recognition of class conflict. His position can be gathered best from a critical reading of the *German Ideology*. He is there quite patently taking moral judgments to be the assertion of a common social interest or demand. The existence of private property creates social classes which can only satisfy their demands at each other's expense; in the class society, therefore, there can be no truly common social demand or interest. The various historical moralities are thus fraudulent: they present the specific, sectional demands of one or other of the existing classes in the *guise* of universality in order to gain or maintain dominance and support. (On a thoroughgoing economic reductionism, of course, Marx could never show why anyone possessing economic control should need the support of moral pressure or illusion, or how the illusion of a common interest could arise; but then Marx's economic reductionism was never thoroughgoing.) 'Each new class which puts itself in the place of the one ruling before it,' he and Engels write,[4] 'is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aims, to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of the society, put in an ideal form; it will give its ideas the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones. . . . The class making a revolution appears from the very start, merely because it is opposed to a class, not as a class but as the representative of the whole society; it appears as the whole mass of society confronting the one ruling class. It can do this because, to start with, its interest really is more connected with the common interest of all other non-ruling classes, because under the pressure of conditions its interest has not yet been able to develop as the particular interest of a particular class.'

The situation they describe here, Marx and Engels assume, provides evidence for their belief that history does display a moral advance towards true universality. After describing how the victory of the French bourgeoisie over the aristocracy enabled many proletarians to raise themselves into the ranks of the bourgeoisie, they conclude: 'Every new class, therefore, achieves its hegemony only on a broader basis than that of the class ruling previously'. (While Marx and Engels certainly provide insufficient evidence for this claim and no reason that would sufficiently explain it if it was true, the increasing generality of moral —and legal—ideas and the increasing emphasis on a universalising trend in moral theory certainly suggest an extremely interesting field of study.)

Here, then, we do have a view which seems at first sight able to provide a systematic basis for much of Marx's view on morality. The 'abstract' moralities of the past represent either sectional interests or a purely illusory

[4] *The German Ideology (Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe,* Abt. I, Bd. 5, p. 37).

common interest, or various compromises between the two. To the actual attainment of a common interest and its satisfaction they are irrelevant or positively hostile; the common interest will not be attained by moral proclamation, or even by moral living, but by the inevitable forces of history working in non-moral ways. But with the abolition of private property and the disappearance of classes, the common interest will cease to be an illusion, and morality, as the expression of that interest, come into full flower.

THIS, I think, is the most *systematic* position on 'morality' that can be carved out of the work of Marx. At his best, Marx was not a thoroughly systematic thinker, so that much of the most valuable ethical material in his work conflicts directly with this position. Still, it is as a systematic thinker that he has influenced subsequent Marxists; for them, this view of morality is the best that he has to give. It still leaves fundamental problems untouched; it says nothing about that vexed problem of traditional morality, the relation between private and public interests; if under communism the two coincide completely, it cannot explain why any form of morality should be necessary. It does not show how we arrive at the 'common interest' or how we can show its moral primacy without having a theory of moral obligation. What Soviet philosophers have actually done with the ethical and moral material in Marx, and to what extent they face these problems, I shall discuss in a subsequent article.

(*Mr. Kamenka's second article, 'Moral Theory in the Soviet Union', will appear in a future issue of SURVEY.*)

PORTRAIT OF A COLLABORATOR: OKTAN

A Page of Recent History

Alexander Dallin

THE Soviet citizens who collaborated with the Germans during the occupation in the second world war range in conviction from deeply democratic to thoroughly totalitarian. An unusual, and little-known, case was that of Mikhail Oktan.[1]

In January 1942 the German Second Panzer Army operating in the area of Orel in Central Russia, received a forty-page memorandum from 'Engineer M. A. Ilinich from Odessa', the man who was soon to adopt the pseudonym of Oktan.[2] Thanks to the propaganda company of Second Panzer, Oktan was promptly assigned to German-held Orel. There, under Mayor Stavrov—an old tsarist officer of pro-German sympathies but little determination or administrative experience—he managed to become in effect 'city boss' and local dictator.[3]

Beyond the fact that Mikhail Alexandrovich Ilinich came from Odessa, little of his background is known. Apparently he had gone to an engineering school (the Germans referred to him as 'Diplom-Ingenieur', not necessarily an accurate designation); some associates thought he had studied economics. He was young: one guess puts his age at 28 in 1941; another, at 35 in 1944. A newspaperman who knew him well during the war claims that 'formerly he must have been a [Communist] Party official of some importance,' such as a propagandist or secretary of a local party organisation. He was unquestionably a man of some intelligence and a smattering of knowledge. Persons who knew him report that in personal conduct he was vain, inordinately ambitious, unscrupulous, self-assured and stubborn, cowardly, undisciplined and vindictive, spending much of his time on liquor and women, or both.

It seems that, in the late summer of 1941, while serving as a captain in the Red Army, Oktan was cut off behind the German lines in the vicinity of Orel. Thanks to his knowledge of German, his self-assurance, and his ability to impress others, he found himself in a position to submit the memorandum to the Germans. Unfortunately this document is not available. A secondary account reveals that it dealt with the anti-Soviet potential of the Russian people; the necessity of countering Soviet propaganda; the need to appeal to peasants, workers, and soldiers in the Soviet Union with effective slogans; and the organisation of 'resistance' on the Soviet side of the front lines. In conclusion, Oktan (obviously having himself in mind for a key position) urged that ex-Soviet citizens be entrusted with the central direction of such efforts.

In February 1942, probably as a direct consequence of this proposal, the first of Oktan's pamphlets appeared. It was entitled 'Is this a "patriotic war" for the Soviet peoples?' in an attempt to counter Moscow's national propaganda.[4] By then he had become editor of the Orel newspaper, *Rech*, which became his mouthpiece and was one of the best-known publications on occupied Soviet soil. From then until the end of the occupation, Oktan was a leading collaborator.

WHAT was Oktan like? Another prominent collaborator, who considered him 'an accomplished rascal', thought that he had a streak of the idealist in him, 'but his soul remains a mystery'. Others were less charitable, considering him an opportunist, an adventurer, a demagogue, 'a classic model of

[1] The author is grateful to the Project on the Soviet Social System, Russian Research Center, Harvard University, for the opportunity to conduct interviews with some Soviet refugees who knew Oktan personally. Thanks are also due to Mr Boris Nicolaevsky for making available two valuable publications to this writer.

[2] It has been surmised that the name was simply a contraction of *Odesskii Kapitan* (captain from Odessa).

[3] Administratively Orel had its own German commandant and was not directly subject to the Second Panzer Army. In 1942 the city administration apparently enjoyed some genuine autonomy.

[4] Mikhail Oktan, *Iavliaetsia li eta voina otechestvennoi dlia naradov Rossii?* (Orel, February 1942). The same pamphlet was republished in 100,000 copies by the Smolensk newspaper, *Novy put* (actually printed in Minsk).

the political intriguer'. He 'skilfully combined the qualities of a German officer, an Odessa tradesman, and a clever lickspittle'. Quite clearly, he envisaged himself as a candidate for the Russian Führer. One former associate describes him as consciously imitating Hitler's appearance and gestures. Several others speak of his love for medals and decorations, which the Germans bestowed upon him as generously as the rules allowed. He wore the black uniform of a first lieutenant of the German Panzer troops—without considering this to be inconsistent with his ambition to be a Russian national leader.

A young Russian in the uniform of a German corporal was Oktan's personal valet. He was also his master's 'treasurer' (Oktan would never 'stoop' to making personal payments) and would make a big show of extracting the needed amount from a heavily-stuffed field-bag. Oktan's adjutant was a Russian officer in captain's rank. All this was calculated to produce the desired effect—and often did. But much of the effect was cancelled by Oktan's style of living.

> He was a habitual drunkard [reports the wartime chief of police of Mogilev]. In spite of this he managed to dictate his editorials, often in a state of total intoxication.
> When I was in Orel in 1943 [a young soldier recalls], I went to the *Rech* office. Oktan came out drunk, in a black German Panzer uniform, a thick man with an intelligent face, tall, energetic, wearing a few German medals. All seven men in the office were drunk.

What Oktan himself thought will perhaps never be known. A clever demagogue, he was at the same time the nearest to a 'successful' Russian fascist among the publicists which the younger generation produced under the occupation. Some of his utterances and actions betrayed utter hypocrisy. He had Tolstoy's *War and Peace* removed from the Orel public library as a dangerous book because (he apparently hoped to impress the Germans) comparisons with 1812 might undermine morale and faith in the German cause.[5] He would insist that 'These days we don't need Pushkin and Lermontov. I recommend that every Russian have a copy of Dostoevsky's *Possessed* on his desk'. While there was surely an element of delight in shocking others by this suggestion, *The Possessed* does convey some of the reactionary flavour of Oktan's outlook—which, once again, he did not feel to be compromised by, or incompatible with, his wholehearted collaboration with the Germans.

A fellow-editor considered Oktan's to be the most anti-Semitic of all the Russian papers published under the Germans, 'whereby he repelled the better people and attracted the worst. Others just used the requisite anti-Semitic terminology. Not he. In his public speeches in Orel he was shameless. He would loudly wail that the Jews had seized the world's gold, while he himself would have heavy gold rings and bracelets on his hands'.

His writings suggest that he identified himself fully with National-Socialism. Yet, while Moscow wanted communism for Germany, he wrote, Germany was not forcing its system on Russia; it would permit the restoration of land, customs, and religion. Every genuine patriot should therefore help Germany 'restore a normal life' in Russia. His writings also reflected Great Russian chauvinism; in addition to Jews, he attacked 'moral degenerates' such as Armenians (Mikoyan) and Georgians (Stalin, Orjonikidze) in the communist élite. Beyond that, his political philosophy and programme seem to have no clear features.

OKTAN'S uninterrupted incumbency as editor of *Rech* indicated the complete confidence the Germans had in him. The army and propaganda authorities let him do pretty much as he wished.

More than most other leading collaborators, Oktan went out of his way to toe the Nazi line on the Jewish question. To him, as to the Nazis, Bolshevism was a tool in the service of the Jews who were striving for world rule; having failed in Russia, they were now trying to export Communism to the West. Such was the argument of his February 1942 brochure. In April *Rech* published another pamphlet of his, entitled 'Jews and Bolshevism'. Beginning with a motto from *Mein Kampf*, Oktan again sought to show that Bolshevism was part of a plan for world dominion by the Jews (whom he identified in racial terms, as did the Nazis). His

[5] A. Nikolin, 'V svete nedavnevo opyta', *Posev* (Limburg), 31 October 1948.

writing, peculiarly primitive, occasionally revealed some experience in propaganda and some acquaintance with history (however distorted). In one of his editorials, he wrote:

> . . . All that is still healthy in mankind is rising, arms in hand, for the struggle against the Jewish race and its hirelings who betray the interests of mankind. This war must protect future generations from self-destruction bred by the Jewish microbe. . . . The Jews have not yet paid the bill which the Russian people present them. It will be paid.[6]

> Mikhail Oktan [writes one newspaper man] was an example of the type of collaborator who overwhelmed his German superiors, who in effect let him do as he pleased.

> He expected to make a career under the Germans. I had an opportunity to observe him at his home [recalls a Cossack colonel]. His orientation was fully on the Germans. I did not know how sincere he was, but he used to tell us that it was not opportune to strive for independence from the Germans. Obviously they trusted him, unlike others.

Some of his authority with the Germans derived not only from his performance as writer and orator but also from his behaviour. He acted entirely 'independently', apparently feeling free to talk back to high army officers. He had easy access to Germans as high as the office of the army commander, from whom he generally returned 'fully satisfied', having got what he wanted.[7]

German confidence in Oktan was shown again when in the spring of 1943 their drive to form a Russian National Committee reached a point where nominations were in order. The official military government proposal forwarded to Field Marshal von Kluge urged the formation of a subcommittee consisting of six members: five heads of Russian regional administrative organs plus 'Editor Oktan, in Orel'.[8] The project collapsed when Hitler vetoed the political utilisation of former Soviet citizens.

Oktan was bound to clash with those defectors on the German side who likewise strove for a position of leadership in the anti-Stalin struggle. Of these, Bronislav Kaminsky, a minor warlord, was located in the same German command as Oktan. Oktan was obviously more gifted than Kaminsky, better trained in political affairs, more capable as an orator and journalist. The two were bound to be bitter enemies. A close associate relates that, when the conversation turned to Oktan, Kaminsky exclaimed, 'I shall hang Oktan if he ventures into my district'. Another informant asserts that despite his hostility, Kaminsky would have been willing to accept Oktan 'as his Goebbels'. But Oktan would never play second fiddle. When Kaminsky's political organisation expanded its work in 1944, Oktan barred its propagandists from 'his' area. The two men could not work together. But, unlike Kaminsky, Oktan had no military arm to rely on. He was a shrewder demagogue than the unsophisticated Kaminsky. Their styles, their personalities, their interests were too dissimilar—and their ambitions too much alike.

Oktan's independence was so great that he, perhaps alone among the leading young collaborators, remained immune to the influence of the one emigré party which the Germans permitted to operate semi-legally, the NTS, or Solidarists. Oktan's deputy, it is true, was recruited into NTS ranks, and thus may have influenced editorial policy accordingly. Oktan himself, however, would tolerate no 'outside influence' of any sort. In turn, the leader of the NTS, Viktor Baidalakov, told a wartime associate that 'Oktan deserves a noose around his neck'. Moreover, the NTS itself was jealous of any other man or group that might vie for Russian political leadership.

Towards the Vlasov movement, Oktan's attitude was more complex. Until 1944, when Andrei Vlasov emerged as a German-backed

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[6] *Rech*, no. 57, cited in *Novoe slovo* (Berlin, 1943), no. 46.

[7] B.A., 'Russkaia pechat pri nemtsakh', MS, 1950, p. 5. The personal files indicate that the Germans had equal confidence in several other members of his staff (Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg, personnel files, Document Occ E 41, YIVO Archives). They were likewise satisfied with the newspaper itself. No file of *Rech* has been located. Some excerpts are cited in other wartime publications. With an editorial staff of six or seven, it was the only paper of significance in the entire Orel *oblast*. Its top circulation of about 100,000 exceeded that of most other collaborator newspapers (Vladimir Samarin, 'Civilian Life under the German Occupation, 1942–44', New York, Research Program on the USSR, 1954, pp. 70–71).

[8] PzAOK 2, 1a, 'Vorschlag für die Errichtung eines russischen Unterkomitees in Orel', 3 June 1943.

leader, Oktan refused to recognise his ability or pretensions. On the contrary, he was hostile to known Vlasov sympathisers and would periodically forbid the spreading of 'Vlasovite ideas' in the Orel area, where he claimed to have a monopoly of political direction-giving. He considered Vlasov a weakling, in whose place (he told a friend) *he* would have established a five-million-man anti-Soviet army long since. Nevertheless in 1943–44, when the so-called Russian Army of Liberation (ROA) was established as an administrative roof for various collaborator units, nominally under Vlasov (though in fact involving no responsibility or command authority by him), Oktan was made a first lieutenant of the ROA—probably at the insistence of his German superiors. Until then he carefully kept a free hand, accepting co-operation from the Germans only. On several occasions he tried to gain authority among prisoners of war in camps close to his own domain, but failed. Likewise, he promised to make contact with Red partisan leaders to induce them to defect, but in vain. Until he left Orel—and for some time thereafter—Oktan considered himself the complete master of his appanage, truly by the grace of the Germans a self-styled Russian *Gauleiter*.

IN the summer of 1943, the Soviet counter-offensive led to the recapture of Orel. In mid-July the editorial staff of *Rech*, along with other German and collaborator units, moved westward—first to Orjonikidzegrad, then to Bobruisk. Unlike Kaminsky, who was never able to operate effectively once he was out of his original locale, Oktan adjusted rapidly. Once again he made himself a local tyrant. In Bobruisk he was assigned a beautiful villa complete with an orchard. A staff of eight men 'represented' him in his efforts to extend his influence from the domain of words to that of organisation and administration: no longer was he satisfied with being a mere propagandist. With German consent he awarded prizes and decorations to artists, managers, and officials; he made gifts of foreign dresses to local actresses, financed new orphanages, chess circles, inventors' reunions, and private economic enterprises. He continued his orgies at his new headquarters, yet carefully nurtured his prestige in the eyes of local 'society'.

Here is how a small reception at his home is described. Oktan has invited the director and deputy director of a local wood-working shop with their wives to dinner.

> Oktan receives his guests in a tastefully-furnished living room. His officers stand at attention along the walls. Oktan makes the acquaintance of his guests, introduces his aides, and invites all to table. The guests are offered cigarettes. The six officers, by 'etiquette', immediately reach for their lighters but do not approach the guests. Oktan himself gets some matches from his pocket and offers the guests a light—a little detail which does not fail to impress the guests. Vodka and hors d'oeuvres appear on the table. Oktan does not discuss politics, preferring to talk literature with the Bobruisk 'intelligentsia'. An invited guitarist meanwhile strums away. When the guests finally leave, they have won the impression that here is a man more substantial than the German commandant at their plant. Oktan is to be feared, respected, and listened to.

All this was bound to nurture Oktan's dream: the organisation of a party or league that he would direct in dictatorial fashion. By the spring of 1944 several indigenous organs had emerged in Belorussia, without formal sanction—e.g., the Belorussian National Council, and Kaminsky's Russian National-Socialist Party—all of them futile efforts to rally popular forces and stem the Soviet tide, at a time when the bulk of the population had irrevocably turned against the invaders. In this broad canvas Oktan had his little corner, which he assiduously strove to enlarge.

Elaborate preparations—including printing of membership cards and leaflets, production of lapel insignia and banners, and preparatory speeches over Bobruisk radio—preceded the launching of his 'movement'. With the consent of the Ninth Army (which had assumed jurisdiction over the area) a 'grand rally' was told on 7 March 1944 of the establishment of the 'Union for the Struggle against Bolshevism'.[9] The 2,000 workers, officials, and collaborator

[9] Heeresgruppe Mitte/O.Qu./Qu2/VII, 'Monatsbericht für März 1944', 12 April 1944.

troops who attended heard Oktan make an inflammatory speech 'in the image of Hitler'. The presence of German officials and Oktan's award of some tokens and decorations to local shop managers seemed to support the view that Oktan had been given authority by the Germans to do as he pleased.

This opening was soon followed by recruiting trips to other towns of the province, such as Borisov, Rogachov, and Krichev—areas increasingly controlled by Soviet partisans. In mid-April, when he was allowed to 'organise' in Western Belorussia as well, a German report confirmed that in some localities

> in addition to the local auxiliary police units (*Ordnungsdienst*) the entire personnel of economic enterprises joined the Union. . . . The emphasis of the Union's work is on galvanising the population in the struggle against Bolshevism. Concrete promises of a political or ideological sort are consciously being avoided.

To the Germans, the avoidance of specific political content was vital. There is no evidence that Oktan objected. To the local residents, such an obvious gap notwithstanding, the German support given this 'native' movement was in itself a new departure. The Germans reported that by May the Union had 12,000 members in the area of the Ninth Army alone. The top membership figure—probably vastly inflated—is reported at about 75,000 in June 1944. The Germans, then short of victory news, were so elated that in mid-May the domestic press was allowed to carry a dispatch about the founding of the Union, which, it claimed, citizens 'from all strata of the population' were joining, 'almost to a man . . .'.

Circumventing the German ban on political promises, Oktan made use of the German plans to re-establish private farmsteads in Russia: he promised land in return for support of his Union. This proved to be a more powerful appeal than any other, in spite of its late date. Many, it is true, joined because they were already irrevocably committed to the German side and had nothing to lose. Others were enlisted 'wholesale' at their place of employment and without personal choice. Still others joined out of fear of Oktan, who implied that not joining was tantamount to tacit support of the Soviet cause.

While its membership rosters swelled, the Union's activity was virtually nil. To all intents and purposes the German occupation was over. In June 1944 the Red Army launched a new offensive which took it, within six weeks, across all of Belorussia well into Poland. The Union was thus bound to collapse. Yet before the end came, Oktan's doings left an indelible mark on his reputation among residents and refugees alike. As they were increasingly hard-pressed and anxious to rescue what they could, the Germans made a variety of demands on him. On only one subject did Oktan take a firm stand: he would not make his Union an anti-partisan combat force—something which would indeed have been folly. Given the authoritarian structure of the Union, however, Oktan was able to carry out a number of other 'drives' which benefited the Germans only. These included requisition of foodstuffs; draft of Union members for 'voluntary' extra work on week-ends to dig trenches, collect fuel, or load cargo; and mobilisation of peasants with horse-drawn carts to transport German army supplies in partisan-infested areas. To decline Oktan's demands was tantamount to admitting complicity with the 'Reds'. Soon forced labour assumed more overt forms, and during the last month of their stay—June 1944—the Germans could report that the use of Oktan's Union 'for the conscription of labour forces for the Reich [was] entirely satisfactory and speaks for a further employment of the Union'.[10]

One other 'line of activity' stemmed from the belated establishment, in Minsk and Borisov, of a 'Russian Youth Movement'.

> At the same time [a German report put it succinctly] a Russian youth centre was opened at Bobruisk in the framework of the Union for Struggle against Bolshevism. This centre will be put under the jurisdiction of the indigenous youth inspector of the Army Group. . . .[11]

This organisation facilitated the German recruitment of 'air-force helpers'—boys and girls

[10] Heeresgruppe Mitte, HeWiFue, Ia, 'Monatlicher Bericht', 24 August 1944.

[11] Heeresgruppe Mitte, Ia, 'Abschlussbericht', 27 August 1944 (Nuremberg Military Tribunal, Document NO-2545).

sent off to Germany as auxiliaries for the armed forces; and, more dramatically, the removal of children ten to fourteen years of age. Apparently part of the operation, known under the code name of 'Heuaktion',[12] the separation of children from their parents, initially led to concentration in special training camps, where Oktan declared he took personal responsibility for their welfare. But step by step all pretences were dropped. In the panic of retreat, the children were left stranded, often without identification, addresses, or even photographs of their parents. Some of the camps were evacuated while the parents remained behind on Soviet soil.

ONCE he had launched his Union, Oktan sought to contact other collaborators from a 'position of strength'. He flew to Berlin in a vain effort to promote a Union of Writers and Journalists among Soviet defectors. The consensus of opinion is that this idea, like the Union, was meant to be a move to checkmate the Vlasov effort. Oktan did get himself publicised sufficiently to be invited to the International Anti-Jewish Congress being staged by Rosenberg's propaganda arm. He was to be one of the five ex-Soviet participants. Actually the congress never took place because of the Soviet advance.

Partly at German insistence, Oktan also sought contacts with the Belorussian separatists. This effort was meaningless except as it indicates how servile he had remained: most other 'patriotic' collaborators among the Great Russians refused to have any truck with the leaders of the Belorussian and Ukrainian separatist movements. Not so Oktan, who somehow managed to reconcile such tactics with his Russian chauvinism and admiration for Dostoevsky, in good dialectical fashion.

Oktan continued his peculiar way of life to the last days: busy outside in daytime, and drunken parties in his villa until late into the night. Now a German guard stood outside his home—at his own request, he explained. He continued to feign optimism about the war's outcome but was circumspect enough to take over control of the 'treasury' from his valet—especially since the managers of enterprises in his area made monthly deposits on his account (in a German bank branch in Bobruisk) for purposes of 'party work'.

When the Soviet attack came, Oktan fled, abandoning his Union, his men, and the children he had pledged himself to protect. The Union fell apart, with the records and membership lists burned by some of the remaining activists out of fear that the returning Soviets would punish them. Some of Oktan's aides are known to have been captured by the Red Army and were reported to have been shot. Oktan left Bobruisk alone. He was seen in Warsaw on his way to the west; several informants encountered him in Berlin in the winter of 1944–45. Apparently he tried to see Vlasov, who had now received last-minute blessings from the Nazi élite, but no interview took place. Oktan was allegedly indignant about the lack of respect from Vlasov's aides; he was prepared to 'cede' his Union's 70,000 members to Vlasov in return for a commensurate post for himself. Yet even in the dreamland of the Vlasov staff (General Zhilenkov handled the dealings with Oktan), these Dead Souls were turned down, as was Oktan himself.

There is no information about his whereabouts after March 1945. Rumours persist that he was seen in Frankfurt in 1947 under an assumed name. No more recent trace has been found.

Few collaborators were so roundly and unanimously condemned as was Oktan. 'A talented scoundrel and adventurer', 'an utter rascal', a 'servile and clever fanatic': these are some of the comments from men who knew him. There were rumours that he was a Soviet agent (as there were about most emigré leaders), but there is no reason to believe them. It remains true that many felt that his behaviour objectively helped the Soviet cause; a ditty current in Minsk identified his name as the initials of *Osoby Komissar v Tylu Armii Nepriatelia*, i.e., Special Commissar Behind the Enemy Army's Lines.

The Soviet era had by 1941 failed to produce a new 'Soviet man', but even among the unscrupulous operators, Oktan remained a rather exceptional case.

[12] There is ample documentation on the over-all aspects of 'Heuaktion' in the Nuremberg trials.

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